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THE
WORKS

OF

Dr. Jonathan Swift,

Dean of St. PATRICK's, Dublin.

VOLUME IX.

L O N D O N,

Printed for T. OSBORNE, W. BOWYER, C. BATHURST,
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O F

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THE
PUBLIC SPIRIT
OF THE
WHIGS,

Set forth in their generous Encouragement
of the Author of The CRISIS.

WITH

Some Observations on the Seasonableness, Candour, Erudition, and Style of that Treatise.

VOL. IX.

B

Upon the first publication of this pamphlet, all the Scotch Lords, then in London, went in a body, and complained to Queen ANNE of the affront put on them and their nation by the author of this Treatise. Whereupon a proclamation was published by her Majesty, offering a reward of three hundred pounds to discover him. The reason for offering so small a sum was, that the Queen and Ministry had no desire to have the author taken into custody.

T H E

T H E
P U B L I C S P I R I T
O F T H E
W H I G S [a].

I Cannot without some envy, and a just resentment against the opposite conduct of others, reflect upon that generosity and tenderness, where-with the heads and principal members of a struggling faction treat those who will undertake to hold a pen in their defence. And the behaviour of these patrons is yet the more laudable, because the benefits they confer are almost *gratis*. If any of their labourers can scratch out a pamphlet, they desire no more; there is no question offered about

[a] It was written in the year 1712, by the consent, if not the encouragement, of the ministers of that æra, in answer to the Crisis by Sir *Richard Steele*. ORRERY.

The noble commentator, who appears in another instance to have given an account of the works of his author, from a perusal of no more than a title * in the *Dublin* editions, has been betrayed into mistakes, which, if he had read the piece, he would have escaped. This tract, in the title which his lordship consulted, is said to have been written in the year 1712: but in that part of it which most deserves the notice of a critic, because it occasioned the complaint in the House of Lords, mention is made of a motion to dissolve the Union, which did not happen till 1713. The complaint, which is said in the note to happen upon the *first* publication, was made the 2d of *March* 1713-14, and the pamphlet, according to the custom of printers, was dated 1714.

* See *Voyage to Brobdingnag*, Chap. VI.

the wit, the style, the argument. Let a pamphlet come out upon demand in a proper juncture, you shall be well and certainly paid; you shall be paid before-hand; every one of the party, who is able to read, and can spare a shilling, shall be a subscriber; several thousands of each production shall be sent among their friends through the kingdom; the work shall be reported admirable, sublime, unanswerable; shall serve to raise the sinking clamours, and confirm the scandal of introducing popery and the pretender upon the QUEEN and her ministers.

Among the present writers on that side I can recollect but three of any great distinction, which are the *Flying-post*, Mr. *Dunton*, and the author of *The Crisis* [b]. The first of these seems to have been much sunk in reputation, since the sudden retreat of the *only true genuine original author*, Mr. *Ridpath*, who is celebrated by the *Dutch gazetteer* as *one of the best pens in England*. Mr. *Dunton* hath been longer and more conversant in books than any of the three, as well as more voluminous in his productions: however, having employed his studies in so great a variety of other subjects, he hath, I think, but lately turned his genius to politicks. His famous tract, intituled *Neck or nothing*, must be allowed to be the shrewdest piece, and written with the most spirit of any, which hath appeared

[b] Mr. *Steele* was expelled the House of Commons for this pamphlet, at the very same time that the House moved against the Dean for the Reply.

from that side since the change of the ministry : it is indeed a most cutting satire upon the lord treasurer and lord *Bolingbroke* ; and I wonder none of our friends ever undertook to answer it. I confess, I was at first of the same opinion with several good judges, who, from the style and manner, suppose it to have issued from the sharp pen of the earl of *Nottingham* ; and I am still apt to think it might receive his lordship's last hand. The third and principal of this triumvirate is the author of *The Crisis* ; who, although he must yield to the *Flying-post* in knowledge of the world and skill in politics, and to Mr. *Dunton* in keenness of satire and variety of reading, hath yet other qualities enough to denominate him a writer of a superior class to either ; provided he would a little regard the propriety and disposition of his words, consult the grammatical part, and get some information in the subject he intends to handle.

Omitting the generous countenance and encouragement that have been shewn to the persons and productions of the two former authors, I shall here only consider the great favour conferred upon the last. It hath been advertised for several months in *The Englishman* [c], and others papers, that a pamphlet, called *The Crisis*, should be published at a proper time, in order to open the eyes of the nation. It was proposed to be printed by subscription, price a shilling. This was a little out of

[c] A paper written by the same author, in favour of the preceding administration.

form ; because subscriptions are usually begged only for books of great price, and such as are not likely to have a general sale. Notice was likewise given of what this pamphlet should contain ; only an extract from certain acts of parliament relating to the succession, which at least must sink nine-pence in the shilling, and leave but three-pence for the author's political reflexions ; so that nothing very wonderful or decisive could be reasonably expected from this performance. But, a work was to be done, a hearty writer to be encouraged, and accordingly many thousand copies were bespoke. Neither could this be sufficient ; for when we expected to have our bundles delivered us, all was stopt ; the friends to the cause sprang a new project ; and it was advertised that *The Crisis* could not appear, till the ladies had shewn their zeal against the *pretender*, as well as the men ; against the *pretender* in the bloom of his youth, reported to be handsome, and endued with an understanding exactly of a size to please the sex. I should be glad to have seen a printed list of the fair subscribers prefixed to this pamphlet ; by which the *chevalier* might know, he was so far from *pretending* to a monarchy here, that he could not so much as *pretend* to a mistress.

At the destined period, the first news we hear, is of a huge train of dukes, earls, viscounts, barons, knights, esquires, gentlemen, and others, going to *Sam. Buckley's*, the publisher of *The Crisis*, to fetch home their cargoes, in order to transmit them by
dozens,

dozens, scores, and hundreds, into the several counties, and thereby to prepare the wills and understandings of their friends against the approaching sessions. Ask any of them, whether they have read it? they will answer no; but they have sent it every where, and it will do a world of good. It is a pamphlet, and a pamphlet they hear against the ministry; talks of slavery, *France*, and the *pretender*: they desire no more; it will settle the wavering, confirm the doubtful, instruct the ignorant, inflame the clamorous, although it never be once looked into. I am told by those who are expert in the trade, that the author and bookseller of this twelve-penny treatise will be greater gainers, than from one edition of any folio that hath been published these twenty years. What needy writer would not solicit to work under such masters, who will pay us before hand, take off as much of our ware as we please at our own rates, and trouble not themselves to examine, either before or after they have bought it, whether it be staple or no?

But, in order to illustrate the implicit munificence of those noble patrons, I cannot take a more effectual method than by examining the production itself; by which we shall easily find that it was never intended, further than from the noise, the bulk, and the title of *Crisis*, to do any service to the factious cause. The entire piece consists of a title-page, a dedication to the clergy, a preface,

an extract from certain acts of parliament, and about ten pages of dry reflections on the proceedings of the QUEEN and her servants; which his coadjutors, the earl of *Nottingham*, Mr. *Dunton*, and the *flying-post*, had long ago set before us in a much clearer light.

In popish countries, when some impostor cries out, *A miracle! a miracle!* it is not done with a hope or intention of converting hereticks, but confirming the deluded vulgar in their errors; and so the cry goes round, without examining into the cheat. Thus the *whigs* among us give about a cry, *A pamphlet! a pamphlet! the Crisis! the Crisis!* not with a view of convincing their adversaries, but to raise the spirits of their friends, recall their stragglers, and unite their numbers by sound and impudence; as bees assemble and cling together by the noise of brass.

That no other effect could be imagined or hoped by the publication of this timely treatise, will be manifest from some obvious reflections upon the several parts of it; wherein the follies, the falsehoods, or the absurdities, appear so frequent, that they may boldly contend for number with the lines.

When the hawker holds this pamphlet towards you, the first words you perceive are, *The Crisis*; or, *A discourse*, &c. The interpreter of *Suidas* gives four translations of the word *Crisis*; any of which may be as properly applied to this author's letter

ter to the *bailiff* of *Stockbridge* [d]. Next, what he calls a *discourse*, consists only of two pages, prefixed to twenty-two more, which contain extracts from acts of parliament; for as to the twelve last pages, they are provided for by themselves in the title under the name of *Some seasonable remarks on the danger of a popish successor*. Another circumstance worthy of our information in the title-page is, that the crown hath been settled by *previous acts*. I never heard of any act of parliament that was not previous to what it enacted, unless those two, by which the earl of *Strafford* and Sir *John Fenwick* lost their heads, may pass for exceptions. *A discourse, representing from the most authentic records, &c.* He hath borrowed this expression from some writer, who probably understood the words; but this gentleman hath altogether misapplied them; and, under favour, he is wholly mistaken; for a heap of extracts from several acts of parliament cannot be called a discourse; neither do I believe he copied them from the most authentic records, which, as I take it, are lodged in the *Tower*, but out of some printed copy. I grant there is nothing material in all this, further than to shew the generosity of our adversaries in encouraging a writer, who cannot furnish out so much as a title-page with propriety or common sense.

[d] *Steele* addressed a letter to the *bailiff* of *Stockbridge*, who appears to have been returning officer for this borough, which *Steele* represented in parliament.

Next follows the dedication to the clergy of the church of *England*, wherein the modesty and the meaning of the first paragraphs are hardly to be matched. He tells them, he hath made a *comment upon the acts of settlement*, which he *lays before them*, and *conjures them to recommend in their writings and discourses to their fellow-subjects*: and he doth all this, *out of a just deference to their great power and influence*. This is the right whig scheme of directing the clergy what to preach. The archbishop of *Canterbury's* jurisdiction extends no farther than over his own province; but the author of *the crisis* constitutes himself vicar-general over the whole clergy of the church of *England*. The bishops in their letters or speeches to their own clergy proceed no further than to *exhortation*; but this writer *conjures* the whole clergy of the church to *recommend his comment upon the laws of the land, in their writings and discourses*. I would fain know, who made him a *commentator upon the laws of the land*: after which it will be time enough to ask him, by what authority he directs the clergy to *recommend his comments* from the pulpit or the press?

He tells the clergy *there are two circumstances which place the minds of the people under their direction*; the first circumstance is their education; the second circumstance is the tenths of our lands. This last, according to the *Latin* phrase, is spoken *ad invidiam*; for he knows well enough, they have not a twentieth: but if you take it in his own way,

way, the landlord has nine parts in ten of the people's minds under his direction. Upon this rock the author before us is perpetually splitting, as often as he ventures out beyond the narrow bounds of his literature. He hath a confused remembrance of words since he left the university, but hath lost half their meaning, and puts them together with no regard, except to their cadence; as I remember a fellow nailed up maps in a gentleman's closet, some sideling, others upside down, the better to adjust them to the pannels.

I am sensible it is of little consequence to their cause, whether this defender of it understands grammar or no; and if what he would fain say, discovered him to be a well-wisher to reason or truth, I would be ready to make large allowances. But when, with great difficulty, I descry a composition of rancour and falshood intermixed with plausible nonsense, I feel a struggle between contempt and indignation at seeing the character of a *censor*, a *guardian*, an *Englishman*, a *commentator* on the *laws*, an *instructor* of the *clergy*, assumed by a child of obscurity, without one single qualification to support them.

This writer, who either affects, or is commanded, of late to copy after the bishop of *Sarum*, hath, out of the pregnancy of his invention, found out an old way of insinuating the grossest reflections under the appearance of admonitions; and is so judicious a follower of the prelate, that he taxes the clergy for *inflaming their people with apprehensions*

sions of danger to them and their constitution from men, who are innocent of such designs; when we must needs confess, the whole design of his pamphlet is to inflame the people with apprehensions of danger from the present ministry, whom we believe to be at least as innocent men as the last.

What shall I say to a pamphlet, where the malice and falshood of every line would require an answer, and where the dulness and absurdities will not deserve one?

By his pretending to have always maintained an inviolable respect to the clergy, he would insinuate, that those papers among the *Tatlers* and *Spectators*, where the whole order is abused, were not his own. I will appeal to all who know the flatness of his style, and the barrenness of his invention, whether he doth not grossly prevaricate? was he ever able to walk without leading-strings, or swim without bladders, without being discovered by his hobbling and his sinking? hath he adhered to his character in his paper called *The Englishman*, whereof he is allowed to be sole author without any competition? what does he think of the letter signed by himself, which relates to *Molesworth* [c],

[c] The right honourable *Robert Molesworth*, Esq; one of the privy council and member of the House of Commons, created a peer by king *George I.* The lower house of convocation there preferred a complaint against him for disrespectful words, which being represented in *England*, he was removed from the council: to justify him against this complaint was the subject of *Steele's* letter.

in whose defence he affronts the whole convocation of *Ireland*?

It is a wise maxim, that because the clergy are no civil lawyers, they ought not to preach obedience to governors; and therefore they ought not to preach temperance, because they are no physicians. Examine all this author's writings, and then point me out a divine who knoweth less of the constitution of *England* than he; witness those many egregious blunders in his late papers, where he pretended to dabble in the subject.

But the clergy have, it seems, imbibed their notions of power and obedience, abhorrent from our laws, *from the pompous ideas of imperial greatness and the submission to absolute emperors.* This is gross ignorance, below a school-boy in his *Lucius Florus*. The *Roman History*, wherein lads are instructed, reacheth little above eight hundred years, and the authors do every where instil republican principles; and, from the account of nine in twelve of the first emperors, we learn to have a detestation against tyranny. The *Greeks* carry this point yet a great deal higher, which none can be ignorant of, who hath read or heard them quoted. This gave *Hobbes* the occasion of advancing a position directly contrary; that the youth of *England* were corrupted in their political principles, by reading the histories of *Rome* and *Greece*, which, having been written under republics, taught the readers to have ill notions of monarchy. In this assertion there was something

something specious, but that advanced by *The Crisis* could only issue from the profoundest ignorance.

But, would you know his scheme of education for young gentlemen at the university? it is, that they should spend their time in perusing those acts of parliament, whereof his pamphlet is an extract, which *if it had been done, the kingdom would not be in its present condition, but every member sent into the world thus instructed, since the Revolution, would have been an advocate for our rights and liberties.*

Here now is a project for getting more money by *the crisis*; to have it read by tutors in the universities. I thoroughly agree with him, that, if our students had been thus employed for twenty years past, *the kingdom had not been in its present condition*: but we have too many of such proficient already among the young nobility and gentry, who have gathered up their politicks from chocolate-houses, and factious clubs, and who, if they had spent their time in hard study at *Oxford* or *Cambridge*, we might indeed have said, that the factious part of this kingdom *had not been in its present condition*, or have suffered themselves to be taught, that a few acts of parliament relating to the succession are preferable to all other *civil institutions* whatsoever. Neither did I ever before hear, that an act of parliament relating to one particular point could be called a civil institution.

He spends almost a quarto page in telling the clergy, that they will be certainly perjured if they bring in the *pretender*, whom they have abjured;
and

and he wisely reminds them, that they have sworn without equivocation or mental reservation; otherwise the clergy might think, as soon as they received the *pretender*, and turned *papists*, they would be free from their oath.

This honest, civil, ingenious gentleman knows in his conscience, that there are not ten clergymen in *England* (except nonjurors) who do not abhor the thoughts of the *pretender* reigning over us, much more than himself. But this is the spittle of the bishop of *Sarum* [*f*], which our author licks up, and swallows, and then coughs out again with an addition of his own phlegm. I would fain suppose the body of the clergy were to return an answer by one of their members to these worthy counsellors; I conceive it might be in the following terms:

“ *My lord and gentleman,*

“ The clergy command me to give you thanks
 “ for your advice; and if they knew any crimes,
 “ from which either of you were as free, as they
 “ are from those which you so earnestly exhort
 “ them to avoid, they would return your favour
 “ as near as possible in the same style and manner.
 “ However, that your advice may not be wholly
 “ lost, particularly that part of it which relates to
 “ the *pretender*, they desire you would apply it to
 “ more proper persons. Look among your own

[*f*] Dr. Gilbert Burnet.

“ leaders ; examine which of them engaged in a
 “ plot to restore the late king *James*, and received
 “ pardons under his seal ; examine which of them
 “ have been since tampering with his pretended
 “ son, and to gratify their ambition, their avarice,
 “ their malice and revenge, are now willing to re-
 “ store him at the expence of the religion and li-
 “ berty of their country. Retire, good my lord,
 “ with your pupil, and let us hear no more of
 “ these hypocritical insinuations, lest the QUEEN
 “ and ministers, who have been hitherto content
 “ with only *disappointing* the lurking villainies of
 “ your faction, may be at last provoked to *ex-*
 “ *pose* them.”

But his respect for the clergy is such, that he doth not insinuate as if they really had these evil dispositions ; he only *insinuates*, that they give *too much cause* for such *insinuations*.

I will, upon occasion, strip some of his *insinua-*
tions from their generality and solecisms, and drag them into the light. His dedication to the clergy is full of them, because here he endeavours to mould up his rancour and civility together ; by which constraint he is obliged to shorten his paragraphs, and to place them in such a light, that they obscure one another. Supposing, therefore, that I have scraped off his good manners in order to come at his meaning, which lies under ; he tells the clergy, that the favour of the QUEEN and her ministers is but a *colour of zeal towards them* ; that the
 people

people were deluded by a groundless cry of the church's danger at *Sacheverel's* trial; that the clergy, as they are *men of sense and honour*, ought to preach this truth to their several congregations; and let them know, that the true design of the present men in power, in that and all their proceedings since in favour of the church, was to bring in *popery, France, and the pretender*, and to enslave all *Europe*, contrary to the *laws of our country, the power of the legislature, the faith of nations, and the honour of God*.

I cannot see why the clergy, as *men of sense and men of honour* (for he appeals not to them as men of religion), should not be allowed to know when they are in danger, and be able to guess whence it comes, and who are their protectors. The design of their destruction indeed may have been projected in the dark; but when all was ripe, their enemies proceeded to so many overt-acts in the face of the nation, that it was obvious to the meanest people, who wanted no other motives to rouse them. On the other side, can this author, or the wisest of his faction, assign one single act of the present ministry any way tending towards bringing in the *pretender*, or to weaken the succession of the house of *Hanover*? Observe then the reasonableness of this gentleman's advice: the clergy, the gentry, and the common people, had the utmost apprehensions of danger to the church under the late ministry; yet then it was the greatest impiety to *inflame the people with any such apprehensions*. His

danger of a *popish* successor, from any steps of the present ministry, is an artificial calumny, raised and spread against the conviction of the inventors, pretended to be believed only by those, who abhor the constitution in church and state; an obdurate faction, who compass heaven and earth to restore themselves upon the ruin of their country; yet here our author *exhorts the clergy* to preach up his imaginary danger to their people, and disturb the public peace with his strained seditious comments.

But how comes this gracious licence to the clergy from the *whigs* to concern themselves with politicks of any sort, although it be only the glosses and comments of Mr. *Steele*? The speeches of the managers at *Sacheverel's* trial, particularly those of *Stanhope*, *Lechmere*, *King*, *Parker* [g], and some others, seemed to deliver a different doctrine. Nay, this very dedication complains of *some in holy orders, who have made the constitution of their country* (in which and the *coprick* Mr. *Steele* is equally skilled) *a very little part of their study, and yet made obedience and government the frequent subjects of their discourses*. This difficulty is easily solved; for by *politicks* they mean *obedience*. Mr. *Hoadley* [h], who is a champion for resistance, was never charged with meddling out of his function: *Hugh Peters*, and his brethren, in the times of usurpation, had

[g] These persons were created peers by king *George I.*

[h] Doctor *Benjamin Hoadley*, created bishop of *Bangor* by king *George I.* in 1715, translated to *Hereford* in 1721, to *Salisbury* in 1723, and to *Winchester* in 1734.

full liberty to preach up sedition and rebellion; and so here Mr. *Steele* issues out his licence to the clergy to preach up the *danger of a popish pretender*, in defiance of the QUEEN and her administration.

Every whiffler in a laced coat, who frequents the chocolate-house, and is able to spell the title of a pamphlet, shall talk of the constitution with as much plausibility as this very solemn writer; and, with as good a grace, blame the clergy for meddling with politicks, which they do no understand. I have known many of these able politicians furnished, before they were of age, with all the necessary topicks of their faction, and by the help of about twenty polysyllables capable of maintaining an argument, that would shine in *The Crisis*; whose author gathered up his little stock from the same schools, and hath written from no other fund.

But, after all, it is not clear to me, whether this gentleman addresseth himself to the clergy of *England* in general, or only to those very few (hardly enough, in case of a change, to supply the mortality of those *self-denying prelates* he celebrates) who are in his principles, and among these only such as live in and about *London*; which probably will reduce the number to about half a dozen at most. I should incline to guess the latter; because he tells them they *are surrounded by a learned, wealthy, knowing gentry, who know with what firmness, self-denial, and charity, the bishops adhered to the public cause, and what contumelies those clergymen*

have undergone, &c. who adhered to the cause of truth. By those terms, the public cause, and the cause of truth, he understands the cause of the whigs, in opposition to the QUEEN and her servants: therefore, by the learned, wealthy, and knowing gentry, he must understand the Bank and East-India company, and those other merchants or citizens within the bills of mortality, who have been strenuous against the church and crown, and whose spirit of faction hath lately got the better of their interest. For let him search all the rest of the kingdom, he will find the surrounded clergy, and the surrounding gentry, wholly strangers to the merits of those prelates, and adhering to a very different cause of truth, as will soon, I hope, be manifest, by a fair appeal to the representatives of both.

It was very unnecessary in this writer to bespeak the treatment of contempt and derision, which the clergy are to expect from his faction, whenever they come into power. I believe, that venerable body is in very little concern after what manner their most mortal enemies intend to treat them, whenever it shall please God, for our sins, to visit us with so fatal an event; which, I hope, it will be the united endeavours both of clergy and laity to hinder. It will be some support to this hope, if I could have any opinion of his predicting talent (which some have ascribed to people of this author's character) where he tells us, that noise and wrath will not always pass for zeal. What other instances of zeal hath this gentleman, or the rest
of

of his party, been able to produce? If clamour be *noise*, it is but opening our ears to know from what side it comes; and, if sedition, scurrility, slander and calumny be the fruit of *wrath*, read the pamphlets and papers issuing from the *zealots* of that faction, or visit their clubs and coffee-houses, in order to form a judgment of the tree.

When Mr. Steele tells us, *we have a religion that wants no support from the enlargement of secular power, but is well supported by the wisdom and piety of its preachers, and its own native truth*; it would be good to know what religion he professeth: for the clergy, to whom he speaks, will never allow him a member of the church of *England*. They cannot agree that the *truth* of the gospel, and the *piety* and *wisdom* of its preachers, are a sufficient support, in an evil age, against infidelity, faction, and vice, without the assistance of *secular power*; unless God would please to confer the gift of miracles on those who wait at the altar. I believe they venture to go a little further, and think, that, upon some occasions, they want a little *enlargement of assistance from the secular power* against *atheists, deists, socinians*, and other hereticks. Every first *Sunday in Lent*, a part of the liturgy is read to the people, in the preface to which the church declares her wishes for the restoring of that discipline she formerly had, and which, for some years past, hath been more wanted than ever. But of this no more, lest it might *insinuate jealousies between the clergy and laity*; which, the author tells us, is the

policy of vain and ambitious men among the former, in hopes to derive, from their order, a veneration they cannot deserve from their virtue. If this be their method for procuring veneration, it is the most singular that ever was thought on; and the clergy would then indeed have no more to do with politicks of any sort, than Mr. *Steele* or his faction will allow them.

Having thus toiled through his dedication, I proceed to consider his preface, which, half consisting of quotation, will be so much the sooner got through. It is a very unfair thing in any writer to employ his *ignorance* and *malice* together; because it gives his answerer double work: it is like the sort of sophistry that the logicians call *two mediums*, which are never allowed in the same syllogism. A writer with a weak head, and a corrupt heart, is an over-match for any single pen; like a hireling jade, dull and vicious, hardly able to stir, yet offering at every turn to kick.

He begins his preface with such an account of the original of power, and the nature of civil institutions, as, I am confident, was never once imagined by any writer upon government, from *Plato* to Mr. *Locke*. Give me leave to transcribe his first paragraph. *I never saw an unruly crowd of people cool by degrees into temper, but it gave me an idea of the original of power, and the nature of civil institutions. One particular man has usually, in those cases, from the dignity of his appearance, or other qualities known or imagined by the multitude, been re-*
ceived

ceived into sudden favour and authority; the occasion of their difference has been represented to him, and the matter referred to his decision.

I have known a poet, who never was out of *England*, introduce a fact, by way of simile, which could probably no where happen nearer than in the plains of *Libya*; and begin with, *So have I seen* [i]. Such a fiction, I suppose, may be justified by poetical licence; yet *Virgil* is much more modest. This paragraph of *Mr. Steele's*, which he sets down as an observation of his own, is a miserable mangled translation of six verses out of that famous poet, who speaks after this manner; *As when a sedition arises in a great multitude, &c. then if they see a wise grave man, &c. Virgil*, who lived but a little after the ruin of the *Roman* republick, where seditions often happened, and the force of oratory was great among the people, made use of a simile, which *Mr. Steele* turns into a fact after such a manner, as if he had seen it an hundred times; and builds upon it a system of the origin of government. When the vulgar here in *England* assemble in a riotous manner (which is not very frequent of late years) the prince takes a much more effectual way than that of sending orators to appease them: but *Mr. Steele* imagines such a crowd of people as this, where there is no government at all; their *unruliness* quelled, and their passions cooled by a particular man, whose great qualities they

[i] See the *Περὶ Βαθύς*.

had known before. Such an assembly must have risen suddenly from the earth, and the *man of authority* dropt from the clouds; for, without some previous form of government, no such crowd did ever yet assemble, or could possibly be acquainted with the merits and dignity of any *particular man* among them. But to pursue his scheme; this man of authority, who *cools* the crowd by degrees, and to whom they all appeal, must, of necessity, prove either an open or *clandestine tyrant*. A *clandestine tyrant* I take to be a king of *Brentford*, who keeps his army in disguise; and whenever he happens either to die naturally, be knocked on the head, or deposed, the people *calmly take further measures, and improve upon what was begun under his unlimited power*. All this our author tells us, with extreme propriety, *is what seems reasonable to common sense*; that is, in other words, it seems *reasonable to reason*. This is what he calls *giving an idea of the original of power, and the nature of civil institutions*. To which I answer, with great phlegm, that I defy any man alive to shew me, in double the number of lines, although writ by the same author, such a complicated ignorance in history, human nature, or politicks, as well as in the ordinary properties of thought or of style.

But, it seems, these profound speculations were only premised to introduce some quotations in favour of *resistance*. What hath *resistance* to do with the succession of the house of *Hanover*, that the whig writers should perpetually affect to tag them together?

together? I can conceive nothing else, but that their hatred to the QUEEN and ministry puts them upon thoughts of introducing the successor by *another* Revolution. Are cases of *extreme necessity* to be produced as common maxims, by which we are always to proceed? Should not these gentlemen sometimes inculcate the general rule of obedience, and not always the exception of resistance; since the former hath been the perpetual dictate of all laws both divine and civil, and the latter is still in dispute?

I shall meddle with none of the passages he cites to prove the lawfulness of resisting princes, except that from the present lord chancellor's [k] speech in defence of Dr. Sacheverel: that *there are extraordinary cases, cases of necessity, which are implied, although not expressed, in the general rule* [of obedience]. These words, very clear in themselves, Mr. Steele explains into nonsense; which, in any other author, I should suspect to have been intended as a reflection upon as great a person as ever filled or adorned that high station: but I am so well acquainted with his pen, that I much more wonder how it can trace out a true quotation than a false comment. To see him treat my lord Harcourt with so much civility, looks indeed a little suspicious, and as if he had malice in his heart.

[k] Sir Simon Harcourt, who, at the time of Sacheverel's trial, had resigned his place of attorney general, which he afterwards accepted again; upon the change of the ministry, he was made lord keeper, and in 1711 created a baron.

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He calls his lordship *a very great man*, and *a great living authority*; places himself in company with general *Stanhope* and Mr. *Hoadley*; and, in short, takes the most effectual method in his power of ruining his lordship in the opinion of every man, who is wise or good. I can only tell my lord *Harcourt* for his comfort, that these praises are encumbered with the doctrine of *resistance*, and the true revolution-principles; and provided he will not allow Mr. *Steele* for his commentator, he may hope to recover the honour of being libelled again, as well as his sovereign and fellow-servants.

We now come to *The Crisis*; where we meet with two pages by way of introduction to those extracts from acts of parliament, that constitute the body of his pamphlet. This introduction begins with a definition of liberty, and then proceeds in a panegyrick upon that great blessing. His panegyrick is made up of half a dozen shreds, like a school-boy's theme, beaten general topicks, where any other man alive might wander securely; but this politician, by venturing to vary the good old phrases, and give them a new turn, commits an hundred solecisms and absurdities. The weighty truths, which he endeavours to press upon his reader, are such as these. That *liberty is a very good thing*; that *without liberty we cannot be free*; that *health is good, and strength is good, but liberty is better than either*; that *no man can be happy without the liberty of doing whatever his own mind tells him is best*; that *men of quality love liberty, and common people*

people love liberty; even women and children love liberty; and you cannot please them better than by letting them do what they please. Had Mr. Steele contented himself to deliver these and the like maxims in such intelligible terms, I could have found where we agreed and where we differed. But us let hear some of these axioms, as he hath involved them. *We cannot possess our souls with pleasure and satisfaction, except we preserve in ourselves that inestimable blessing, which we call liberty. By liberty, I desire to be understood to mean the happiness of men's living, &c.*—The true life of man consists in conducting it according to his own just sentiments and innocent inclinations—man's being is degraded below that of a free agent, when his affections and passions are no longer governed by the dictates of his own mind.—Without liberty, our health (among other things) may be at the will of a tyrant employed to our own ruin, and that of our fellow-creatures. If there be any of these maxims which is not grossly defective in truth, in sense, or in grammar, I will allow them to pass for uncontrollable. By the first, omitting the pedantry of the whole expression, there are not above one or two nations in the world, where any one man can possess his soul with pleasure and satisfaction. In the second, he desires to be understood to mean; that is, he desires to be meant to mean, or to be understood to understand. In the third, *the life of man consists in conducting his life.* In the fourth he affirms, that *men's beings are degraded, when their*
passions

passions are no longer governed by the dictates of their own minds; directly contrary to the lessons of all moralists and legislators; who agree unanimously, that the passions of men must be under the government of reason and law; neither are laws of any other use than to correct the irregularity of our affections. By the last, our health is ruinous to ourselves and other men when a tyrant pleases; which I leave to him to make out.

I cannot sufficiently commend our ancestors for transmitting to us the blessing of liberty; yet, having *laid out their blood and treasure upon the purchase*, I do not see how they *acted parsimoniously*; because I can conceive nothing more generous than that of employing our blood and treasure for the service of others. But I am suddenly struck with the thought, that I have found his meaning; our ancestors acted parsimoniously, because they only spent their own treasure for the good of their posterity; whereas we squandered away the treasures of our posterity too; but whether they will be thankful, and think it was done for the preservation of their liberty, must be left to themselves for a decision.

I verily believe, although I could not prove it in *Westminster-hall* before a *lord chief justice*, that, by *enemies to our constitution, and enemies to our present establishment*, Mr. Steele would desire to be understood to mean my lord treasurer and the rest of the ministry: by those who are grown supine in proportion to the danger, to which our liberty is every day more exposed,

exposed, I should guess, he means the *tories*: and by *honest men*, who ought to look up with a spirit that becomes *honesty*, he understands the *whigs*. I likewise believe, he would take it ill, or think me stupid, if I did not thus expound him. I say then, that according to this exposition, the four great officers of state, together with the rest of the cabinet-council (except the archbishop of *Canterbury* [1]) are *enemies to our establishment*, making artful and open attacks upon our constitution, and are now practising indirect arts, and mean subtleties, to weaken the security of those acts of parliament for settling the succession in the house of *Hanover*. The first and most notorious of these criminals is *Robert Harley*, earl of *Oxford*, lord high treasurer, who is reputed to be chief minister: the second is *James Butler*, duke of *Ormond*, who commands the army, and designs to employ it in bringing over the *pretender*: the third is *Henry St. John*, lord viscount *Bolingbroke*, secretary of state, who must be supposed to hold a constant correspondence at the court of *Barle Duc*, as the late earl of *Godolphin* did with that at *St. Germain*s: and, to avoid tediousness, Mr. *Bromley* [m] and the rest are employed in their several districts to the same end. These are the opinions, which Mr. *Steele* and his faction, under the direction of their leaders, are endeavouring, with all their might, to propagate among the people of

[1] Dr. *Tennison*.

[m] Speaker of the House of Commons.

England, concerning the present ministry; with what reservation to the honour, wisdom or justice of the QUEEN, I cannot determine; who, by her own free choice, after long experience of their abilities and integrity, and in compliance to the general wishes of her people, called them to her service. Such an accusation against persons in so high trust should require, I think, at least one single overt-act to make it good. If there be no other choice of persons fit to serve the crown without danger from the *pretender*, except among those who are called the *whig* party, the *Hanover* succession is then indeed in a very desperate state: that illustrious family will have almost nine in ten of the kingdom against it, and those principally of the landed interest; which is most to be depended upon in such a nation as ours.

I have now got as far as his extracts, which I shall not be at the pains of comparing with the originals, but suppose he hath gotten them fairly transcribed: I only think, that whoever is patentee for printing acts of parliament may have a very fair action against him for invasion of property: but this is none of my business to inquire into.

After two and twenty pages spent in reciting acts of parliament, *he desires leave to repeat the history and progress of the Union*; upon which I have some few things to observe.

This *work*, he tells us, *was unsuccessfully attempted by several of her majesty's predecessors*; although

though I [n] do not remember it was ever thought on by any except king *James* the first, and the late king *William*. I have read indeed, that some small overtures were made, by the former of these princes, towards an Union between the two kingdoms, but rejected with indignation and contempt by the *English*: and the historian tells us, that, how degenerate and corrupt soever the court and parliament then were, they would not give ear to so infamous a proposal. I do not find, that any of the succeeding princes, before the Revolution, ever resumed the design; because it was a project for which there could not possibly be assigned the least reason or necessity: for I defy any mortal to name one single advantage that *England* could ever expect from such an union.

But towards the end of the late king's reign, upon apprehensions of the want of issue from him or the princess *Anne*, a proposition, for uniting both kingdoms, was begun; because *Scotland* had not settled their crown upon the house of *Hanover*, but left themselves at large, in hopes to make their advantage; and it was thought highly dangerous to leave that part of the island, inhabited by a poor fierce northern people, at liberty to put themselves under a different king. However, the opposition to this work was so great, that it could not be overcome until some time after her present majesty

[n] The author's memory failed him a little in this assertion, as one of his answerers observed,

came to the crown; when, by the weakness or corruption of a certain minister, since dead, an act of parliament was obtained by the *Scots*, which gave them leave to arm themselves [o]; and so the Union became necessary, not for any actual good it could possibly do us, but to avoid a probable evil; and at the same time save an obnoxious minister's head; who was so wise as to take the first opportunity of procuring a general pardon by act of parliament, because he could not, with so much decency and safety, desire a particular one for himself. These facts are well enough known to the whole kingdom. And I remember, discoursing above six years ago with the most considerable [p] person of the adverse party, and a great promoter of the Union, he frankly owned to me, that this necessity, brought upon us by the wrong management of the earl of *Godolphin*, was the only cause of the Union.

Therefore, I am ready to grant two points to the author of *The Crisis*: *first*, that the Union became necessary for the cause above related; because it prevented this island from being governed by two kings, which *England* would never have suffered; and it might probably have cost us a war of a year or two to reduce the *Scots*. *Secondly*, that it would be dangerous to break this Union, at least at this juncture, while there is a *pretender* abroad, who

[o] See the Examiner, N^o. XIX. vol. VIII. p. 61.

[p] Lord *Somers*,

might probably lay hold of such an opportunity. And this made me wonder a little at the spirit of faction last summer among some people, who, having been the great promoters of the *Union*, and several of them the principal gainers by it [q], could yet proceed so far as to propose in the house of lords, that it should be dissolved; while at the same time those peers, who had ever opposed it in the beginning, were then for preserving it, upon the reason I have just assigned, and which the author of *The Crisis* hath likewise taken notice of.

But when he tells us, *the Englishmen ought, in generosity, to be more particularly careful in preserving this Union*, he argues like himself. *The late kingdom of Scotland* (saith he) *had as numerous a nobility as England, &c.* They had indeed; and to that we owe one of the great and necessary evils of the Union, upon the foot it now stands. Their nobility is indeed so numerous, that the whole revenues of their country would be hardly able to maintain them according to the dignity of their titles; and, what is infinitely worse, they are never likely to be extinct until the last period of all things; because the greatest part of them des-

[q] The duke of *Argyle*, who zealously promoted the Union, the earl of *Mar*, Mr. *Lockhart*, and Mr. *Cockburn*, having been deputed on purpose, remonstrated to the queen against the malt tax, which, they said, would probably prompt the *Scots* to declare the Union dissolved. The earl of *Finlater* soon after moved the house of lords for leave to bring in a bill for dissolving the Union; he was seconded by the earl of *Mar*, and supported by lord *Eglinton*, earl of *Hay*, the duke of *Argyle*, and others.

cend to heirs general. I imagine a person of quality prevailed on to marry a woman much his inferior, and without a groat to her fortune, and her friends arguing she was as good as her husband, because she brought him as numerous a family of relations and servants as she found in his house. *Scotland*, in the taxes, is obliged to contribute one penny for every forty pence laid upon *England*; and the representatives they send to parliament are about a thirteenth. Every other *Scotch* peer hath all the privileges of an *English* one, except that of sitting in parliament, and even precedence before all of the same title that shall be created for the time to come. The pensions and employments, possessed by the natives of that country now among us, do amount to more than the whole body of their nobility ever spent at home; and all the money they raise upon the publick is hardly sufficient to defray their civil and military lists. I could point out some with great titles, who affected to appear very vigorous for dissolving the Union, although their whole revenues, before that period, would have ill maintained a *Welsh* justice of the peace; and have since gathered more money than ever any *Scotchman*, who had not travelled, could form an idea of.

I have only one thing more to say upon occasion of the Union-act; which is, that the author of *The Crisis* may be fairly proved, from his own citations, to be guilty of HIGH TREASON. In a paper of his called *The Englishman*, of October 29,

there is an advertisement about taking in subscriptions for printing *The Crisis*, where the title is published at length with the following clause, which the author thought fit to drop in the publication; [*and that no power on earth can bar, alter, or make void, the present settlement of the crown, etc.* By Richard Steele.] In his extract of an act of parliament made since the Union, it appears to be *high treason for any person, by writing or printing, to maintain and affirm, that the kings or queens of this realm, with and by the authority of parliament, are not able to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to limit and bind the crown, and the descent, limitation, inheritance, and government thereof.* This act being subsequent to the settlement of the crown confirmed at the Union, it is probable some friend of the author advised him to leave out those *treasonable* words in the printed title-page, which he had before published in the advertisement; and, accordingly, we find, that in the treatise itself he only offers it to every good subject's consideration, whether this article of the settlement of the crown is not as firm as the Union itself, and as the settlement of episcopacy in England, etc. And he thinks the Scots understood it so, that the succession to the crown was never to be controverted.

These I take to be only treasonable insinuations; but the advertisement before mentioned is actually *high treason*; for which the author ought to be prosecuted, if that would avail any thing under a jurisdiction, where cursing the QUEEN is not above the penalty of twenty marks.

Nothing is more notorious than that the *whigs* of late years, both in their writings and discourses, have affected, upon all occasions, to allow the legitimacy of the *pretender*. This makes me a little wonder to see our author labouring to prove the contrary, by producing all the popular chat of those times, and other solid arguments from *Fuller's* narrative: but it must be supposed, that this gentleman acts by the commands of his superiors, who have thought fit, at this juncture, to issue out new orders, for reasons best known to themselves. I wish they had been more clear in their directions to him upon that weighty point, whether the settlement of the succession in the house of *Hanover* be alterable or no. I have observed where, in his former pages, he gives it in the negative; but, in the turning of a leaf, he hath wholly changed his mind. He tells us, *he wonders there can be found any Briton weak enough to contend against a power in their own nation, which is practised in a much greater degree in other states: and how hard it is, that Britain should be debarred the privilege of establishing its own security by relinquishing only those branches of the royal line, which threaten it with destruction; whilst other nations never scruple, upon less occasions, to go much greater lengths; of which he produceth instances in France, Spain, Sicily, Sardinia; and then adds, can Great Britain help to advance men to other thrones, and have no power in limiting its own? How can a senator, capable of doing honour to Sir Thomas Hanmer, be guilty of such ridiculous inconsistencies; the author of The conduct of the allies (says he) hath dared to drop insinuations about altering the*

succession,

succession. The author of *The conduct of the allies* writes sense and English ; neither of which the author of *The Crisis* understands. The former thinks it *wrong in point of policy to call in a foreign power to be guarantee of our succession, because it puts it out of the power of our own legislature to change our succession without the consent of that prince or state, who is guarantee, whatever necessity may happen in future times.* Now, if it be high treason to affirm by writing, that the legislature hath no such power ; and if Mr. Steele thinks it strange, that *Britain* should be debarred this privilege, what could be the crime of putting such a case, that in future ages a necessity might happen of limiting the succession, as well as it hath happened already ?

When Mr. Steele reflects upon the many solemn, strong barriers (to our succession) of laws and oaths, &c. he thinks all fear vanished before them. I think so too, provided the epithet *solemn* goes for nothing ; because, although I have often heard of a *solemn* day, a *solemn* feast, and a *solemn* coxcomb, yet I can conceive no idea to myself of a *solemn* barrier. However, be that as it will, his thoughts, it seems, will not let him rest, but, before he is aware, he asks himself several questions ; and, since he cannot resolve them, I will endeavour to give him what satisfaction I am able. The first is, *What are the marks of a lasting security ?* To which I answer, that the signs of it in a kingdom or state are, first, good laws ; and, secondly, those laws well executed : we are pretty well provided with the former, but ex-

tremely defective in the latter.—Secondly, *What are our tempers and our hearts at home?* If by ours he means those of himself and his abettors, they are most damnably wicked; impatient for the death of the QUEEN; ready to gratify their ambition and revenge by all desperate methods; wholly alienate from truth, law, religion, mercy, conscience, or honour.—Thirdly, *In what hands is power lodged abroad?* To answer the question naturally, *Louis XIV.* is king of *France*, *Philip V.* (by the counsels and acknowledgements of the whigs) is king of *Spain*, and so on. If by power he means money; the duke of *Marlborough* is thought to have more ready money than all the kings of *Christendom* together; but, by the peculiar disposition of Providence, it is locked up in a trunk, to which his ambition hath no key; and that is our security.---Fourthly, *are our unnatural divisions our strength?* I think not; but they are the sign of it; for, being *unnatural*, they cannot last; and this shews, that *union*, the foundation of all strength, is more agreeable to our nature.---Fifthly, *Is it nothing to us, which of the princes of Europe has the longest sword?* Not much, if we can tie up his hands, or put a strong *shield* into those of his neighbours; or, if our *sword* be as *sharp* as his is *long*; or, if it be necessary for him to turn his own *sword* into a *plowshare*; or, if such a *sword* happeneth to be in the hands of an *infant*, or struggled for by two competitors.---Sixthly, *The powerful hand that deals out crowns and kingdoms all around us, may it not, in time, reach a*
king

king out to us too? If the *powerful hand* he means be that of *France*, it may reach out as many kings as it pleaseth; but we will not accept them. Whence does this man get his intelligence? I should think, even his brother *Ridpath* might furnish him with better. What *crowns* or *kingdoms* hath *France* dealt about? *Spain* was given by the will of the former king, in consequence of that infamous treaty of *partition*, the adviser of which will, I hope, never be forgot in *England*. *Sicily* was disposed of by her majesty of *Great Britain*; so, in effect, was *Sardinia*. *France* indeed once reached out a king to *Poland*, but the people would not receive him. This question of Mr. *Steele's* was therefore only put in *terrorem* without any regard to truth.---Seventhly, *Are there no pretensions to our crown that can never be revived?* There may, for ought I know, be about a dozen; and those in time may possibly beget a hundred; but we must do as well as we can. Captain *Bessus*, when he had fifty challenges to answer, protested he could not fight above three duels a day. If the *pretender* should fail (says the writer), the *French king* has, in his quiver, a succession of them; the *duchess of Savoy*, or her sons, or the *dauphin* her grandson. Let me suppose the *chevalier de St. George* to be dead; the *duchess of Savoy* will then be a *pretender*, and consequently must leave her husband, because his royal highness (for Mr. *Steele* has not yet acknowledged him for a king) is in alliance with her *British* majesty; her sons, when they grow *pretenders*, must undergo the same fate. But I am

at a loss how to dispose of the *dauphin*, if he happen to be king of *France* before the *pretendership* to *Britain* falls to his share ; for, I doubt, he will never be persuaded to remove out of his own kingdom, only because it is too near *England*.

But the duke of Savoy did, some years ago, put in his claim to the crown of *England*, in right of his wife ; and he is a prince of great capacity, in strict alliance with *France*, and may therefore very well add to our fears of a *popish* successor. Is it the fault of the present, or of any ministry, that this prince put in his claim ; must we give him opium to destroy his capacity ? or can we prevent his alliance with any prince, who is in peace with her majesty ? Must we send to stab or poison all the *popish* princes, who have any pretended title to our crown by the proximity of blood ? What, in the name of God, can these people drive at ? what is it they demand ? Suppose the present *dauphin* were now a man, and king of *France*, and next *popish* heir to the crown of *England* ; is he not excluded by the laws of the land ? But what regard will he have to our laws ? I answer ; hath not the QUEEN as good a title to the crown of *France* ? and how is she excluded, but by their law against the succession of females, which we are not bound to acknowledge ? And is it not in our power to exclude female successors, as well as in theirs ? If such a pretence shall prove the cause of a war, what human power can prevent it ? But our cause must necessarily be good and righteous ; for either the kings of *England* have been un-

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justly

justly kept out of the possession of *France*, or the *dauphin*, although nearest of kin, can have no legal title to *England*. And he must be an ill prince indeed, who will not have the hearts and hands of ninety-nine in an hundred among his subjects against such a *popish pretender*.

I have been the longer in answering the seventh question, because it led me to consider all he had afterwards to say upon the subject of the *pretender*. --- Eighthly, and lastly, he asks himself, *Whether popery and ambition are become tame and quiet neighbours?* In this I can give him no satisfaction, because I never was in that street where they live; nor do I converse with any of their friends; only I find they are persons of a very evil reputation. But I am told for certain, that *ambition* hath removed her lodging, and lives the very next door to *faction*, where they keep such a racket, that the whole parish is disturbed, and every night in an uproar.

Thus much in answer to those eight *uneasy questions* put by the author to himself, in order to *satisfy every Briton*, and give him an occasion of *taking an impartial view of the affairs of Europe in general, as well as of Great Britain in particular*.

After enumerating the great actions of the *confederate* armies under the command of prince *Eugene* and the duke of *Marlborough*, Mr. *Steele* observes, in the bitterness of his soul, that the *British general, however unaccountable it may be to posterity, was not permitted to enjoy the fruits of his glorious labour*. Ten years *fruits*, it seems, were not sufficient;

sufficient; and yet they were the *fruitfullest* campaigns that ever any general cropt. However, I cannot but hope, that posterity will not be left in the dark, but some care taken both of her majesty's glory, and the reputation of those she employs. An impartial historian may tell the world (and the next age will easily believe what it continues to feel) that the avarice and ambition of a few factious insolent subjects had almost destroyed their country by continuing a ruinous war in conjunction with allies, for whose sakes principally we fought, who refused to bear their just proportion of the charge, and were connived at in their refusal, for private ends: that these factious people treated the best and kindest of sovereigns with insolence, cruelty, and ingratitude (of which he will be able to produce several instances); that they encouraged persons and principles alien from our religion and government, in order to strengthen their faction: he will tell the reasons, why the *general* and *first minister* were seduced to be heads of this faction, contrary to the opinions they had always professed. Such an historian will shew many reasons, which made it necessary to remove the *general* and his friends, who, knowing the bent of the nation was against them, expected to lose their power when the war was at an end. Particularly, the historian will discover the whole intrigue of the duke of *Marlborough's* endeavouring to procure a commission to be *general for life* *; wherein justice will be

* [?] See Examiner, number xix, and the subsequent papers.

done to a person at that time of high station in the law, who (I mention it to his honour) advised the duke, when he was consulted upon it, not to accept of such a *commission*. By these and many other instances, which time will bring to light, it may perhaps appear not very unaccountable to posterity, why this great man was dismissed at last; but rather why he was dismissed no sooner.

But this is entering into a wide field. I shall therefore leave *posterity* to the information of better historians than the author of *The Crisis*, or myself; and go on to inform the present age in some facts, which this great orator and politician thinks fit to misrepresent with the utmost degree either of natural or wilful ignorance. He asserts, that in the duke of Ormond's campaign, *after a suspension of arms between Great Britain and France proclaimed at the head of the armies, the british troops, in the midst of the enemy's garrisons, withdrew themselves from their confederates*. The fact is directly otherwise; for the *british* troops were most infamously deserted by the confederates, after all that could be urged by the duke of Ormond and the earl of Stafford to press the confederate generals not to forsake them. The duke was directed to avoid engaging in any action, until he had further orders, because an account of the king of Spain's renunciation was every day expected. This the *Imperialists* and *Dutch* knew well enough; and therefore proposed to the duke, in that very juncture, to engage the *French*, for no other reason but to render desperate all the QUEEN's measures

tures towards a peace. Was not the certain possession of *Dunkirk* of equal advantage to the uncertainty of a battle? A whole campaign under the duke of *Marlbrough*, with such an acquisition, although at the cost of many thousand lives, and several millions of money, would have been thought very gloriously ended.

Neither, after all, was it a new thing, either in the *British* general or the *Dutch* deputies, to refuse fighting, when they did not approve it. When the duke of *Marlbrough* was going to invest *Bouchain*, the deputies of the *states* pressed him in vain to engage the enemy; and one of them was so far discontented upon his grace's refusal, that he presently became a partizan of the peace; yet I do not remember any clamour then raised here against the duke upon that account. Again: When the *French* invaded *Doway*, after the confederates had deserted the duke of *Ormond*, prince *Eugene* was violently bent upon a battle, and said they should never have another so good an opportunity; but monsieur —, a private deputy, rose up, and opposed it so far, that the prince was forced to desist. Was it then more criminal in the duke of *Ormond* to refuse fighting by express command of the QUEEN, and in order to get possession of *Dunkirk*, than for the duke of *Marlbrough* to give the same refusal, without any such orders, or any such advantage? or shall a *Dutch* deputy assume more power than
the

the QUEEN of *Great Britain's* general, acting by the immediate commands of his sovereign?

The *emperor and the empire* (says Mr. Steele by way of admiration) *continue the war!* Is his *imperial* majesty able to continue it or no? if he be, then *Great Britain* hath been strangely used for ten years past: then how came it to pass, that of above thirty thousand men in his service in *Italy*, at the time of the battle of *Turin*, there were not above four thousand paid by himself? if he be not able to continue it, why does he go on? The reasons are clear; because the war only affects the princes of the empire (whom he is willing enough to expose) but not his own dominions. Besides, the *imperial* ministers are in daily expectation of the QUEEN's death, which, they hope, will give a new turn to affairs, and rekindle the war in *Europe* upon the old foot; and we know how the ministers of that court publicly assign it for a reason of their obstinacy against peace, that they hope for a sudden revolution in *England*. In the mean time, this appearance of the *emperor's* being forsaken by his ally will serve to increase the clamour, both here and in *Holland*, against her majesty and those she employs.

Mr. Steele says, *there can be no crime in affirming (if it be truth) that the house of Bourbon is at this juncture become more formidable, and bids fairer for an universal monarchy, and to engross the whole trade of Europe, than it did before the war.*

No crime in affirming it, if it be truth. I will for once allow his proposition. But if it be false,
then

then I affirm, that whoever advanceth so seditious a falshood deserves to be hanged. Doth he mean by the house of *Bourbon*, the two kings of *France* and *Spain*? If so, I reject his meaning, which would insinuate, that the interests and designs of both those princes will be the same; whereas they are more opposite than those of any two other monarchs in *Christendom*. This is the old foolish slander so frequently flung upon the peace, and as frequently refuted. These factious undertakers of the press write with great advantage; they strenuously affirm a thousand falshoods without fear, wit, conscience, or knowledge; and, we, who answer them, must be at the expence of an argument for each; after which, in the very next pamphlet, we see the same assertions produced again, without the least notice of what hath been said to disprove them. By the house of *Bourbon* doth he mean only the *French* king for the time being? If so, and his assertion be true, then that prince must either deal with the devil, or else the money and blood spent in our ten years victories against him might as well have continued in the purses and veins of her majesty's subjects.

But the *particular* assertions of this author are easier detected than his *general* ones; I shall therefore proceed upon examining the former. For instance; I desire him to ask the *Dutch*, who can best inform him, *why they delivered up Traerbach to the Imperialists*? for, as to the *QUEEN*, her majesty was never once consulted with it; whatever his
preceptors,

preceptors, the politicians of *Button's* coffee-house, may have informed him to the contrary.

Mr. *Steele* affirms, that *the French have begun the demolition of Dunkirk contemptuously and arbitrarily their own way.* The governor of the town, and those gentlemen entrusted with the inspection of this work, do assure me, that the fact is altogether otherwise; that the method prescribed by those whom her majesty employs, hath been exactly followed, and that the works are already demolished. I will venture to tell him further, that the demolition was so long deferred in order to remove those difficulties, which the *barrier* treaty hath put us under; and the event hath shewn, that it was prudent to proceed no faster, until those difficulties were got over. The *mole* and *harbour* could not be destroyed, until the ships were got out; which, by reason of some profound secrets of state, did not happen until the other day. Who gave him those just suspicions, that the *mole* and *harbour* will never be destroyed? what is it he would now insinuate? that the ministry is bribed to leave the most important part of the work undone; or that the *pretender* is to invade us from thence; or that the *QUEEN* hath entered into a conspiracy with her servants to prevent the good effects of the peace for no other end, but to lose the affections of her people, and endanger herself?

Instead of any further information, which I could easily give, but which no honest man can want, I venture to affirm, that the *mole* and *harbour* of *Dunkirk* will, in a short time, be most effectually

fectually destroyed ; and at the same time I venture to prophesy, that neither Mr. *Steele*, nor his faction, will ever confess they believe it.

After all, it is a little hard, that the QUEEN cannot be allowed to demolish this town in whatever manner she pleases to fancy. Mr. *Steele* must have it done in his own way, and is angry the *French* have pretended to do in theirs ; and yet he wrongs them in the bargain. For my own part, I do seriously think the most *Christian* king to be a much better friend of her majesty's than Mr. *Steele*, or any of his faction. Besides, it is to be considered, that he is a monarch and a relation ; and therefore, if I were a privy counsellor, and my advice to be asked, which of those two [s] GENTLEMEN BORN should have the direction in the demolition of *Dunkirk*, I would give it for the former ; because I look upon Mr. *Steele*, in quality of member of his party, to be much more skilful in *demolishing at home* than *abroad*.

There is a prospect of much danger to the balance of *Europe*, and to the trade of *Britain*, from the emperor over-running *Italy*, than from *France* over-running the empire ; that his imperial majesty entertains such thoughts, is visible to the world : and although little can be said to justify many actions of the *French* king, yet the worst of them have never equalled the emperor's arbitrary keeping the possession of *Milan* directly contrary to his oath and the express words of the *golden bull*, which oblige

[s] Mr. *Steele* often styles himself so,

him to deliver up every *fief* that falls, or else they must all, in the course of time, lapse into his own hands.

I was at a loss, who it was that Mr. *Steele* hinted at some time ago by *the powerful hand, that deals out crowns and kingdoms all around us* : I now plainly find he means no other hand but his own. He hath dealt out the crown of *Spain* to *France* ; to *France* he hath given leave to invade the *empire* next spring with two hundred thousand men ; and now at last he deals to *France* the *imperial* dignity ; and so *farewel liberty* ; Europe *will be French*. But in order to bring all this about, *the capital of Austria, the residence of his imperial majesty*, must continue to be *visited by the plague*, of which the *emperor* must die, and so the thing is done.

Why should not I venture to *deal out one sceptre* in my turn, as well as Mr. *Steele* ? I therefore *deal out the empire* to the *elector of Saxony*, upon failure of issue to this *emperor* at his death ; provided the *whigs* will prevail on the *son* to turn *papist* to get an *empire*, as they did upon the *father* to get a *kingdom*. Or if this prince be not approved of, I *deal it out* in his stead to the *elector of Bavaria* : and in one or the other of these I dare engage to have all *Christendom* to second me, whatever the spleen, in the shape of politicks, may dictate to the author of *The Crisis*.

The design of Mr. *Steele*, in representing the circumstances of the affairs of Europe, is to signify to the world, that all Europe is put in the high road

to slavery, by the corruption of her majesty's present ministers; and so he goes on to *Portugal*; which *having, during the war, supplied us with gold in exchange for our woollen manufacture, hath only at present a suspension of arms for its protection, to last no longer than till the Catalonians are reduced; and then the old pretensions of Spain to Portugal will be revived: and Portugal, when once enslaved by Spain, falls naturally with the rest of Europe into the gulph of France.* In the mean time, let us see what relief a little truth can give this unhappy kingdom. That *Portugal* hath yet no more than a suspension of arms, they may thank themselves, because they came so late into the treaty; and that they came so late, they may thank the *whigs*, whose false representations they were so weak as to believe. However, the QUEEN hath voluntarily given them a guarantee to defend them against *Spain*, until the peace shall be made; and such terms after the peace are stipulated for them, as the *Portuguese* themselves are contented with.

Having mentioned the *Catalonians*, he puts the question, *Who can name the Catalonians without a tear?* That can I; for he hath told so many melancholy stories, without one syllable of truth, that he hath blunted the edge of my fears, and I shall not be startled at the worst he can say. What he affirms concerning the *Catalonians* is included in the following particulars; first, *that they were drawn into the war by the encouragement of the maritime powers; by which are understood England and Holland:*

Holland: but he is too good a friend of the *Dutch* to give them any part of the blame. Secondly, that *they are now abandoned and exposed to the resentment of an enraged prince*. Thirdly, that *they always opposed the person and interest of that prince, who is their present king*. Lastly, that *the doom is dreadful of those, who shall, in the sight of God, be esteemed their destroyers*. And if we interpret the insinuation he makes, according to his own mind, the destruction of those people must be imputed to the present ministry.

I am sometimes, in charity, disposed to hope, that this writer is not always sensible of the flagrant falsehoods he utters, but is either biassed by an inclination to believe the worst, or a want of judgment to chuse his informers. That the *Catalonians* were drawn into the war by the encouragement of her majesty, should not, in decency, have been affirmed until about fifty years hence; when it might be supposed there would be no living witness left to disprove it. It was only upon the assurances of a revolt given by the prince of *Hesse* and others, and their invitation, that the QUEEN was prevailed with to send her forces upon that expedition. When *Barcelona* was taken by a most unexpected accident of a bomb lighting on the magazine, then indeed the *Catalonians* revolted, having before submitted and sworn allegiance to *Philip*, as much as any other province in *Spain*. Upon the peace between that crown and *Britain*, the QUEEN, in order to ease the emperor, and save his troops, sti-

pulated with king *Philip* for a neutrality in *Italy*, and that his *imperial* majesty should have liberty to evacuate *Catalonia*; upon condition of absolute indemnity to the *Catalans*, with an entire restitution to their honours, dignities, and estates. As this neutrality was never observed by the *emperor*, so he never effectually evacuated *Catalonia*; for although he sent away the main body, he left behind many officers and private men, who now spirit up and assist those obstinate people to continue in their rebellion. It is true indeed that king *Philip* did not absolutely restore the *Catalans* to all their old privileges, of which they never made other use than as an encouragement to rebel; but admitted them to the same privileges with the subjects of *Castile*, particularly to the liberty of trading, and having employments in the *West-Indies*, which they never enjoyed before. Besides, the QUEEN reserved to herself the power of procuring further immunities for them, wherein the most *christian* king was obliged to second her; for his *catholic* majesty intended no more than to retrench those privileges, under the pretext of which they now rebel, as they had formerly done in favour of *France*. How dreadful then must be the doom of those, who hindered these people from submitting to the gentle terms offered them by their prince! and who, although they be conscious of their own inability to furnish one single ship for the support of the *Catalans*, are, at this instant, spurring them on to their ruin by promises of aid and protection!

Thus

Thus much in answer to Mr. Steele's account of the affairs of *Europe*; from which he deduceth the universal monarchy of *France*, and the danger of I know not how many *popish successors* to *Britain*. His political reflections are as good as his facts. *We must observe*, says he, *that the person who seems to be the most favoured by the French king in the late treaties, is the duke of Savoy*. Extremely right; for whatever that prince got by the peace, he owes entirely to her majesty, as a just reward for his having been so firm and useful an ally; neither was *France* brought with more difficulty to yield any one point than that of allowing the duke such a barrier as the QUEEN insisted on.

He is become the most powerful prince in Italy. I had rather see *him* so than the emperor. *He is supposed to have entered into a secret and strict alliance with the house of Bourbon*. This is one of those facts wherein I am most inclined to believe the author, because it is what he must needs be utterly ignorant of, and therefore may possibly be true.

I thought indeed we should be safe from all *popish successors* as far as *Italy*, because of the prodigious clutter about sending the *pretender* thither. But they will never agree where to fix their *longitude*. The duke of *Savoy* is the more dangerous for removing to *Sicily*: he adds to our fears for being too near. So whether *France* conquer Germany, or be in peace and good understanding with it, either event will put us and *Holland* at the mercy of *France*,

which hath a quiver full of *pretenders* at its back, whenever the *chevalier* shall die.

This was just the logick of poor *prince Butler*, a splenetick mad-man, whom every body may remember about the town. *Prince Pamphilio* in *Italy* employed emissaries to torment *prince Butler* here. But what if *prince Pamphilio* die? Why then he had left in his will, that his heirs and executors torment *prince Butler* for ever.

I cannot think it a misfortune what *Mr. Steele* affirms, that *treasonable books lately dispersed among us, striking apparently at the Hanover succession, have passed almost without observation from the generality of the people*; because it seems a certain sign, that *the generality of the people* are well disposed to that illustrious family: but I look upon it as a great evil, to see seditious books *dispersed among us, apparently striking at the QUEEN* and her administration, at the constitution in church and state, and at all religion; yet *passing without observation from the generality of those in power*: but whether this remissness may be imputed to *White-hall*, or *Westminster-hall*, is other men's business to enquire. *Mr. Steele* knows, in his conscience, that the *Queries concerning the pretender* issued from one of his own party. And as for the poor nonjuring-clergyman, who was trusted with committing to the press a late book *on the subject of hereditary right*, by a strain of the *summum jus*, he is now, as I am told, with half a score children, starving and rotting among thieves and pick-pockets in the common room

room of a stinking gaol [t]. I have never seen either the book or the publisher; however, I would fain ask *one single person* [u] in the world a question; why he hath so often drank the abdicated king's health upon his knees?—But the transition is natural and frequent, and I shall not trouble him for an answer.

It is the hardest case in the world, that Mr. *Steele* should take up the artificial reports of his own faction, and then put them off upon the world as *additional fears of a popish successor*. I can assure him, that no good subject of the QUEEN is under the least concern, whether the *pretender* be converted or no, further than their wishes that all men would embrace the true religion. But, reporting backwards and forwards upon this point helps to keep up the noise, and is a topick for Mr. *Steele* to enlarge himself upon, by shewing how little we can depend on such conversions, by collecting a list of *popish* cruelties, and repeating, after himself and the bishop of *Sarum*, the dismal effects likely to follow upon the return of that superstition among us.

But as this writer is reported by those who know him to be what the *French* call *journalier*, his fears and courage operating according to the weather in our uncertain climate; I am apt to believe the two last pages of his *Crisis* were written on a

[t] Upon his conviction, he was committed to the *Marshalsea*; and at his sentence, to the *Queen's-Bench* for three years.

[u] *Parker*, afterwards lord chancellor.

sun-shine day. This I guess from the general tenor of them, and particularly from an unwary assertion, which, if he believes as firmly as I do, will at once overthrow all his foreign and domestic fears of a *popish* successor. *As divided a people as we are, those who stand for the house of Hanover are INFINITELY superior in number, wealth, courage, and all arts military and civil, to those in the contrary interest; besides which, we have the laws, I say, the laws on our side. The laws, I say, the laws.* This elegant repetition is, I think, a little out of place; for the stress might better have been laid upon so great a majority of the nation; without which, I doubt, the laws would be of little weight, although they be very good additional securities. And if what he here asserts be true, as it certainly is, although he assert it (for I allow even the majority of his own party to be against the *pretender*), there can be no danger of a *popish* successor, except from the unreasonable jealousies of the *best* among that party, and from the malice, the avarice, or ambition of the *worst*; without which, *Britain* would be able to defend her succession against all her enemies, both at home and abroad. Most of the dangers from abroad, which he enumerates as the consequences of this very bad peace made by the QUEEN, and approved by parliament, must have subsisted under any peace at all; unless, among other projects equally feasible, we could have stipulated to cut the throats of every *popish* relation to the royal family.

Well,

Well, by this author's own confession, a number infinitely superior, and the best circumstantiated imaginable, are for the *succession* in the house of *Hanover*. This *succession* is established, confirmed, and secured by several laws; her majesty's repeated declarations, and the oaths of all her subjects, engage both her and them to preserve what those laws have settled. This is a security indeed, a *security* adequate at least to the importance of the thing; and yet, according to the whig-scheme, as delivered to us by Mr. *Steele* and his coadjutors, is altogether insufficient; and the *succession* will be defeated, the *pretender* brought in, and *popery* established among us, without the further assistance of this writer and his faction.

And what securities have our adversaries substituted in the place of these? A club of politicians, where *Jenny Man* presides; A *Crisis* written by Mr. *Steele*; a confederacy of knavish stock-jobbers to ruin credit; a report of the QUEEN's death; an *effigies* of the *pretender* run twice through the body by a valiant peer; a speech by the author of *The Crisis*; and, to sum up all, an unlimited freedom of reviling her majesty and those she employs.

I have now finished the most disgustful task that ever I undertook. I could, with more ease, have written *three* dull pamphlets, than remarked upon the falsehoods and absurdities of *one*. But I was quite confounded last *Wednesday*, when the printer came with another pamphlet in his hand, written by the same author, and entitled, *The Englishman*,
being

being the close of the paper so called, &c. He desired I would read it over, and consider it in a paper by itself; which last I absolutely refused. Upon refusal, I found it chiefly an invective against *Toby*, the ministry, the *Examiner*, the clergy, the QUEEN, and the *Post-boy*; yet, at the same time, with great justice, exclaiming against those, who presumed to offer the least word against the heads of that faction whom her majesty discarded. The author likewise proposes an *equal division of favour and employments* between the *whigs* and *tories*; for if the former *can have no part or portion* [w] in David, *they desire no longer to be his subjects*. He insists, that her majesty *hath exactly followed Monsieur Tughe's memorial* [x] *against demolishing of Dunkirk*. He reflects, with *great satisfaction*, on the *good already done to his country by The Crisis*. *Non nobis, Domine, non nobis, &c.*—He gives us hopes that he will leave off writing, *and consult his own quiet and happiness*; and concludes with a *letter to a friend at court*. I suppose, by the style of *old friend*, and the like, it must be some body *there* of his own level; among whom his party have indeed more *friends* than I could wish. In this letter he asserts, that the present ministers were not edu-

[w] What portion have we in *David*? 1 Kings, xii. 16.

[x] “*Tughe* was deputed by the magistrates of *Dunkirk*, to intercede with the Queen, that she would recall part of her sentence concerning *Dunkirk*, by causing her thunderbolts to fall only on the martial works, and to spare the moles and dykes, which, in their naked condition, could be no more than objects of pity.”

cated

cated in the church of *England*, but are *new converts from presbytery*. Upon which I can only reflect, how blind the malice of that man must be, who invents a groundless lie in order to defame his superiors, which would be no disgrace if it had been a truth. And he concludes with making three demands, *for the satisfaction of himself and other malecontents*. First, *the demolition of the harbour of Dunkirk*. Secondly, *that Great-Britain and France would heartily join against the exorbitant power of the duke of Lorrain, and force the pretender from his asylum at Bar-le-Duc*. Lastly, *that his electoral highness of Hanover would be so grateful to signify to all the world the perfect good understanding he hath with the court of England, in as plain terms as her majesty was pleased to declare she had with that house on her part*.

As to the first of these demands, I will venture to undertake it shall be granted; but then Mr. *Steele*, and his brother *malecontents*, must promise to believe the thing is done, after those employed have made their report; or else bring vouchers to disprove it. Upon the second; I cannot tell whether her majesty will engage in a war against the duke of *Lorrain*, to *force him to remove the pretender*; but, I believe, if the parliament should think it necessary to address upon such an occasion, the QUEEN will move that prince to send him away. His last demand, offered under the title of a *wish*, is of so insolent and seditious a strain, that I care not to touch it. Here he directly chargeth her
majesty

majesty with delivering a falshood to her parliament from the throne ; and declares he will not believe her, until the elector of *Hanover* himself shall vouch for the truth of what he hath so solemnly affirmed.

I agree with this writer, that it is an idle thing in his antagonists to trouble themselves upon the *articles of his birth, education, or fortune* ; for whoever writes at this rate of his sovereign, to whom he owes so many personal obligations, I should never enquire whether he be a GENTLEMAN BORN, but whether he be a HUMAN CREATURE.

THE

THE
CONDUCT
OF THE
ALLIÉS,

And of the

LATE MINISTRY,

In beginning and carrying on the present
WAR.

Written in the Year 1712.

*Partem tibi Gallia nostri
Eripuit : Partem duris Hispania bellis :
Pars jacet Hesperia ; totoque exercitus orbe,
Te vincente, perit.
Odimus accipitrem, quia semper vivit in armis.
Victrix Provincia plorat.*

To this Tract and the Examiners, which make Vol. V. of the *Irish* Edition, there is a preface in the name of the publisher, which lord *Orrery* ascribes to *Swift*, for no other apparent reason, than to accuse him of praising himself; but, besides, the incorrectness of the style, which his lordship supposes to be affected, there is an assertion that these papers *produced* the change in the queen's ministry, which even in his lordship's opinion they were written to *defend*, and to which they appear, by their date, as well as tenor, to be *subsequent*; an absurdity of which *Swift*, even in the character of a publisher, cannot be supposed to have been guilty.

P R E F A C E.

I Cannot sufficiently admire the industry of a sort of men, wholly out of favour with the prince and people, and openly professing a separate interest from the bulk of the landed men, who yet are able to raise, at this juncture, so great a clamour against a peace, without offering one single reason, but what we find in their *ballads*. I lay it down for a maxim, that no reasonable man, whether *whig* or *tory*, (since it is necessary to use those foolish terms) can be of opinion for continuing the war upon the foot it now is, unless he be a gainer by it, or hopes it may occasion some new turn of affairs at home to the advantage of his party; or, lastly, unless he be very ignorant of the kingdom's condition, and by what means we have been reduced to it. Upon the two first cases, where interest is concerned, I have nothing to say: but as to the last, I think it highly necessary that the publick should be freely and impartially told what circumstances they are in, after what manner they have been treated by those, whom they trusted so many years with the disposal of their blood and treasure, and what the consequences of this management are like to be upon themselves and their posterity.

Those who, either by writing or discourse, have undertaken to defend the proceedings of the late ministry in the management of the war, and of the
treaty

treaty of *Gertruydenburgh*, have spent time in celebrating the conduct and valour of our leaders and their troops, in summing up the victories they have gained, and the towns they have taken. Then they tell us, what high articles were insisted on by our ministers and those of the confederates, and what pains both were at in persuading *France* to accept them. But nothing of this can give the least satisfaction to the just complaints of the kingdom. As to the war our grievances are, that a greater load has been laid on us than was either just or necessary, or than we have been able to bear; that the grossest impositions have been submitted to, for the advancement of private wealth and power, or in order to forward the more dangerous designs of a *faction*, to both which a peace would have put an end; and that the part of the war which was chiefly our province, which would have been most beneficial to us, and destructive to the enemy, was wholly neglected. As to a peace, we complain of being deluded by a *mock-treaty*; in which those who negotiated took care to make such demands as they knew were impossible to be complied with; and therefore might securely press every article as if they were in earnest.

These are some of the points I design to treat of in the following discourse; with several others, which I thought it necessary at this time for the kingdom to be informed of. I think I am not mistaken in those facts I mention; at least not in
any

any circumstance so material as to weaken the consequences I draw from them.

After ten years war with perpetual success, to tell us it is yet impossible to have a good peace, is very surprizing, and seems so different from what hath ever happened in the world before, that a man of any party may be allowed suspecting, that we have been either ill-used, or have not made the most of our victories, and might therefore desire to know where the difficulty lay. Then it is natural to enquire into our present condition; how long we shall be able to go on at this rate; what the consequences may be upon the present and future ages; and whether a peace without that impracticable point, which some people do so much insist on, be really ruinous in itself, or equally so with the continuance of the war.

T H E
C O N D U C T
O F T H E
A L L I E S, &c. [y].

TH E motives that may engage a wise prince, or state in war, I take to be one or more of these: either to check the overgrown power of some ambitious neighbour; to recover what hath been unjustly taken from them; to revenge some injury they have received (which all political casuists allow); to assist some ally in a just quarrel; or lastly, to defend themselves when they are invaded. In all these cases the writers upon politicks admit a war to be justly undertaken. The last is what hath been usually called *pro aris et focis*; where no expence or endeavour can be too great, because all we have is at stake, and consequently our utmost force to be exerted; and the dispute is soon determined, either in safety or utter destruction. But in the other four, I believe, it will be found, that no monarch or commonwealth did

[y] This was written preparatory to the peace which the ministers were then concerting, and which was afterwards perfected at *Utrecht*.

O R R E R Y.

This tract, and Remarks on the Barrier treaty, contain the principal facts which the author of *John Bull* has thrown into allegory; and greatly illustrate that piece, of which indeed it is possible they were the ground-work.

E V E R

ever engage beyond a certain degree; never proceeded so far as to exhaust the strength and substance of their country by anticipations and loans, which in a few years must put them in a worse condition, than any they could reasonably apprehend from those evils, for the preventing of which they first entered into the war; because this would be to run into real infallible ruin, only in hopes to remove what might perhaps but appear so by a probable speculation.

And as a war should be undertaken upon a just and prudent motive, so it is still more obvious, that a prince ought maturely to consider the condition he is in, when he enters on it; whether his coffers be full, his revenues clear of debts, his people numerous and rich by a long peace and free trade, not over-pressed with many burthensome taxes; no violent faction ready to dispute his just prerogative, and thereby weaken his authority at home, and lessen his reputation abroad. For, if the contrary of all this happen to be his case, he will hardly be persuaded to disturb the world's quiet and his own, while there is any other way left of preserving the latter with honour and safety.

Supposing the war to have commenced upon a just motive; the next thing to be considered is, when a prince ought, in prudence, to receive the overtures of a peace; which I take to be, either when the enemy is ready to yield the point originally contended for; or when that point is found impossible to be ever obtained; or when contend-

ing any longer, although with probability of gaining that point at last, would put such a prince and his people in a worse condition than the present loss of it. All which considerations are of much greater force, where a war is managed by an alliance of many confederates, which, in the variety of interests, among the several parties, is liable to so many unforeseen accidents.

In a confederate war it ought to be considered, which party has the deepest share in the quarrel: for although each may have their particular reasons, yet one or two among them will probably be more concerned than the rest, and therefore ought to bear the greatest part of the burthen in proportion to their strength. For example: two princes may be competitors for a kingdom, and it will be your interest to take the part of him, who will probably allow you good conditions of trade, rather than of the other, who possibly may not. However, that prince whose cause you espouse, although never so vigorously, is the principal in that war, and you, properly speaking, are but a second. Or a commonwealth may lie in danger to be overrun by a powerful neighbour, which, in time, may produce very bad consequences upon your trade and liberty: it is therefore necessary, as well as prudent, to lend them assistance, and help them to win a strong secure frontier; but, as they must in course be the first and greatest sufferers, so in justice they ought to bear the greatest weight. If a house be on fire, it behoves all in the neighbourhood

hood to run with buckets to quench it; but the owner is sure to be undone first; and it is not impossible, that those at next door may escape by a shower from heaven, or the stillness of the weather, or some other favourable accident.

But if an ally, who is not so immediately concerned in the good or ill fortune of the war, be so generous as to contribute more than the principal party, and even more in proportion to his abilities, he ought at least to have his share in what is conquered from the enemy; or, if his romantic disposition transport him so far as to expect little or nothing from this, he might however hope, that the principals would make it up in dignity and respect; and he would surely think it monstrous to find them intermeddling in his domestic affairs, prescribing what servants he should keep or dismiss, pressing him perpetually with the most unreasonable demands, and at every turn threatening to break the alliance if he will not comply.

From these reflexions upon war in general, I descend to consider those wars wherein *England* hath been engaged since the conquest. In the civil wars of the *Barons*, as well as those between the houses of *York* and *Lancaster*, great destruction was made of the nobility and gentry; new families raised and old ones extinguished; but the money spent on both sides was employed and circulated at home; no public debts contracted; and a very few years of peace quickly set all right again.

The like may be affirmed even of that unnatural rebellion against king *Charles I.* The usurpers maintained great armies in constant pay, had almost continual war with *Spain* or *Holland*; but, managing it by their fleets, they increased very much the riches of the kingdom, instead of exhausting them.

Our foreign wars were generally against *Scotland* or *France*: the first, being in this island, carried no money out of the kingdom, and were seldom of long continuance. During our first wars with *France*, we possessed great dominions in that country, where we preserved some footing till the reign of queen *Mary*; and although some of our later princes made very chargeable expeditions thither, a subsidy and two or three fifteenths cleared all the debt. Besides, our victories were then of some use as well as glory; for we were so prudent as to fight, and so happy as to conquer, only for ourselves.

The *Dutch* wars in the reign of king *Charles II.* although begun and carried on under a very corrupt administration, and much to the dishonour of the crown, did indeed keep the king needy and poor by discontinuing or discontenting his parliament, when he most needed their assistance; but neither left any debt upon the nation, nor carried any money out of it.

At the *Revolution*, a general war broke out in *Europe*, wherein many princes joined in alliance against *France* to check the ambitious designs of that monarch; and here the *emperor*, the *Dutch*,
and

and *England* were principals. About this time the custom first began among us of borrowing millions upon funds of interest. It was pretended, that the war could not possibly last above one or two campaigns; and that the debts contracted might be easily paid in a few years by a gentle tax, without burthening the subject. But the true reason for embracing this expedient was the security of a new prince not firmly settled on the throne. People were tempted to lend by great premiums and large interest; and it concerned them nearly to preserve that government, which they had trusted with their money. The person [z] said to have been author of so detestable a project, lived to see some of its fatal consequences, whereof his grand-children will not see an end. And this pernicious counsel closed very well with the posture of affairs at that time: for a set of upstarts, who had little or no part in the *Revolution*, but valued themselves upon their noise and pretended zeal when the work was over, were got into credit at court, by the merit of becoming undertakers, and projectors of loans and funds. These, finding that the gentlemen of estates were not willing to come into their measures, fell upon those new schemes of raising money, in order to create a monied interest that might, in time, vie with the landed, and of which they hoped to be at the head.

[z] Dr. Burnet, bishop of Sarum.

This ground of the first war for ten years after the *Revolution*, as to the part we had in it, was to make *France* acknowledge the late king, and to recover *Hudson's-Bay*. But, during that whole war, the sea was almost entirely neglected, and the greatest part of *six* millions annually employed to enlarge the frontier of the *Dutch*. For the king was a general, but not an admiral; and, although king of *England*, was a native of *Holland*.

After ten years fighting to little purpose, after the loss of above a hundred thousand men, and a debt remaining of twenty millions, we, at length, hearkened to the terms of peace, which was concluded with great advantages to the *empire* and *Holland*, but none at all to us; and clogged soon after with the famous treaty of *partition*, by which *Naples*, *Sicily*, and *Lorrain* were to be added to the *French* dominions; or, if that crown should think fit to set aside the treaty upon the *Spaniards* refusing to accept it, as they declared they would to the several parties at the very time of transacting it, then the *French* would have pretensions to the whole monarchy. And so it proved in the event; for the late king of *Spain* reckoning it an indignity to have his territories cantoned out into parcels by other princes during his own life, and without his consent, rather chose to bequeath the monarchy entire to a younger son of *France*; and this prince was acknowledged for king of *Spain* both by us and *Holland*.

It

It must be granted, that the counsels of entering into this war were violently opposed by the *church-party*, who first advised the late king to acknowledge the duke of *Anjou*; and particularly it is affirmed, that a certain [a] *great person*, who was then in the church interest, told the king in *November 1701*, that, since his majesty was determined to engage in a war so contrary to his private opinion, he could serve him no longer, and accordingly gave up his employment; although he happened afterwards to change his mind, when he was to be at the head of the treasury, and have the sole management of affairs at home, while those abroad were to be in the hands of [b] *one*, whose advantage, by all sorts of ties, he was engaged to promote.

The declarations of war against *France* and *Spain*, made by us and *Holland*, are dated within a few days of each other. In that published by the *States*, they say very truly, that *they are nearest and most exposed to the fire*; that *they are blocked up on all sides, and actually attacked by the kings of France and Spain*; that *their declaration is the effect of an urging and pressing necessity*; with other expressions to the same purpose. They *desire the assistance of all kings and princes, &c.* The grounds of their quarrel with *France* are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other prince or state; such as, *the French refusing to grant the tariff promised by the treaty of Ryswick*;

[a] Earl of Godolphin.

[b] Duke of Marlborough.

the loading the Dutch inhabitants settled in France with excessive duties, contrary to the said treaty; the violation of the partition treaty by the French accepting the king of Spain's will, and threatening the states if they would not comply; the seizing the Spanish Netherlands by the French troops, and turning out the Dutch, who, by permission of the late king of Spain, were in garrison there, by which means that republick was deprived of her barrier, contrary to the treaty of partition, where it was particularly stipulated, that the Spanish Netherlands should be left to the archduke. They alledged, that the French king governed Flanders as his own, although under the name of his grandson, and sent great numbers of troops thither to frighten them [c]; that he had seized the city and citadel of Liege; had possessed himself of several places in the archbishoprick of Cologne, and maintained troops in the county of Wolsenbittel, in order to block up the Dutch on all sides; and caused his resident to give in a memorial, wherein he threatened the States to act against them if they refused complying with the contents of that memorial.

The QUEEN's declaration of war is grounded upon the grand alliance, as this was upon the unjust usurpations and encroachments of the French king; whereof the instances produced are, his keeping in possession a great part of the Spanish dominions, seizing Milan and the Spanish Low-countries,

[c] This the author of *John Bull* calls frightening the children out of their bread and butter.

making himself master of Cadiz, &c. And instead of giving satisfaction in these points, his putting an indignity and affront on her majesty and kingdoms, by declaring the pretended prince of Wales king of England, &c. Which last was the only personal quarrel we had in the war; and even this was positively denied by France, that king being willing to acknowledge her majesty.

I think it plainly appears, by both declarations, that *England* ought no more to have been a principal in this war than *Prussia*, or any other power, who came afterwards into that alliance. *Holland* was first in danger, the *French* troops being at that time just at the gates of *Nimeguen*. But the complaints made in our declaration do all, except the last, as much or more concern almost every prince in *Europe*.

For among the several parties who came first or last into this confederacy, there were few but who in proportion had more to get or to lose, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill success of this war than we. The *Dutch* took up arms to defend themselves from immediate ruin; and, by a successful war, they proposed to have a larger extent of country, and a better frontier against *France*. The emperor hoped to recover the monarchy of *Spain*, or some part of it, for his younger son, chiefly at the expence of us and *Holland*. The king of *Portugal* had received intelligence, that *Philip* designed to renew the old pretensions of *Spain* upon that kingdom, which is surrounded by
the

the other on all sides, except towards the sea; and could therefore only be defended by *maritime powers*. This, with the advantageous terms offered by king *Charles* as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into the alliance. The duke of *Savoy's* temptations and fears were yet greater: the main chance of the war on that side was to be supplied by *England*, and the profit to redound to him. In case *Milan* should be conquered, it was stipulated, that his highness should have the duchy of *Montferrat* belonging to the duke of *Mantua*, the provinces of *Alexandria* and *Valencia* and *Lomellino*, with other lands between the *Po* and the *Tanaro*, together with the *Vigevenasco*, or in lieu of it an equivalent out of the province of *Novara*, adjoining to his own state; besides whatever else could be taken from *France* on that side by the confederate forces. Then he was in terrible apprehensions of being surrounded by *France*, who had so many troops in the *Milanese*, and might have easily swallowed up his whole duchy.

The rest of the allies came in purely for subsidies, whereof they sunk considerable sums into their own coffers, and refused to send their *contingent* to the *emperor*, alledging their troops were already hired by *England* and *Holland*.

Some time after the duke of *Anjou's* succeeding to the monarchy of *Spain*, in breach of the *partition* treaty, the question here in *England* was, whether the peace should be continued, or a new war begun. Those who were for the former, alledged

ledged the debts and difficulties we laboured under; that both we and the *Dutch* had already acknowledged *Philip* for king of *Spain*; that the inclinations of the *Spaniards* to the house of *Austria*, and their aversion from that of *Bourbon*, were not so surely to be reckoned upon as some would pretend; that we thought it a piece of insolence as well as injustice in the *French* to offer putting a king upon us, and the *Spaniards* would conceive we had as little reason to force one upon them: that it was true, the nature and genius of those two people differed very much, and so would probably continue to do, as well under a king of *French* blood as one of *Austrian*; but that, if we should engage in a war for dethroning the duke of *Anjou*, we should certainly effect what by the progress and operations of it we endeavoured to prevent, I mean an union of interest and affections between the two nations; for the *Spaniards* must, of necessity, call in *French* troops to their assistance; this would introduce *French* counsellors into king *Philip's* court, and this by degrees would habituate and reconcile the two nations; that to assist king *Charles* by *English* and *Dutch* forces would render him odious to his new subjects, who have nothing in so great abomination as those whom they hold for hereticks; that the *French* would, by this means, become masters of the treasures in the *Spanish West-Indies*; that in the last war, when *Spain*, *Cologne*, and *Bavaria* were in our alliance, and, by a modest computation, brought sixty thousand men
into

into the field against the common enemy; when *Flanders*, the seat of war, was on our side, and his majesty, a prince of great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet we had no reason to boast of our success; how then should we be able to oppose *France* with those powers against us, which could carry sixty thousand men from us to the enemy; and so make us upon the balance weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this war, than of that in 1688?

On the other side, those, whose opinion or some private motives inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alledged how dangerous it would be for *England* that *Philip* should be king of *Spain*; that we could have no security for our trade while that kingdom was subject to a prince of the *Bourbon* family, nor any hopes of preserving the balance of *Europe*, because the grandfather would, in effect, be king, while his grandson had but the title, and thereby have a better opportunity than ever of pursuing his design for universal monarchy. These and the like arguments prevailed; and so, without offering at any other remedy, without taking time to consider the consequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we hastily engaged in a war, which hath cost us sixty millions; and after repeated, as well as unexpected, success in arms, hath put us and our posterity in a worse condition, not only than any
of

of our allies, but even our conquered enemies themselves.

The part we have acted in the conduct of this whole war, with reference to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I shall now particularly examine; where, I presume, it will appear by plain matters of fact, that no nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, and the ambition of its domestic enemies; or treated with so much insolence, injustice, and ingratitude by its foreign friends.

This will be manifest by proving the three following points:

First, that against all manner of prudence or common reason we engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as auxiliaries.

Secondly, that we spent all our vigour in pursuing that part of the war, which could least answer the end we proposed by beginning it; and made no efforts at all, where we could have most weakened the common enemy, and, at the same time, enriched ourselves.

Lastly, that we suffered each of our allies to break every article in those treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the burthen upon us.

Upon the first of these points, that we ought to have entered into this war only as auxiliaries, let any man reflect upon our condition at that time:

time: just come out of the most tedious, expensive, and unsuccessful war that ever *England* had been engaged in [d]; sinking under heavy debts, of a nature and degree never heard of by us or our ancestors; the bulk of the gentry and people heartily tired of the war and glad of a peace, although it brought no other advantage but itself; no sudden prospect of lessening our taxes, which were grown as necessary to pay our debts as to raise armies; a sort of artificial wealth of funds and stocks in the hands of those, who, for ten years before, had been plundering the publick; many corruptions in every branch of our government that needed reformation. Under these difficulties, from which twenty years peace and the wisest management could hardly recover us, we declare war against *France*, fortified by the accession and alliance of those powers I mentioned before, and which, in the former war, had been parties in our confederacy. It is very obvious, what a change must be made in the balance by such weights taken out of our scale and put into theirs; since it was manifest, by ten years experience, that *France*, without those additions of strength, was able to maintain itself against us. So that human probability ran with mighty odds on the other side; and in this case nothing under the most extreme necessity should force any state to engage in a war. We had already acknowledged *Philip* for king of *Spain*;

[d] I was then lean, being just come out of a fit of sickness.
John Bull.

neither does the QUEEN's declaration of war take notice of the duke of *Anjou's* succession to that monarchy as a subject of quarrel, but the *French* king's governing it as if it were his own; his seizing *Cadiz*, *Milan*, and the *Spanish Low-countries*, with the indignity of proclaiming the *Pretender*. In all which we charge that prince with nothing directly relating to us, excepting the last: and this, altho' indeed a great affront, might easily have been redressed without a war; for the *French* court declared they did not acknowledge the *Pretender*, but only gave him the title of king, which was allowed to *Augustus* by his enemy of *Sweden*, who had driven him out of *Poland*, and forced him to acknowledge *Stanislaus*.

It is true indeed, the danger of the *Dutch*, by so ill a neighbourhood in *Flanders*, might affect us very much in the consequences of it; and the loss of *Spain* to the *House of Austria*, if it should be governed by *French* influence and *French* politicks, might, in time, be very pernicious to our trade. It would therefore have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our neighbour; and so we might have done without injuring ourselves; for, by an old treaty with *Holland*, we were bound to assist that republick with ten thousand men, whenever they were attacked by the *French*; whose troops, upon the king of *Spain's* death, taking possession of *Flanders* in right of *Philip*, and securing the *Dutch* garrisons till they would acknowledge him, the

States-general, by memorials from their envoys here, demanded only the ten thousand men we were obliged to give them by virtue of that treaty. And I make no doubt but the *Dutch* would have exerted themselves so vigorously, as to be able, with that assistance alone, to defend their frontiers; or, if they had been forced to a peace, the *Spaniards*, who abhor dismembring their monarchy, would never have suffered the *French* to possess themselves of *Flanders*. At that time, they had none of those endearments to each other, which this war hath created; and whatever hatred and jealousy were natural between the two nations would then have appeared. So that there was no sort of necessity for us to proceed further, although we had been in a better condition. But our politicians, at that time, had other views; and a new war must be undertaken upon the advice of those, who, with their partizans and adherents, were to be the sole gainers by it. A grand alliance was therefore made between the *Emperor*, *England*, and the *States-general*; by which, if the injuries complained of from *France* were not remedied in two months, the parties concerned were obliged mutually to assist each other *with their whole strength*.

Thus we became parties in a war in conjunction with two allies, whose share in the quarrel was beyond all proportion greater than ours. However, I can see no reason from the words of the grand alliance, by which we were obliged to make those

those prodigious expences we have since been at. By what I have always heard and read, I take the *whole strength of a nation*, as understood in that treaty, to be the utmost that a prince can raise annually from his subjects. If he be forced to mortgage and borrow, whether at home or abroad, it is not, properly speaking, *his own strength*, or that of the nation, but the entire substance of particular persons, which, not being able to raise out of the annual income of his kingdom, he takes upon security, and can only pay the interest. And by this method one part of the nation is pawned to the other, with hardly a possibility left of being ever redeemed.

Surely it would have been enough for us to have suspended the payment of our debts contracted in the former war; and to have continued our land and malt taxes, with those others which have since been mortgaged. These, with some additions, would have made up such a sum, as, with prudent management, might, I suppose, have maintained an hundred thousand men by sea and land; a reasonable *quota* in all conscience for that ally, who apprehended least danger, and expected least advantage. Nor can we imagine that either of the confederates, when the war began, would have been so unreasonable as to refuse joining with us upon such a foot, and expect that we should, every year, go between three and four millions in debt (which hath been our case), because the *French* could hardly have con-

trived any offers of peace so ruinous to us as such a war. Posterity will be at a loss to conceive, what kind of spirit could possess their ancestors, who after ten years suffering by the unexampled politicks of a nation maintaining a war by annually pawning itself; and during a short peace, while they were looking back with horror on the heavy loads of debts they had contracted, universally condemning those pernicious counsels which had occasioned them; racking their invention for some remedies or expedients to mend their shattered condition; I say, that these very people, without giving themselves time to breathe, should again enter into a more dangerous, chargeable, and extensive war, for the same or perhaps a greater period of time, and without any apparent necessity. It is obvious in a private fortune, that whoever annually runs out, and continues the same expences, must every year mortgage a greater quantity of land than he did before; and as the debt doubles and trebles upon him, so doth his inability to pay it. By the same proportion we have suffered twice as much by this last ten years war, as we did by the former; and, if it were possible to continue it five years longer at the same rate, it would be as great a burthen as the whole twenty. This computation being so easy and trivial that it is almost a shame to mention it, posterity will think, that those who first advised the war, wanted either the sense or the honesty to consider it.

And as we have wasted our strength and vital substance in this profuse manner, so we have shamefully misapplied it to ends at least very different from those, for which we undertook the war, and often to effect others, which after a peace we may severely repent. This is the second article I proposed to examine.

We have now, for ten years together, turned the whole force and expence of the war where the enemy was best able to hold us at a bay; where we could propose no manner of advantage to ourselves; where it was highly impolitic to enlarge our conquests; utterly neglecting that part, which would have saved and gained us many millions, which the perpetual maxims of our government teach us to pursue; which would have soonest weakened the enemy, and must either have promoted a speedy peace, or enabled us to continue the war.

Those who are fond of continuing the war, cry up our constant success at a most prodigious rate, and reckoned it infinitely greater than, in all human probability, we had reason to hope. Ten glorious campaigns are passed, and now at last, like the sick man, we are just expiring with all sorts of good symptoms. Did the advisers of this war suppose it would continue ten years without expecting the success we have had; and yet at the same time determine, that *France* must be reduced, and *Spain* subdued, by employing our whole strength upon *Flanders*? Did they believe, the last war left us in a condition to furnish such vast supplies for

so long a period without involving us and our posterity in unextricable debts? If, after such miraculous *doings*, we are not yet in a condition of bringing *France* to our terms, nor can tell when we shall be so, although we should proceed without any reverse of fortune; what could we look for in the ordinary course of things, but a *Flanders* war of at least twenty years longer? Do they indeed think, a town taken from the *Dutch* is a sufficient recompence to us for six millions of money; which is of so little consequence to determine the war, that the *French* may yet hold out a dozen years more, and afford a town every campaign at the same price?

I say not this by any means to detract from the army, or its leaders. Getting into the enemy's lines, passing rivers, and taking towns, may be actions attended with many glorious circumstances: but when all this brings no real solid advantage to us; when it hath no other end than to enlarge the territories of the *Dutch*, and increase the same and wealth of our *general*; I conclude, however it comes about, that things are not as well as they should be; and that surely our forces and money might be better employed, both towards reducing our enemy, and working out some benefit to ourselves. But the case is still much harder; we are destroying many thousand lives, exhausting our substance, not for our own interest, which would be but common prudence; not for a thing indifferent, which would be sufficient folly; but perhaps to our own destruction, which is perfect madness.

We may live to feel the effects of our own valour more sensibly, than all the consequences we imagine from the dominions of *Spain* in the duke of *Anjou*. We have conquered a noble territory for the *States*, that will maintain sufficient troops to defend itself, and feed many hundred thousand inhabitants ; where all encouragement will be given to introduce and improve manufactures, which was the only advantage they wanted ; and which, added to their skill, industry, and parsimony, will enable them to under-sell us in every market in the world.

Our supply of forty thousand men according to the first stipulation, added to the quota's of the *Emperor* and *Holland*, which they were obliged to furnish, would have made an army of near two hundred thousand, exclusive of garrisons ; enough to withstand all the power that *France* could bring against it ; and we might have employed the rest much better both for the common cause and our own advantage.

The war in *Spain* must be imputed to the credulity of our ministers, who suffered themselves to be persuaded by the imperial court, that the *Spaniards* were so violently affected to the house of *Austria*, as, upon the first appearance there, with a few troops under the archduke, the whole kingdom would immediately revolt. This we tried ; and found the *Emperor* to have deceived either us or himself. Yet there we drove on the war at a prodigious disadvantage with great expence ; and by a

most corrupt management the only [e] general, who, by a course of conduct and fortune almost miraculous, had nearly put us into possession of that kingdom, was left wholly unsupported, exposed to the envy of his rivals, disappointed by the caprices of a young unexperienced prince under the guidance of a rapacious *German* ministry, and at last called home in discontent. By which our armies both in *Spain* and *Portugal*, were made a sacrifice to avarice, ill-conduct, or treachery.

In common prudence we should either have pushed that war with the utmost vigour in so fortunate a juncture, especially since the gaining that kingdom was the great point, for which we pretended to continue the war; or at least when we had *found*, or *made* that design impracticable, we should not have gone on in so expensive a management of it; but have kept our troops on the defensive in *Catalonia*, and pursued some other way more effectual for distressing the common enemy, and advantaging ourselves.

And what a noble field of honour and profit had we before us wherein to employ the best of our strength, which, against all maxims of *British* policy, we suffered to lie wholly neglected! I have sometimes wondered how it came to pass that the style of *maritime powers*, by which our allies, in a sort of contemptuous manner, usually couple us with the *Dutch*, did never put us in mind of the sea; and while some politicians were shewing us

[e] The earl of *Peterborough*.

the way to *Spain* by *Flanders*, others to *Savoy* or *Naples*, that the *West-Indies* should never come into their heads. With half the charge we have been at, we might have maintained our original *quota* of forty thousand men in *Flanders*, and, at the same time, by our fleets and naval forces have so distressed the *Spaniards* in the north and south seas of *America*, as to prevent any returns of money from thence except in our own bottoms. This is what best became us to do as a *maritime power*; this, with any common degree of success, would soon have compelled *France* to the necessities of a peace, and *Spain* to acknowledge the archduke. But while we, for ten years, have been squandering away our money upon the continent, *France* hath been wisely engrossing all the trade of *Peru*, going directly with their ships to *Lima* and other ports, and there receiving ingots of gold and silver for *French* goods of little value; which, besides the mighty advantage to their nation at present, may divert the channel of that trade for the future, so beneficial to us, who used to receive annually such vast sums at *Cadiz* for our goods sent thence to the *Spanish West-Indies*. All this we tamely saw and suffered without the least attempt to hinder it; except what was performed by some private men at *Bristol*, who, inflamed by a true spirit of courage and industry, did, about three years ago, with a few vessels fitted out at their own charge, make a most successful voyage into those parts; took one of the *Aquapulco* ships, very narrowly miss of the other, and are
lately

lately returned laden with unenvied wealth, to shew us what might have been done with the like management by a public undertaking. At least we might easily have prevented those great returns of money to *France* and *Spain*, although we could not have taken it ourselves. And if it be true, as the advocates for war would have it, that the *French* are now so impoverished, in what condition must they have been, if that issue of wealth had been stopped?

But great events often turn upon very small circumstances. It was the kingdom's misfortune, that the sea was not the duke of *Marlborough's* element; otherwise the whole force of the war would infallibly have been bestowed there infinitely to the advantage of his country, which would then have gone hand in hand with his own. But it is very truly objected, that if we alone had made such an attempt as this, *Holland* would have been jealous; or, if we had done it in conjunction with *Holland* the house of *Austria* would have been discontented. This hath been the style of late years; which whoever introduced among us, they have taught our allies to speak after them. Otherwise it could hardly enter into any imagination, that while we are confederates in a war with those who are to have the whole profit, and who leave a double share of the burthen upon us, we dare not think of any design (although against the common enemy) where there is the least prospect of doing good to our own country, for fear of giving umbrage and offence to our allies,

allies, while we are ruining ourselves to conquer provinces and kingdoms for them. I therefore confess with shame, that this objection is true: for it is very well known, that while the design of Mr. *Hill's* expedition [f] remained a secret, it was suspected in *Holland* and *Germany* to be intended against *Peru*; whereupon the *Dutch* made every where their public complaints; and the ministers at *Vienna* talked of it as an *insolence in the QUEEN to attempt such an undertaking*; which although it has failed, partly by the accidents of a storm, and partly by the stubbornness or treachery of some in that colony, for whose relief, and at whose entreaty, it was in some measure designed, is no objection at all to an enterprize so well concerted, and with such fair probability of success.

It was something singular that the *States* should express their uneasiness, when they thought we intended to make some attempt in the *Spanish West-Indies*; because it is agreed between us, that whatever is conquered there by us or them shall belong to the conqueror; which is the only article that I can call to mind in all our treaties or stipulations with any view of interest to this kingdom; and for that very reason I suppose, among others, hath been altogether neglected. Let those, who think this too severe a reflexion, examine the whole manage-

[f] The expedition in 1711, wherein Sir *Horvenden Walker* commanded the fleet, and Mr. *Hill* the land forces for the reduction of *Quebec* and *Canada*, and regaining the *Newfoundland* fishery, which the *French* had taken from us.

ment of the present war by sea and land, with all our alliances, treaties, stipulations, and conventions, and consider whether the whole doth not look, as if some particular care and industry had been used to prevent any benefit or advantage that might possibly accrue to *Britain*?

This kind of treatment, from our principal allies, hath taught the same dialect to all the rest; so that there is not a petty prince whom we half maintain by subsidies and pensions, who is not ready, upon every occasion, to threaten us, that he will recal his troops (although they must rob or starve at home) if we refuse to comply with him in any demand, however unreasonable.

Upon the third head I shall produce some instances to shew, how tamely we have suffered each of our allies to infringe every article in those treaties and stipulations, by which they were bound; and to lay the load upon us.

But before I enter upon this, which is a large subject, I shall take leave to offer a few remarks on certain articles in three of our treaties; which may let us perceive how much those ministers valued or understood the true interest, safety, or honour of their country.

We have made two alliances with *Portugal*, an offensive and a defensive; the first is to remain in force only during the present war; the second to be perpetual. In the offensive alliance the *Emperor*, *England*, and *Holland* are parties with *Portugal*; in the defensive only we and the *States*.

Upon

Upon the first article of the offensive alliance it is to be observed, that although the grand alliance, as I have already said, allows *England* and *Holland* to possess for their own whatever each of them shall conquer in the *Spanish West-Indies*: yet there we are quite cut out by consenting, that the archduke shall possess the dominions of *Spain* in as full a manner as their late king *Charles*. And what is more remarkable, we broke this very article in favour of *Portugal* by subsequent stipulations; where we agree that king *Charles* shall deliver up *Estremadura, Vigo*, and some other places to the *Portuguese*, as soon as we can conquer them from the enemy. They, who are guilty of so much folly and contradiction, know best whether it proceeded from corruption or stupidity.

By two other articles (besides the honour of being convoys and guards in ordinary to the *Portuguese* ships and coasts) we are to guess the enemy's thoughts, and to take the king of *Portugal's* word whenever he hath a fancy that he shall be invaded. We are also to furnish him with a strength superior to what the enemy intends to invade any of his dominions with, let that be what it will. And until we know what the enemy's forces are, his *Portuguese* majesty is sole judge what strength is superior, and what will be able to prevent an invasion; and may send our fleets whenever he pleases upon his errands to some of the further parts of the world, or keep them attending upon his own coasts till he think fit to dismiss them. These fleets must likewise

likewise be subject in all things not only to the king, but to his viceroys, admirals, and governors, in any of his foreign dominions, when he is in an humour to apprehend an invasion; which, I believe, is an indignity that was never offered before, except to a conquered nation.

In the defensive alliance with that crown, which is to remain perpetual, and where only *England* and *Holland* are parties with them, the same care in almost the same words is taken for our fleet to attend their coasts and foreign dominions, and to be under the same obedience. We and the *States* are likewise to furnish them with twelve thousand men at our own charge, which we are constantly to recruit; and these are to be subject to the *Portuguese* generals.

In the offensive alliance we took no care of having the assistance of *Portugal*, whenever we should be invaded; but in this it seems, we are wiser; for that king is obliged to make war on *France* or *Spain*, whenever we or *Holland* are invaded by either; but, before this, we are to supply them with the same forces both by sea and land, as if he were invaded himself. And this must needs be a very prudent and safe course for a *maritime power* to take upon a sudden invasion; by which, instead of making use of our fleets and armies for our own defence, we must send them abroad for the defence of *Portugal*.

By the thirteenth article we are told what this assistance is which the *Portuguese* are to give us, and upon what conditions. They are to furnish
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ten men of war; and when *England* and *Holland* shall be invaded by *France* and *Spain* together, or by *Spain* alone, in either of these cases those ten *Portuguese* men of war are to serve only upon their own coasts; where, no doubt, they will be of mighty use to their allies, and terror to the enemy.

How the *Dutch* were drawn to have a part in either of these two alliances is not very material to enquire, since they have been so wise as never to observe them; and I suppose never intended it; but resolved, as they have since done, to shift the load upon us.

Let any man read these two treaties from the beginning to the end, he will imagine that the king of *Portugal* and his ministers sat down and made them by themselves, and then sent them to their allies to sign; the whole spirit and tenor of them quite through running only upon this single point, what we and *Holland* are to do for *Portugal*, without any mention of an equivalent, except those ten ships, which, at the time when we have greatest need of their assistance, are obliged to attend upon their own coasts.

The barrier-treaty between *Great Britain* and *Holland*, was concluded at the *Hague* on the 29th of *October*, in the year 1709. In this treaty neither her majesty nor her kingdoms have any interest or concern, further than what is mentioned in the second and twentieth articles: by the former the *States* are to assist the *QUEEN* in defending the act of succession; and by the other, not to treat of

a peace, till *France* had acknowledged the *QUEEN* and the succession of *Hanover*, and promised to remove the *Pretender* out of that king's dominions.

As to the first of these, it is certainly for the safety and interest of the *States general*, that the Protestant succession should be preserved in *England*; because such a popish prince, as we apprehended, would infallibly join with *France* in the ruin of that republick. And the *Dutch* are as much bound to support our succession, as they are tied to any part of a treaty or league offensive and defensive against a common enemy, without any seperate benefit upon that consideration. Her majesty is in the full peaceable possession of her kingdoms, and of the hearts of her people, among whom hardly one in five thousand are in the *Pretender's* interest. And whether the assistance of the *Dutch* to preserve a right so well established be an equivalent to those many unreasonable exorbitant articles in the rest of the treaty, let the world judge. What an impression of our settlement must it give abroad, to see our ministers offering such conditions to the *Dutch* to prevail on them to be guarantees of our acts of parliament! neither perhaps is it right, in point of policy, or good sense, that a foreign power should be called in to confirm our succession by way of guarantee, but only to acknowledge it; otherwise we put it out of the power of our own legislature to change our succession without the consent of that prince or state, who is guarantee, how much soever the necessities of the kingdom may require it.

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As to the other article, it is a natural consequence that must attend any treaty of peace we can make with *France*; being only the acknowledgment of her majesty as *QUEEN* of her own dominions, and the right of succession by our own laws, which no foreign power hath any pretence to dispute.

However, in order to deserve these mighty advantages from the *States*, the rest of the treaty is wholly taken up in directing what we are to do for them.

By the grand alliance, which was the foundation of the present war, the *Spanish Low-countries* were to be recovered and delivered to the king of *Spain*; but by this treaty that prince is to possess nothing in *Flanders* during the war; and after a peace the *States* are to have the military command of about twenty towns, with the dependences, and four hundred thousand crowns a year from the king of *Spain* to maintain their garrisons. By which means they will have the command of all *Flanders*, from *Newport* on the sea to *Namur* on the *Maese*, and be entirely masters of the *Pais de waas*, the richest part of those provinces. Further, they have liberty to garrison any place they shall think fit in the *Spanish Low-countries*, whenever there is an appearance of war; and consequently to put garrisons into *Ostend*, or where else they please, upon a rupture with *England*.

By this treaty likewise the *Dutch* will, in effect, be entire masters of all the *Low-countries* ; may impose duties, restrictions in commerce, and prohibitions at their pleasure ; and, in that fertile country, may set up all sorts of manufactures, particularly the woollen, by inviting the disobliged manufacturers in *Ireland*, and the *French* refugees, who are scattered all over *Germany*. And as this manufacture increaseth abroad, the cloathing people of *England* will be necessitated, for want of employment, to follow ; and in few years, by help of the low interest of money in *Holland*, *Flanders* may recover that beneficial trade, which we got from them. The landed men of *England* will then be forced to re-establish the staples of wool abroad ; and the *Dutch*, instead of being only the carriers, will become the original possessors of those commodities, with which the greatest part of the trade of the world is now carried on. And as they increase their trade, it is obvious they will enlarge their strength at sea, and ours must lessen in proportion.

All the ports in *Flanders* are to be subject to the like duties, that the *Dutch* shall lay upon the *Scheld*, which is to be closed on the sides of the *States* : thus all other nations are, in effect, shut out from trading with *Flanders*. Yet in the very same article it is said, that the *States* shall be favoured in all the *Spanish dominions* as much as Great Britain, or as the people most favoured. We have conquered *Flanders* for them, and are in a worse condition as to our trade there, than before the war began. We have
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been the great support of the king of *Spain*, to whom the *Dutch* have hardly contributed any thing at all; and yet *they are to be equally favoured with us in all his dominions*. Of all this the QUEEN is under the unreasonable obligation of being guarantee, and that they shall possess their barrier and their four hundred thousand crowns a year, even before a peace.

It is to be observed, that this treaty was only signed by one of our plenipotentiaries [g]; and I have been told that the other [h] was heard to say, he would rather lose his right hand than set it to such a treaty. Had he spoke these words in due season, and loud enough to be heard on this side the water, considering the credit he had then at court, he might have saved much of his country's honour, and got as much to himself; therefore, if the report be true, I am inclined to think he only SAID it. I have been likewise told, that some very necessary circumstances were wanting in the entrance upon this treaty; but the ministers here rather chose to sacrifice the honour of the crown, and the safety of their country, than not ratify what one of their favourites had transacted.

Let me now consider in what manner our allies have observed those treaties they made with us, and the several stipulations and agreements pursuant to them.

[g] Lord *Townshend*. See *John Bull*,

[h] Duke of *Marlborough*.

By the grand alliance between the *Empire, England, and Holland*, we were to assist the other two *totis viribus* by sea and land. By a convention subsequent to this treaty, the proportions which the several parties should contribute towards the war, were adjusted in the following manner: the *Emperor* was obliged to furnish ninety thousand men against *France*, either in *Italy*, or upon the *Rhine*; *Holland* to bring sixty thousand into the field in *Flanders*, exclusive of *garrisons*; and *we* forty thousand. In winter, 1702, which was the next year, the duke of *Marlborough* proposed raising ten thousand men more by way of augmentation, and to carry on the war with greater vigour; to which the parliament agreed, and the *Dutch* were to raise the same number. This was upon a *par*, directly contrary to the former stipulation, whereby our part was to be a third less than theirs; and therefore it was granted with a condition that *Holland* should break off all trade and commerce with *France*. But this condition was never executed; the *Dutch* only amusing us with a specious declaration, till our session of parliament was ended; and the following year it was taken off by concert between our *general* and the *States*, without any reason assigned, for the satisfaction of the kingdom. The next and some ensuing campaigns, further additional forces were allowed by parliament for the war in *Flanders*; and in every new supply the *Dutch* gradually lessened their proportions, although the parliament addressed the *QUEEN*, that
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the *States* might be desired to observe them according to agreement; which had no other effect, than to teach them to elude it by making their troops nominal corps; as they did by keeping up the number of regiments, but sinking a fifth part of the men and money; so that now things are just inverted. And in all new levies we contributed a third more than the *Dutch*, who at first were obliged to the same proportion more than us.

Besides, the more towns we conquer for the *States*, the worse condition we are in towards reducing the common enemy, and consequently of putting an end to the war. For they make no scruple of employing the troops of their *quota* towards garrisoning every town, as fast as it is taken; directly contrary to the agreement between us, by which all garrisons are particularly excluded. This is at length arrived by several steps to such a height, that there are at present in the field not so many forces under the duke of *Marlborough's* command in *Flanders*, as *Britain* alone maintains for that service, nor have been for some years past.

The duke of *Marlborough* having entered the enemies lines and taken *Bouchain*, formed the design of keeping so great a number of troops, and particularly of cavalry, in *Lisle*, *Tournay*, *Doway*, and the country between, as should be able to harass all the neighbouring provinces of *France* during the winter, prevent the enemy from erecting their magazines, and, by consequence, from subsisting their forces next spring, and render it im-

possible for them to assemble their army another year, without going back behind the *Soame* to do it. In order to effect this project, it was necessary to be at an expence extraordinary of forage for the troops, for building stables, finding fire and candle for the soldiers, with other incident charges. The QUEEN readily agreed to furnish her share of the first article, that of the forage, which only belonged to her. But the *States* insisting that her majesty should likewise come into a proportion of the other articles, which in justice belonged totally to them; she agreed even to that, rather than a design of this importance should fail. And yet we know it hath failed, and that the *Dutch* refused their consent till the time was past for putting it in execution, even in the opinion of those who proposed it. Perhaps, a certain article in the treaties of contributions submitted to by such of the *French* dominions, as pay them to the *States*, was the principal cause of defeating this project; since one great advantage to have been gained by it was, as is before mentioned, to have hindered the enemy from erecting their magazines; and one article in those treaties of contributions is, that the produce of those countries shall pass free and unmolested. So that the question was reduced to this short issue: whether the *Dutch* should lose this poultry benefit, or the common cause an advantage of such mighty importance.

The sea being the element, where we might most probably carry on the war with any advantage
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to ourselves, it was agreed that we should bear five eighths of the charge in that service, and the *Dutch* the other three; and by the grand alliance, whatever we or *Holland* should conquer in the *Spanish West-Indies*, was to accrue to the conquerors. It might therefore have been hoped, that this *maritime ally* of ours would have made up in their fleet what they fell short in their army; but quite otherwise, they never once furnished their *quota* either of ships or men; or if some few of their fleet now and then appeared, it was no more than appearing; for they immediately separated to look to their merchants and protect their trade. And we may remember very well, when these guarantees of our succession, after having not one ship for many months together in the *Mediterranean*, sent that part of their *quota* thither, and furnished nothing to us, at the same time that they alarmed us with the rumour of an invasion. And last year, when Sir *James Wisbart* was dispatched into *Holland* to expostulate with the *States*, and to desire they would make good their agreements in so important a part of the service; he met with such a reception as ill became a republick to give, that were under so many great obligations to us; in short such an one, as those only deserve who are content to take it.

It hath likewise been no small inconvenience to us, that the *Dutch* are always slow in paying their subsidies; by which means the weight and pressure of the payment lies upon the QUEEN, as well as the blame, if her majesty be not very exact. Nor

will even this always content our allies: for, in *July 1711*, the king of *Spain* was paid all the subsidies to the first of *January* next; nevertheless he hath since complained for want of money; and his *secretary* threatened, that, if we would not further supply his majesty, he could not answer for what might happen; although king *Charles* had not at that time one third of the troops for which he was paid; and even those he had were neither paid nor cloathed.

I cannot forbear mentioning here another passage concerning subsidies, to shew what opinion foreigners have of our easiness, and how much they reckon themselves masters of our money, whenever they think fit to call for it. The *QUEEN* was, by agreement, to pay two hundred thousand crowns a year to the *Prussian* troops; the *States* one hundred thousand; and the *Emperor* only thirty thousand for recruiting, which his *imperial* majesty never paid. Prince *Eugene* happening to pass by *Berlin*, the ministers of that court applied to him for redress in this particular; and his highness very frankly promised them, that, in consideration of this deficiency, *Britain* and the *States* should increase their subsidies to seventy thousand crowns more between them; and that the *Emperor* should be punctual for the time to come. This was done by that prince without any orders or power whatsoever. The *Dutch* very reasonably refused consenting to it: but the *Prussian* minister here, making his application at our court, prevailed

vailed on us to agree to our proportion, before we could hear what resolution would be taken in *Holland*. It is therefore to be hoped, that his *Prussian* majesty, at the end of this war, will not have the same cause of complaint, which he had at the close of the last; that his military chest was emptier by twenty thousand crowns than at the time the war began.

The *Emperor*, as we have already said, was, by stipulation, to furnish ninety thousand men, against the common enemy, as having no fleets to maintain, and, in right of his family, being most concerned in the success of the war. However, this agreement hath been so ill observed, that from the beginning of the war to this day neither of the two last *Emperors* had ever twenty thousand men on their own account in the common cause, excepting once in *Italy*, when the *imperial* court exerted itself in a point they have much more at heart, than that of gaining *Spain* or the *Indies* to their family. When they had succeeded in their attempts on the side of *Italy*, and observed our blind zeal for pushing on the war at all adventures, they soon found out the most effectual expedient to excuse themselves. They computed easily, that it would cost them less to make large presents to one single person than to pay an army, and turn to as good account. They thought they could not put their affairs into better hands; and therefore wisely left us to fight their battles.

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Besides, it appeared by several instances, how little the *Emperor* regarded his allies, or the cause they were engaged in, when once he thought the *empire* itself was secure. It is known enough, that he might several times have made a peace with his discontented subjects in *Hungary*, upon terms not at all unbecoming either his dignity or interest; but he rather chose to sacrifice the whole alliance to his private passion, by entirely subduing and enslaving a miserable people, who had but too much provocation to take up arms to free themselves from the oppressions, under which they were groaning; yet this must serve as an excuse for breaking his agreement, and diverting so great a body of troops, which might have been employed against *France*.

Another instance of the *Emperor's* indifference, or rather dislike, to the common cause of the allies, is the business of *Toulon*. This design was indeed discovered here at home by a person, whom every body knows to be the creature of a certain *great man* at least as much noted for his skill in gaming as in politicks, upon the base mercenary end of getting money by wagers; which was then so common a practice, that I remember a gentleman in business, who, having the curiosity to enquire how wagers went upon the *Exchange*, found some people deep in the secret to have been concerned in that kind of traffick; as appeared by premiums named for towns, which nobody but those behind the curtain could suspect. However, although this
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project had gotten wind by so scandalous a proceeding; yet *Toulon* might probably have been taken, if the *Emperor* had not thought fit, in that very juncture, to detach twelve or fifteen thousand men to seize *Naples*, as an enterprize that was more his private and immediate interest. But it was manifest, that his *imperial* majesty had no mind to see *Toulon* in possession of the allies; for, even with these discouragements, the attempts might yet have succeeded, if prince *Eugene* had not thought fit to oppose it; which cannot be imputed to his own judgment, but to some politic reasons of his court. The duke of *Savoy* was for attacking the enemy as soon as our army arrived; but when the marshal *de Tesse's* troops were all come up, to pretend to besiege the place in the condition we were at that time, was a farce and a jest. Had *Toulon* fallen then into our hands, the maritime power of *France* would, in a great measure, have been destroyed.

But a much greater instance than either of the foregoing, how little the *Emperor* regarded us or our quarrel, after all we had done to save his *imperial* crown, and to assert the title of his brother to the monarchy of *Spain*, may be brought from the proceedings of that court not many months ago. It was judged, that a war carried on upon the side of *Italy* would cause a great diversion of the *French* forces, wound them in a very tender part, and facilitate the progress of our arms in *Spain* as well as *Flanders*. It was proposed to the duke of *Savoy* to make

make this diversion; and not only a diversion during the summer, but the winter too, by taking quarters on this side of the hills. Only, in order to make him willing and able to perform this work, two points were to be settled: first, it was necessary to end the dispute between the *imperial* court and his royal highness, which had no other foundation than the *Emperor's* refusing to make good some articles of that treaty, on the faith of which the duke engaged in the present war, and for the execution whereof *Britain* and *Holland* became guarantees, at the request of the late emperor *Leopold*. To remove this difficulty, the earl of *Peterborough* was dispatched to *Vienna*, got over some part of those disputes to the satisfaction of the duke of *Savoy*, and had put the rest in a fair way of being accommodated at the time the emperor *Joseph* died. Upon which great event, the duke of *Savoy* took the resolution of putting himself at the head of the army, although the whole matter was not finished, since the common cause required his assistance; and that, until a new emperor were elected, it was impossible to make good the treaty to him. In order to enable him, the only thing he asked was, that he should be reinforced by the imperial court with eight thousand men before the end of the campaign. Mr. *Whitworth* was sent to *Vienna* to make this proposal; and it is credibly reported that he was impowered, rather than fail, to offer forty thousand pounds for the march of those eight thousand men, if he found it

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was want of ability, and not inclination, that hindered the sending them. But he was so far from succeeding, that it was said the ministers of that court did not so much as give him an opportunity to tempt them with any particular sums; but cut off all his hopes at once, by alledging the impossibility of complying with the QUEEN's demands upon any consideration whatsoever. They could not plead their old excuse of the war in *Hungary*, which was then brought to an end. They had nothing to offer but some general speculative reasons, which it would expose them to repeat; and so, after much delay, and many trifling pretences, they utterly refused so small and seasonable an assistance; to the ruin of a project that would have more terrified *France*, and caused a greater diversion of their forces, than a much more numerous army in any other part. Thus, for want of eight thousand men, for whose winter-campaign the QUEEN was willing to give forty thousand pounds; and for want of executing the design I lately mentioned of hindering the enemy from erecting magazines, towards which her majesty was ready not only to bear her own proportion, but a share of that which the *States* were obliged to; our hopes of taking winter-quarters in the north and south parts of *France* are eluded, and the war left in that method which is like to continue it longest. Can there an example be given in the whole course of this war, where we have treated the pettiest prince, with whom we had to deal, in so contemptuous a manner?

ner? Did we ever once consider what we could afford, or what we were obliged to when our assistance was desired, even while we lay under immediate apprehensions of being invaded? .

When *Portugal* came as a confederate into the grand alliance, it was stipulated, that the empire, *England*, and *Holland*, should each maintain four thousand men of their own troops in that kingdom, and pay between them a million of pattacons to the king of *Portugal*, for the support of twenty-eight thousand *Portuguese*; which number of forty thousand was to be the confederate army against *Spain* on the *Portugal* side. This treaty was ratified by all the three powers. But, in a short time after, the *Emperor* declared himself unable to comply with his part of the agreement, and so left the two thirds upon us; who very generously undertook that burthen, and at the same time two thirds of the subsidies for maintenance of the *Portuguese* troops. But neither is this the worst part of the story; for although the *Dutch* did indeed send their own *quota* of four thousand men to *Portugal* (which however they would not agree to but upon condition that the other two thirds should be supplied by us); yet they never took care to recruit them; for, in the year 1706, the *Portuguese*, *British*, and *Dutch* forces having marched with the earl of *Galway* into *Castile*, and by the noble conduct of that general being forced to retire into *Valencia*, it was found necessary to raise a new army on the *Portugal* side; where the QUEEN hath, at several

several times, encreased her establishment to ten thousand five hundred men; and the *Dutch* never replaced one single man, nor paid one penny of their subsidies to *Portugal* in six years.

The *Spanish* army on the side of *Catalonia* is, or ought to be, about fifty thousand men, exclusive of *Portugal*. And here the war hath been carried on almost entirely at our cost. For this whole army is paid by the QUEEN, excepting only seven battalions and fourteen squadrons of *Dutch* and *Palatines*; and even fifteen hundred of these are likewise in our pay; besides the sums given to king *Charles* for subsidies and the maintenance of his court. Neither are our troops at *Gibraltar* included within this number. And further, we alone have been at all the charge of transporting the forces first sent from *Genoa* to *Barcelona*; and of all the *imperial* recruits from time to time. And have likewise paid vast sums as levy-money for every individual man and horse so furnished to recruit; although the horses were scarce worth the price of transportation. But this hath been almost the constant misfortune of our fleet during the present war; instead of being employed on some enterprize for the good of the nation, or even for the protection of our trade, to be wholly taken up in transporting soldiers.

We have actually conquered all *Bavaria*, *Ulm*, *Augsbourg*, *Landau*, and a great part of *Alsace*, for the *Emperor*: and by the troops we have furnished, the armies we have paid, and the diversions we
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have given to the enemies forces, have chiefly contributed to the conquests of *Milan*, *Mantua*, and *Mirandola*, and to the recovery of the duchy of *Modena*. The last *Emperor* drained the wealth of those countries into his own coffers, without increasing his troops against *France* by such mighty acquisitions, or yielding to the most reasonable requests we have made.

Of the many towns we have taken for the *Dutch*, we have consented, by the Barrier-treaty, that all those which were not in the possession of *Spain*, upon the death of the late catholic king, shall be part of the *States* dominions; and that they shall have the military power in the most considerable of the rest; which is, in effect, to be the absolute sovereigns of the whole. And the *Hollanders* have already made such good use of their time, that, in conjunction with our general, the oppressions of *Flanders* are much greater than ever.

And this treatment, which we have received from our two principal allies, hath been pretty well copied by most other princes in the confederacy, with whom we have any dealings. For instance: seven *Portuguese* regiments, after the battle of *Almanza*, went off with the rest of that broken army to *Catalonia*: the king of *Portugal* said he was not able to pay them, while they were out of his country; the QUEEN consented therefore to do it herself, provided the king would raise as many more to supply their place. This he engaged to do, but never performed. Notwithstanding which, his sub-

fidies were constantly paid him, by my lord *Godolphin*, for almost four years, without any deduction upon account of those seven regiments; directly contrary to the seventh article of our offensive alliance with that crown, where it is agreed, that a deduction shall be made out of those subsidies, in proportion to the number of men wanting in that complement which the king is to maintain. But, whatever might have been the reasons for this proceeding, it seems they are above the understanding of the [*i*] present lord *treasurer*; who, not entering into those refinements of paying the *public* money upon *private* considerations, hath been so uncourtly as to stop it. This disappointment, I suppose, hath put the court of *Lisbon* upon other expedients, of raising the price of forage, so as to force us either to lessen our number of troops, or be at a double expence in maintaining them; and this at a time, when their own product, as well as the import of corn, was never greater; and of demanding a duty upon the soldiers cloaths we carried over for those troops, which have been their sole defence against an inveterate enemy; and whose example might have infused courage, as well as taught them discipline, if their spirits had been capable of receiving either.

In order to augment our forces every year in the same proportion as those for whom we fight diminish theirs, we have been obliged to hire troops

[*i*] Earl of *Oxford*.

from several princes of the empire, whose ministers and residents here have perpetually importuned the court with unreasonable demands, under which our late ministers thought fit to be passive. For those demands were always backed with a threat to recall their soldiers; which was a thing not to be heard of, because it might *discontent the Dutch*. In the mean time, those princes never sent their contingent to the *Emperor*, as, by the laws of the empire, they are obliged to do; but gave, for their excuse, that we had already hired all they could possibly spare.

But if all this be true; if, according to what I have affirmed, we began this war contrary to reason; if, as the other party themselves, upon all occasions, acknowledge, the success we have had was more than we could reasonably expect; if, after all our success, we have not made that use of it, which, in reason, we ought to have done; if we have made weak and foolish bargains with our allies; suffered them tamely to break every article even in those bargains to our disadvantage, and allowed them to treat us with insolence and contempt at the very instant when we were gaining towns, provinces, and kingdoms for them at the price of our ruin, and without any prospect of interest to ourselves; if we have consumed all our strength in attacking the enemy on the strongest side, where (as the old duke of *Schomberg* expressed it) *to engage with France was to take a bull by the horns*; and left wholly unattempted that part of the

war,

war, which could only enable us to continue or to end it ; if all this, I say, be our case, it is a very obvious question to ask, by what motives, or what management, we are thus become the *dupes* and *bubbles of Europe*? Sure it cannot be owing to the stupidity arising from the coldness of our climate ; since those among our allies, who have given us most reason to complain, are as far removed from the sun as ourselves.

If, in laying open the real causes of our present misery, I am forced to speak with some freedom, I think it will require no apology. Reputation is the smallest sacrifice those can make us, who have been the instruments of our ruin ; because it is that for which, in all probability, they have the least value. So that, in exposing the actions of such persons, it cannot be said, properly speaking, to do them an injury. But, as it will be some satisfaction to our people to know by whom they have been so long abused, so it may be of great use to us, and our posterity, not to trust the safety of their country in the hands of those, who act by such principles, and from such motives.

I have already observed, that when the counsels of this war were debated in the late king's time, a certain *great man* was then so averse from entering into it, that he rather chose to give up his employment, and tell the king he could serve him no longer. Upon that prince's death, although the grounds of our quarrel with *France* had received no manner of addition, yet this lord thought fit to al-

ter his sentiments; for the scene was quite changed; his lordship, and the family with whom he was engaged by so complicated an alliance, were in the highest credit possible with the QUEEN. The treasurer's staff was ready for his lordship; the duke was to command the army, and the duchess, by her employments, and the favour she was possessed of, to be always nearest her majesty's person; by which the whole power at home and abroad would be devolved upon that family. This was a prospect so very inviting, that, to confess the truth, it could not be easily withstood by any, who have so keen an appetite for wealth or power. By an agreement, subsequent to the grand alliance, we were to assist the *Dutch* with forty thousand men, all to be commanded by the duke of *Marlborough*. So that, whether this war was prudently begun or not, it is plain that the true spring or motive of it was the aggrandizing a particular family; and, in short, a war of the *general* and the *ministry*, and not of the *prince* or *people*; since those very persons were against it, when they knew the power, and consequently the profit, would be in other hands.

With these measures sell in all that sett of people, who are called the *monied men*; such as had raised vast sums by trading with stocks and funds, and lending upon great interest and premiums; whose perpetual harvest is war, and whose beneficial way of traffick must very much decline by a peace.

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In that whole chain of encroachments made upon us by the *Dutch*, which I have above deduced; and under those several gross impositions from other princes, if any one should ask, why our general continued so easy to the last? I know no other way so probable, or indeed so charitable, to account for it, as by that unmeasurable love of wealth, which his best friends allow to be his predominant passion. However, I shall wave any thing that is personal upon this subject. I shall say nothing of those great presents made by several princes, which the soldiers used to call *winter-foraging*, and said it was better than that of the *summer*; of two and half *per cent.* subtracted out of all the subsidies we pay in those parts, which amounts to no inconsiderable sum; and lastly, of the grand perquisites, in a long successful war, which are so amicably adjusted between him and the *States*.

But when the war was thus begun, there soon fell in other incidents here at home, which made the continuance of it necessary for those, who were the chief advisers. The *whigs* were, at that time, out of all credit or consideration. The reigning favourites had always carried what was called the *tory principles*, at least as high as our constitution could bear; and most others, in great employments, were wholly in the church interest. These, last, among whom were several persons of the greatest merit, quality, and consequence, were not able to endure the many instances of pride, insolence, avarice, and ambition, which those favour-

ites began so easily to dispose, nor to see them presuming to be sole dispensers of the royal favour. However, their opposition was to no purpose; they wrestled with too great a power, and were soon crushed under it. For those in possession, finding they could never be quiet in their usurpations, while others had any credit, who were at least upon an equal foot of merit, began to make overtures to the discarded *whigs*, who would be content with any terms of accommodation. Thus commenced this *solemn league and covenant*, which hath ever since been cultivated with so much application. The great traders in money were wholly devoted to the *whigs*, who had first raised them. The army, the court, and the treasury, continued under the old *despotic* administration: the *whigs* were received into employment, left to manage the parliament, cry down the landed interest, and worry the church. Mean time our allies, who were not ignorant, that all this artificial structure had no true foundation in the hearts of the people, resolved to make the best use of it as long as it should last. And the general's credit being raised to a great height at home by our success in *Flanders*, the *Dutch* began their gradual impositions; lessening their *quotas*, breaking their stipulations, garrisoning the towns we took for them, without supplying their troops; with many other infringements: all which we were forced to submit to, because the general was *made easy*; because the monied men at home were fond of the war; because

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the *whigs* were not firmly settled; and because that exorbitant degree of power, which was built upon a supposed necessity of employing particular persons, would go off in a peace. It is needless to add, that the emperor, and other princes, followed the example of the *Dutch*, and succeeded as well, for the same reasons.

I have here imputed the continuance of the war to the mutual indulgence between our general and allies, wherein they both so well found their accounts; to the fears of the *money-changers*, lest their *tables should be overthrown*; to the designs of the *whigs*, who apprehended the loss of their credit and employments in a peace; and to those at home, who held their immoderate engrossments of power and favour by no other tenure, than their own presumption upon the necessity of affairs. The truth of this will appear indisputable, by considering with what unanimity and concert these several parties acted towards that great end.

When the vote passed in the house of lords against any peace without *Spain* being restored to the *Austrian* family, the earl of *Wharton* told the house, that it was indeed impossible and impracticable to recover *Spain*; but however there were *certain reasons* why such a vote should be made at that time; which reasons wanted no explanation: for the general and the ministry having refused to accept very advantageous offers of a peace, after the battle of *Ramilies*, were forced to take in a sett of men, with a previous bargain to screen them

from the consequences of that miscarriage. And accordingly, upon the first succeeding opportunity that fell, which was the [k] prince of *Denmark's* death, the chief leaders of the party were brought into several great employments.

Thus when the QUEEN was no longer able to bear the tyranny and insolence of those ungrateful servants, who, as they *waxed the fatter*, did but *kick the more*; our two great allies abroad, and our stock-jobbers at home, took immediate alarm; applied the nearest way to the throne, by memorials and messages, jointly directing her majesty not to change her secretary or treasurer; who, for the true reasons that these officious intermeddlers demanded their continuance, ought never to have been admitted into the least degree of trust; since what they did was nothing less than betraying the interest of their native country to those princes, who, in their turns, were to do what they could to support them in power at home.

Thus it plainly appears that there was a conspiracy on all sides to go on with those measures, which must perpetuate the war; and a conspiracy founded upon the interest and ambition of each party; which begat so firm an union, that, instead of wondering why it lasted so long, I am astonished to think how it came to be broken. The prudence, courage and firmness of her majesty, in all the steps of that great change, would, if the particulars were

[k] Prince *George of Denmark*, husband to queen *Anne*.

truly related, make a very shining part in her story; nor is her judgment less to be admired, which directed her in the choice of perhaps the only persons, who had skill, credit, and resolution enough to be her instruments in overthrowing so many difficulties.

Some would pretend to lessen the merit of this by telling us, that the rudeness, the tyranny, the oppression, the ingratitude of the late favourites towards their mistress were no longer to be borne. They produce instances to shew, how her majesty was pursued through all her retreats, particularly at *Windfor*; where, after the enemy had possessed themselves of every inch of ground, they at last attacked and stormed the castle, forcing the QUEEN to fly to an adjoining cottage, pursuant to the advice of *Solomon*, who tells us, *It is better to live on the house top, than with a scolding woman in a large house*. They would have it, that such continued ill usage was enough to enflame the meekest spirit. They blame the favourites in point of policy, and think it nothing extraordinary, that the QUEEN should be at an end of her patience, and resolve to discard them. But I am of another opinion, and think their proceedings were right. For nothing is so apt to break even the bravest spirits as a continual chain of oppressions; one injury is best defended by a second, and this by a third. By these steps the old *masters of the palace in France* became [1] *masters of the kingdom*; and by these steps

[1] See the Tale of a Tub.

a *general during pleasure* might have grown into a *general for life*, and a *general for life* into a *king*. So that I still insist upon it as a wonder, how her majesty thus besieged on all sides was able to extricate herself.

Having thus mentioned the real causes, although disguised under specious pretences, which have so long continued the war, I must beg leave to reason a little with those persons, who are against any peace but what they call a *good one*; and explain themselves, that no peace can be *good* without an entire restoration of *Spain* to the house of *Austria*. It is to be supposed, that what I am to say upon this part of the subject will have little influence on those, whose particular ends or designs of any sort lead them to wish the continuance of the war: I mean the general and our allies abroad, the knot of late favourites at home, the body of such as traffic in stocks, and lastly, that sett of factious politicians, who were so violently bent at least upon *clipping* our constitution in church and state. Therefore I shall not apply myself to any of these, but to all others indifferently, whether *whigs* or *tories*, whose private interest is best answered by the welfare of their country. And if among these there be any, who think we ought to fight on till king *Charles* be quietly settled in the monarchy of *Spain*, I believe there are several points, which they have not thoroughly considered.

For first it is to be observed, that this resolution against any peace without *Spain* is a new incident,
grafted

grafted upon the original quarrel by the intrigues of a faction among us, who prevailed to give it the sanction of a vote in both houses of parliament, to justify those whose interest lay in perpetuating the war. And as this proceeding was against the practice of all princes and states, whose intentions were fair and honourable; so is it contrary to common prudence as well as justice, I might add, that it was impious too, by presuming to controul events which are only in the hands of God. Ours and the *States* complaint against *France* and *Spain* are deduced in each of our declarations of war, and our pretensions specified in the *eighth article* of the grand alliance; but there is not in any of these the least mention of demanding *Spain* for the *house* of *Austria*, or of refusing any peace without that condition. Having already made an extract from both declarations of war, I shall here give a translation of the *eighth article* in the grand alliance, which will put this matter out of dispute.

The EIGHTH ARTICLE of the GRAND ALLIANCE.

WHEN the war is once undertaken, none of the parties shall have the liberty to enter upon a treaty of peace with the enemy, but jointly and in concert with the others. Nor is peace to be made without having first obtained a just and reasonable satisfaction for his Cæsarean majesty, and for his royal majesty of Great-Britain, and a particular security to the lords the States-general of their dominions, provinces, titles, navigation

navigation and commerce: and a sufficient provision, that the kingdoms of France and Spain be never united, or come under the government of the same person, or that the same man may never be king of both kingdoms; and particularly, that the French may never be in possession of the Spanish West-Indies; and that they may not have the liberty of navigation for convenience of trade, under any pretence whatsoever, neither directly nor indirectly; except it is agreed, that the subjects of Great-Britain and Holland may have full power to use and enjoy all the same privileges, rights, immunities, and liberties of commerce by land and sea in Spain, in the Mediterranean, and in all the places and countries which the late king of Spain, at the time of his death, was in possession of, as well in Europe as elsewhere, as they did then use and enjoy; or which the subjects of both, or each nation, could use and enjoy, by virtue of any right, obtained before the death of the said king of Spain, either by treaties, conventions, custom, or any other way whatsoever.

Here we see the demands intended to be insisted on by the allies upon any treaty of peace are, a just and reasonable satisfaction for the *Emperor* and king of *Great-Britain*, a security to the *States-general* for their dominions, &c. and a sufficient provision, that *France* and *Spain* be never united under the same man as king of both kingdoms. The rest relates to the liberty of trade and commerce for us and the *Dutch*; but not a syllable of engaging to dispossess the duke of *Anjou*.

But

But to know how this new language of *no peace without Spain*, was first introduced, and at last prevailed among us, we must begin a great deal higher.

It was the partition treaty, which begot the will in favour of the duke of *Anjou*; for this naturally led the *Spaniards* to receive a prince supported by a great power, whose interest, as well as affection, engaged them to preserve that monarchy entire, rather than to oppose him in favour of another family, who must expect assistance from a number of confederates, whose principal members had already disposed of what did not belong to them, and by a previous treaty parcelled out the monarchy of *Spain*.

Thus the duke of *Anjou* got into the full possession of all the kingdoms and states belonging to that monarchy, as well in the old world as the new. And whatever the house of *Austria* pretended, from their memorials, to us and the *States*, it was, at that time, but too apparent, that the inclinations of the *Spaniards* were on the duke's side.

However, a war was resolved; and, in order to carry it on with great vigour, a grand alliance formed, wherein the ends proposed to be obtained are plainly and distinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleased God, in the course of this war, to bless the arms of the allies with remarkable successes; by which we were soon put into a condition of demanding and expecting such terms of peace, as we proposed to ourselves when

we

we began the war. But, instead of this, our victories only served to lead us on to further visionary prospects; advantage was taken of the sanguine temper, which so many successes had wrought the nation up to; new romantic views were proposed, and the old, reasonable, sober design was forgot.

This was the artifice of those here, who were sure to grow richer, as the publick became poorer; and who, after the resolutions which the two houses were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the war with safety to themselves, till malt and land were mortgaged, till a general excise was established, and the *dizieme denier* raised by *collectors in red coats*. And this was just the circumstance, which it suited their interest to be in.

The house of *Austria* approved this scheme with reason; since whatever would be obtained by the blood and treasure of others, was to accrue to that family, while they only lent their name to the cause.

The *Dutch* might, perhaps, have grown resty under their burthen; but care was likewise taken of that by a *Barrier-treaty* made with the *States*, which deserveth such epithets as I care not to bestow; but may perhaps consider it, at a proper occasion, in a [m] *discourse* by itself.

By this treaty, the condition of the war, with respect to the *Dutch*, was wisely altered; they fought no longer for security, but for grandeur;

[m] Which *discourse* follows next in this volume.

and we, instead of labouring to make them *safe*, must beggar ourselves to make them *formidable*.

Will any one contend, that, if at the treaty of *Gertruydenburgh*, we could have been satisfied with such terms of a peace, as we proposed to ourselves by the grand alliance, the *French* would not have allowed them? It is plain they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to insist on when the war began; and they had reason to grant, as well as we to demand them; since conditions of peace do certainly turn upon events of war. But surely there is some measure to be observed in this; those, who have defended the proceedings of our negotiators at the treaty of *Gertruydenburgh*, dwell very much upon their zeal and patience in endeavouring to work the *French* up to their demands; but say nothing to justify those demands, or the probability that *France* would ever accept them. Some of the articles in that treaty were so very extravagant, that, in all human probability, we could not have obtained them by a successful war of forty years. One of them was inconsistent with common reason; wherein the confederates reserved to themselves full liberty of demanding what further conditions they should think fit; and, in the mean time, *France* was to deliver up several of their strongest towns in a month. These articles were very gravely signed by our plenipotentiaries, and those of *Holland*; but not by the *French*, although it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay, they were brought over
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by the secretary of the embassy ; and the ministers here prevailed on the QUEEN to execute a ratification of articles, which only one part had signed. This was an absurdity in form, as well as in reason ; because the usual form of a ratification is with a preamble, shewing ; *that whereas our ministers, and those of the allies, and of the enemy, have signed, &c. We ratify, &c.* The [n] person, who brought over the articles, said in all companies (and perhaps believed) that it was a pity we had not demanded more ; for the *French* were in a disposition to refuse us nothing we would ask. One of our plenipotentiaries affected to have the same concern ; and particularly, that we had not obtained some further security for the empire on the *Upper Rhine*.

What could be the design of all this grimace, but to amuse the people, and to raise stocks for their friends in the secret to sell to advantage ? I have too great a respect for the abilities of those, who acted in this negotiation, to believe they hoped for any other issue from it, than that we found by the event. Give me leave to suppose, the continuance of the war was the thing at heart among those in power, both abroad and at home ; and then I can easily shew the consistency of their proceedings ; otherwise they are wholly unaccountable and absurd. Did those, who insisted on such wild demands, ever sincerely intend a peace ? Did they

[n] *Henric Walpole*, secretary to that embassy.

really think, that going on with the war was more eligible for their country, than the least abatement of those conditions? Was the smallest of them worth six millions a year, and an hundred thousand men's lives? Was there no way to provide for the safety of *Britain*, or the security of its trade, but by the *French* king's turning his arms to beat his own grandson out of *Spain*? If these able statesmen were so truly concerned for our trade, which they made the pretence of the war's beginning, as well as continuance; why did they so neglect it in those very preliminaries, where the enemy made so many concessions, and where all that related to the advantage of *Holland*, or the other confederates, was expressly settled? But whatever concerned us was to be left to a general treaty; no *tariff* agreed on with *France* or the *Low-countries*, only the *Schelde* was to remain shut, which must have ruined our commerce with *Antwerp*. Our trade with *Spain* was referred the same way; but this they will pretend to be of no consequence, because that kingdom was to be under the house of *Austria*, and we have already made a treaty with king *Charles*. I have indeed heard of a treaty made, by Mr. *Stanhope*, with that prince, for settling our commerce with *Spain*: but whatever it were, there was another between us and *Holland*, which went hand in hand with it, I mean that of *Barrier*, wherein a clause was inserted, by which all advantages proposed for *Britain* are to be in common with *Holland*.

Another point, which I doubt those have not considered, who are against any peace without *Spain*, is, that the face of affairs in *Christendom*, since the *Emperor's* death, hath been very much changed. By this accident, the views and interests of several princes and states in the alliance have taken a new turn, and, I believe, it will be found that ours ought to do so too. We have sufficiently blundered once already, by changing our measures with regard to a peace, while our affairs continued in the same posture; and it will be too much in conscience to blunder again by *not* changing the first, when the others are so much altered.

To have a prince of the *Austrian* family on the throne of *Spain* is, undoubtedly, more desirable than one of the house of *Bourbon*; but to have the *empire* and *Spanish* monarchy united in the same person is a dreadful consideration, and directly opposite to that wise principle on which the eighth article of the alliance is founded.

To this, perhaps, it will be objected, that the indolent character of the *Austrian* princes, the wretched œconomy of that government, the want of a naval force, the remote distance of their several territories from each other, would never suffer an *emperor*, although at the same time king of *Spain*, to become formidable: on the contrary, that his dependance must continually be on *Great-Britain*; and the advantages of trade, by a peace founded upon that condition, would soon make us amends for all the expences of the war.

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In answer to this, let us consider the circumstances we must be in, before such a peace could be obtained, if it were at all practicable. We must become not only poor for the present, but reduced, by further mortgages, to a state of beggary for endless years to come. Compare such a weak condition as this with so great an accession of strength to *Austria*; and then determine how much an *emperor*, in such a state of affairs, would either fear or need *Britain*.

Consider that the comparison is not formed between a prince of the house of *Austria*, Emperor and king of *Spain*, and with a prince of the *Bourbon* family, king of *France* and *Spain*; but between a prince of the latter only king of *Spain*, and one of the former uniting both crowns in his own person.

What returns of gratitude can we expect, when we are no longer wanted? Hath all that we have hitherto done for the imperial family been taken as a favour, or only received as the due of the *augustissima casa*?

Will the house of *Austria* yield the least acre of land, the least article of strained and even usurped prerogative, to resettle the mind of those princes in the alliance, who are alarmed at the consequences of this turn of affairs occasioned by the *Emperor's* death? We are assured it never will. Do we then imagine that those princes, who dread the overgrown power of the *Austrian* as much as that of the *Bourbon* family, will continue in our alliance upon

a system contrary to that which they engaged with us upon? For instance: what can the duke of *Savoy* expect in such a case? Will he have any choice left him but that of being a slave and a frontier to *France*; or a *vassal*, in the utmost extent of the word, to the imperial court? Will he not therefore of the two evils chuse the least; by submitting to a master who hath no immediate claim upon him, and to whose family he is nearly allied; rather than to another, who hath already revived several claims upon him, and threatens to revive more?

Nor are the *Dutch* more inclined than the rest of *Europe*, that the *Empire* and *Spain* should be united in king *Charles*, whatever they may now pretend. On the contrary, it is known to several persons, that upon the death of the late emperor *Joseph*, the States resolved that those two powers should not be joined in the same person; and this they determined as a fundamental maxim by which they intended to proceed. So that *Spain* was first given up by them; and since they maintained no troops in that kingdom, it should seem that they understand the duke of *Anjou* to be lawful monarch.

Thirdly, Those who are against any peace without *Spain*, if they be such as no way find their private account by the war, may perhaps change their sentiments if they will reflect a little upon our present condition.

I had two reasons for not sooner publishing this discourse; the first was, because I would give way
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to others, who might argue very well upon the same subject from general topicks and reason, although they might be ignorant of several facts which I had the opportunity to know. The second was, because I found it would be necessary, in the course of this argument, to say something of the state to which the war hath reduced us; at the same time I knew, that such a discovery ought to be made as late as possible, and at another juncture would not only be very indiscreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.

It is the folly of too many to mistake the echo of a *London* coffee-house for the voice of the kingdom. The city coffee-houses have been for some years filled with people, whose fortunes depend upon the *Bank*, *East-India*, or some other stock. Every new fund to these is like a new mortgage to an usurer, whose compassion for a young heir is exactly the same with that of a stock-jobber to the landed gentry. At the court end of the town, the like places of resort are frequented either by men out of place, and consequently enemies to the present ministry, or by officers of the army: no wonder then if the general cry in all such meetings be against any peace either *with* Spain or *without*; which, in other words, is no more than this; that discontented men desire another change of the ministry; that soldiers would be glad to keep their commissions; and that the creditors have money still, and would have the debtors borrow on at the

old extorting rate, while they have any security to give.

Now to give the most ignorant reader some idea of our present circumstances, without troubling him or myself with computations in form; every body knows that our land and malt tax amount annually to about two millions and an half. All other branches of the revenue are mortgaged to pay interest for what we have already borrowed. The yearly charge of the war is usually about six millions; to make up which sum we are forced to take up, on the credit of new funds, about three millions and an half. This last year the computed charge of the war came to above a million more than all the funds the parliament could contrive were sufficient to pay interest for; and so we have been forced to divide a deficiency of twelve hundred thousand pounds among the several branches of our expence. This is a demonstration that, if the war be to last another campaign, it will be impossible to find funds for supplying it without mortgaging the malt-tax, or taking some other method equally desperate.

If the peace be made this winter, we are then to consider what circumstances we shall be in towards paying a debt of about fifty millions, which is a sixth part of the purchase of the whole island, if it were to be sold.

Towards clearing ourselves of this monstrous incumbrance, some of these annuities will expire, or pay off the principal in thirty, forty, or an hundred

dred years; the bulk of the debt must be lessened gradually, by the best management we can, out of what will remain of the land and malt-taxes, after paying guards and garrisons, and maintaining and supplying our fleet in the time of peace. I have not skill enough to compute what will be left, after these necessary charges, towards annually clearing so vast a debt; but believe it must be very little: however, it is plain that both these taxes must be continued, as well for supporting the government as because we have no other means for paying off the principal. And so likewise must all the other funds remain for paying the interest. How long a time this must require, how steady an administration, and how undisturbed a state of affairs, both at home and abroad, let others determine.

However, some people think all this very reasonable; and that, since the struggle hath been for peace and safety, posterity, which is to partake the benefit, ought to share in the expence; as if, at the breaking out of this war, there had been such a conjuncture of affairs as never happened before, nor would ever happen again. It is wonderful that our ancestors, in all their wars, should never fall under such a necessity; that we meet no examples of it in *Greece* and *Rome*; that no other nation in *Europe* ever knew any thing like it, except *Spain* about an hundred and twenty years ago, when they drew it upon themselves by their own folly, and have suffered for it ever since; no doubt, we shall teach posterity wisdom, but they will be

apt to think the purchase too dear, and I wish they may stand to the bargain we have made in their names.

It is easy to entail debts on succeeding ages, and to hope they will be able and willing to pay them; but how to ensure peace for any term of years is difficult enough to apprehend. Will human nature ever cease to have the same passions, princes to entertain designs of interest or ambition, and occasions of quarrel to arise? May not we ourselves, by the variety of events and incidents which happen in the world, be under a necessity of recovering towns out of the very hands of those for whom we are now ruining our country to take them? Neither can it be said, that those *slates*, with whom we may probably differ, will be in as bad a condition as ourselves; for, by the circumstances of our situation, and the impositions of our allies, we are more exhausted than either they or the enemy; and, by the nature of our government, the corruption of our manners, and the opposition of factions, we shall be more slow in recovering.

It will, no doubt, be a mighty comfort to our grand-children, when they see a few rags hung up in *Westminster-hall*, which cost an hundred millions, whereof they are paying the arrears, to boast, as beggars do, that their grandfathers were rich and great.

I have often reflected on that mistaken notion of credit, so boasted of by the advocates of the late ministry: Was not all that credit built upon funds
raised

raised by the landed men, whom they now so much hate and despise? Is not the greatest part of those funds raised from the growth and product of land? Must not the whole debt be entirely paid, and our fleets and garrisons be maintained, by the land and malt-tax after a peace? If they call it credit to run ten millions in debt without parliamentary security, by which the publick is defrauded of almost half; I must think such credit to be dangerous, illegal, and perhaps treasonable. Neither hath any thing gone further to ruin the nation than their boasted credit. For my own part, when I saw this false credit sink, upon the change of the ministry, I was singular enough to conceive it a good omen. It seemed as if the young extravagant heir had got a new steward, and was resolved to look into his estate before things grew desperate, which made the usurers forbear feeding him with money, as they used to do.

Since the monied men are so fond of war, I should be glad they would furnish out one campaign at their own charge: it is not above six or seven millions; and I dare engage to make it out, that, when they have done this, instead of contributing equal to the lauded men, they will have their full principal and interest at six *per cent.* remaining of all the money they ever lent to the government.

Without this resource, or some other equally miraculous, it is impossible for us to continue the war upon the same foot. I have already observed,
that

that the last funds of interest fell short above a million, although the persons most conversant in ways and means employed their utmost invention; so that, of necessity, we must be still more defective next campaign. But, perhaps, our allies will make up this deficiency on our side by greater efforts on their own. Quite the contrary; both the *Emperor* and *Holland* failed this year in several articles; and signified to us some time ago, that they cannot keep up to the same proportions in the next. We have gained a noble barrier for the latter, and they have nothing more to demand or desire. The *Emperor*, however sanguine he may now affect to appear, will, I suppose, be satisfied with *Naples*, *Sicily*, *Milan*, and his other acquisitions, rather than engage in a long hopeless war, for the recovery of *Spain*, to which his allies the *Dutch* will neither give their assistance, nor consent. So that, since we have done their business, since they have no further service for our arms, and we have no more money to give them; and lastly, since we neither desire any recompence, nor expect any thanks, we ought in pity to be dismissed, and have leave to shift for ourselves. They are ripe for a peace, to enjoy and cultivate what we have conquered for them; and so are we to recover, if possible, the effects of their hardships upon us. The first overtures from *France* are made to *England* upon safe and honourable terms; we, who bore the burthen of the war, ought in reason to have the greatest share in making the peace. If we
do

do not hearken to a peace, others certainly will, and get the advantage of us there, as they have done in the war. We know the *Dutch* have perpetually threatened us, that they would enter into separate measures of a peace; and, by the strength of that argument, as well as by *other powerful motives*, prevailed on those who were then at the helm, to comply with them on any terms, rather than put an end to a war, which every year brought them such great accessions to their wealth and power. Whoever falls off, a peace will follow; and then we must be content with such conditions as our allies, out of their great concern for our safety and interest, will please to chuse. They have no further occasion for fighting, they have gained their point, and they now tell us it is *our war*; so that, in common justice, it ought to be *our peace*.

All we can propose by the desperate steps of pawning our land or malt-tax, or erecting a general excise, is only to raise a fund of interest for running us annually four millions further in debt, without any prospect of ending the war so well as we can do at present. And when we have sunk the only unengaged revenues we had left, our incumbrances must, of necessity, remain perpetual.

We have hitherto lived upon expedients, which, in time, will certainly destroy any constitution, whether civil or natural; and there was no country in *Christendom*, had less occasion for them than ours. We have dieted a healthy body into a consumption,

sumption, by plying it with physick instead of food. Art will help us no longer, and, if we cannot recover by letting the remains of nature work, we must inevitably die.

What arts have been used to possess the people with a strong delusion, that *Britain* must infallibly be ruined, without the recovery of *Spain* to the house of *Austria*? Making the safety of a great and powerful kingdom, as ours was then, to depend upon an event, which, even after a war of miraculous successes, proves impracticable. As if princes and great ministers could find no way of settling the public tranquillity, without changing the possessions of kingdoms, and forcing sovereigns upon a people against their inclinations. Is there no security for the island of *Britain*, unless a king of *Spain* be dethroned by the hands of his grandfather? Has the enemy no cautionary towns and sea-ports to give us for securing trade? Can he not deliver us possession of such places as would put him in a worse condition, whenever he should perfidiously renew the war? The present king of *France* has but few years to live by the course of nature, and, doubtless, would desire to end his days in peace. Grandfathers in private families are not observed to have great influence on their grandsons; and, I believe, they have much less among princes; however, when the authority of a parent is gone, is it likely that *Philip* will be directed by a brother against his own interest, and that of his subjects? Have not those two realms
their

their separate maxims of policy, which must operate in times of peace? These at least are probabilities; and cheaper, by six millions a year, than recovering *Spain*, or continuing the war, both which seem absolutely impossible.

But the common question is, if we must now surrender *Spain*, what have we been fighting for all this while? The answer is ready: we have been fighting for the ruin of the public interest, and the advancement of a private. We have been fighting to raise the wealth and grandeur of a particular family; to enrich usurers and stock-jobbers, and to cultivate the pernicious designs of a faction by destroying the landed interest. The nation begins now to think these *blessings* are not worth fighting for any longer, and therefore desires a peace.

But the advocates on the other side cry out, that we might have had a better peace, than is now in agitation, above two years ago. Supposing this to be true, I do assert, that, by parity of reason, we must expect one just so much the worse about two years hence. If those in power could then have given us a better peace, more is their infamy and guilt, that they did not. Why did they insist upon conditions, which they were certain would never be granted? We allow, it was in their power to have put a good end to the war, and left the nation in some hope of recovering itself. And this is what we charge them with as answerable to God, their country, and posterity; that the bleeding
condition

condition of their fellow-subjects was a feather in the balance with their private ends.

When we offer to lament the heavy debts and poverty of the nation, it is pleasant to hear some men answer all that can be said, by crying up the power of *England*, the courage of *England*, the inexhaustible riches of *England*. I have heard a [o] man very sanguine upon this subject, with a good employment for life, and a hundred thousand pounds in the funds, bidding us *take courage*, and *warranting*, *that all would go well*. This is the style of men at ease, *who lay heavy burthens upon others, which they would not touch with one of their fingers*. I have known some people such ill computers, as to imagine the many millions in stocks and annuities are so much real wealth in the nation; whereas every farthing of it is entirely lost to us, scattered in *Holland*, *Germany*, and *Spain*; and the landed men, who now pay the interest, must at last pay the principal.

Fourthly, those who are against any peace without *Spain*, have, I doubt, been ill informed as to the low condition of *France*, and the mighty consequences of our successes. As to the first, it must be confessed, that, after the battle of *Ranillies*, the *French* were so discouraged with their frequent losses, and so impatient for a peace, that their king was resolved to comply upon any reasonable terms. But when his subjects were informed of our exor-

[o] The late lord *Halifax*.

bitant

bitant demands, they grew jealous of his honour, and were unanimous to assist him in continuing the war at any hazard, rather than submit. This fully restored his authority; and the supplies he hath received from the *Spanish West-Indies*, which in all are computed, since the war, to amount to four hundred millions of livres, and all in *specie*, had enabled him to pay his troops. Besides, the money is spent in his own country; and he hath since waged war in the most thrifty manner by acting on the defensive; compounding with us every campaign for a town, which costs us fifty times more than it is worth, either as to the value or the consequences. Then he is at no charge for a fleet, further than providing privateers, wherewith his subjects carry on a piratical war at their own expence, and he shares in the profit; which hath been very considerable to *France*, and of infinite disadvantage to us, not only by the perpetual losses we have suffered, to an immense value, but by the general discouragement of trade, on which we so much depend. All this considered, with the circumstances of that government, where the prince is master of the lives and fortunes of so mighty a kingdom, shews that monarch not to be so sunk in his affairs as we have imagined, and have long flattered ourselves with the hopes of.

Those who are against *any peace without Spain*, seem likewise to have been mistaken in judging our victories, and other successes, to have been of greater consequence than they really were.

When

When our armies take a town in *Flanders*, the *Dutch* are immediately put into *possession*, and we at home make *bonfires*. I have sometimes pitied the deluded people, to see them squandering away their fewel to so little purpose. For example: what is it to us that *Bouchain* is taken, about which the warlike politicians of the coffee-house make such a clutter? What, though the garrison surrendered prisoners of war, and in sight of the enemy? We are not now in a condition to be fed with points of honour. What advantage have we, but that of spending three or four millions more to get another town for the *States*, which may open them a new country for *contributions*, and increase the perquisites of the general?

In that war of ten years under the late king, when our commanders and soldiers were raw and unexperienced, in comparison of what they are at present, we lost battles and towns, as well as we gained them of late, since those gentlemen have better learned their trade; yet we bore up then, as the *French* do now: nor was there any thing decisive in their successes; they grew weary as well as we, and at last consented to a peace, under which we might have been happy enough, if it had not been followed by that wise *treaty of partition*, which revived the flame that hath lasted ever since. I see nothing else in the modern way of making war, but that the side, which can hold out longest, will end it with most advantage. In such a close country as *Flanders*, where it is carried on by sieges,

the army that acts offensively is at a much greater expence of men and money; and there is hardly a town taken, in the common forms, where the besiegers have not the worse of the bargain. I never yet knew a soldier, who would not affirm, that any town might be taken; if you were content to be at the charge. If you will count upon sacrificing so much blood and treasure, the rest is all a regular, established method, which cannot fail. When the king of *France*, in the times of his grandeur, sat down before a town, his generals and engineers would often fix the day when it should surrender: the enemy, sensible of all this, hath, for some years past, avoided a battle, where he hath so ill succeeded, and taken a surer way to consume us, by letting our courage evaporate against stones and rubbish, and sacrificing a single town to a campaign, which he can so much better afford to lose, than we to take.

Lastly, those who are so violent against *any peace*, without *Spain* being restored to the house of *Austria*, have not, I believe, cast their eye upon a cloud gathering in the north, which we have helped to raise, and may quickly break in a storm upon our heads.

The northern war hath been on foot almost ever since our breach with *France*. The success of it is various; but one effect to be apprehended was always the same, that sooner or later it would involve us in its consequences; and that whenever this happened, let our success be never so great against

France, from that moment *France* would have the advantage.

By our guarantee of the treaty of *Travendall*, we were obliged to hinder the king of *Denmark* from engaging in a war with *Sweden*. It was, at that time, understood by all parties, and so declared even by the *British* ministers, that this engagement specially regarded *Denmark's* not assisting king *Augustus*. But however, if this had not been so, yet our obligation to *Sweden* stood in force, by virtue of former treaties with that crown, which were all revived and confirmed by a subsequent one concluded at the *Hague*, by Sir *Joseph Williamson* and Monsieur *Lilienroot*, about the latter end of the king's reign.

However, the war in the north proceeded; and our not assisting *Sweden* was at least as well excused by the war which we were entangled in, as his not contributing his contingent to the empire, whereof he is a member, was excused by the pressures he lay under, having a confederacy to deal with.

In this war, the king of *Sweden* was victorious; and what dangers were we not then exposed to? What fears were we not in? He marched into *Saxony*; and, if he had really been in the *French* interest, might at once put us under the greatest difficulties. But the torrent turned another way, and he contented himself with imposing on his enemy the treaty of *Alt Rasladt*; by which king *Augustus* makes an absolute cession of the crown of *Poland*, renounces any title to it, acknowledges *Stanislaus*;

Stanislaus; and then both he and the king of *Sweden* join in desiring the guarantee of *England* and *Holland*. The QUEEN did not indeed give this guarantee in form; but, as a steps towards it, the title of *king* was given to *Stanislaus* by a letter from her majesty; and the strongest assurances were given to the *Swedish* minister, in her majesty's name, and in a committee of council, that the guarantee should speedily be granted; and that, in the mean while, it was the same thing as if the forms were passed.

In 1708, king *Augustus* made the campaign in *Flanders*: what measures he might at that time take, or of what nature the arguments might be that he made use of, is not known: but immediately after he breaks through all he had done, marches into *Poland*, and re-assumes the crown.

After this we apprehend, that the peace of the empire might be endangered; and therefore entered into an act of guarantee for the neutrality of it. The king of *Sweden* refused, upon several accounts, to submit to the terms of this treaty; particularly because we went out of the empire to cover *Poland* and *Jutland*, but did not go out of it to cover the territories of *Sweden*.

Let us therefore consider what is our case at present. If the king of *Sweden* return and get the better, he will think himself under no obligation of having any regard to the interests of the allies; but will naturally pursue, according to his own expression, *his enemy wherever he finds him*. In

this case, the *corps* of the neutrality is obliged to oppose him; and so we are engaged in a second war, before the first be ended.

If the northern confederates succeed against *Sweden*, how shall we be able to preserve the balance of power in the north, so essential to our trade, as well as in many other respects? What will become of that great support of the *protestant interest* in *Germany*, which is the footing that the *Swedes* now have in the empire? Or who shall answer, that these princes, after they have settled the north to their minds, may not take a fancy to look southward, and make our peace with *France* according to their own schemes?

And lastly, if the king of *Prussia*, the elector of *Hanover*, and other princes, whose dominions lie contiguous, be forced to draw from those armies which act against *France*, we must live in hourly expectation of having those troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this recall may happen in the midst of a siege, or on the eve of a battle. Is it therefore our interest to toil on in a ruinous war for an impracticable end, till one of these cases shall happen, or to get under shelter before the storm?

There is no doubt but the present ministry (provided they could get over the obligations of honour and conscience) might find their advantage in advising the continuance of the war, as well as the last did, although not in the same degree after the kingdom hath been so much exhausted. They
might

might prolong it, till the parliament desire a peace; and, in the mean time, leave them in full possession of power. Therefore it is plain, that their proceedings at present are meant to serve their country directly against their private interest; whatever clamour may be raised by those, who, for the vilest ends, would remove heaven and earth to oppose their measures. But they think it infinitely better to accept such terms as will secure our trade, find a sufficient barrier for the *States*, give *reasonable satisfaction* to the *Emperor*, and restore the tranquillity of *Europe*, although without adding *Spain* to the empire; rather than go on in a languishing way, upon the vain expectation of some improbable turn for the recovery of that monarchy out of the *Bourbon* family; and at last be forced to a worse peace, by some of the allies falling off, upon our utter inability to continue the war.

SOME
REMARKS
ON THE
BARRIER TREATY
BETWEEN
HER MAJESTY
AND THE
STATES-GENERAL.

To which are added,

The said BARRIER TREATY, with the two separate ARTICLES; part of the Counter-project; the Sentiments of prince EUGENE and count SINZENDORF upon the said treaty; and a Representation of the *English* merchants at *Bruges*.

Written in the Year 1712.

P R E F A C E.

WHEN I published the discourse called *The Conduct of the Allies*, I had thoughts either of inserting or annexing the *Barrier-treaty* at length, with such observations as I conceived might be useful for public information: but that discourse taking up more room than I designed, after my utmost endeavours to abbreviate it, I contented myself only with making some few reflexions upon that *famous treaty*, sufficient, as I thought, to answer the design of my book. I have since heard, that my readers in general seemed to wish I had been more particular, and have discovered an impatience to have that treaty made public, especially since it hath been laid before the *House of Commons*.

That I may give some light to the reader, who is not well versed in those affairs, he may please to know that a project for a treaty of *barrier* with the *States* was transmitted hither from *Holland*; but being disapproved of by our court in several parts, a new project or scheme of a treaty was drawn up here with many additions and alterations. This last was called *The Counter-project*; and was the measure, whereby the duke of *Marlborough* and my lord *Townshend* were commanded and instructed to proceed in negotiating a *treaty of Barrier* with the *States*.

I have

I have added a translation of this *Counter-project* in those articles where it differs from the *Barrier-treaty*, that the reader, by comparing them together, may judge how punctually those negotiators observed their instructions. I have likewise subjoined the sentiments of prince *Eugene* of *Savoy*, and the count *De Sinzendorf*, relating to this treaty, written (I suppose) while it was negotiating. And lastly, I have added a copy of the representation of the *British* merchants at *Bruges*, signifying what inconveniencies they already felt, and further apprehended, from this *Barrier-treaty*.

S O M E

S O M E
R E M A R K S
O N T H E
B A R R I E R T R E A T Y, &c.

I M A G I N E a reasonable person in *China* reading the following treaty, and one who was ignorant of our affairs, or our geography: he would conceive their high mightinesses the *States-general* to be some vast powerful commonwealth, like that of *Rome*; and HER MAJESTY to be a petty prince, like one of those to whom that republick would sometimes send a diadem for a present, when they behaved themselves well, otherwise could depose at pleasure, and place whom they thought fit in his stead. Such a man would sink, that the *States* had taken our prince and us into their *protection*; and, in return, honoured us so far, as to make use of our troops as some small assistance in their conquests, and the enlargement of their empire, or to prevent the incursions of *Barbarians* upon some of their out-lying provinces. But how must it sound in an *European* ear, that *Great-Britain*, after maintaining a war for so many years, with so much glory and success, and such prodigious expence, after saving the *Empire*, *Holland*, and *Portugal*, and almost

almost recovering *Spain*, should, towards the close of a war, enter into a treaty with seven *Dutch* provinces, to secure to them a dominion larger than their own, which she had conquered for them; to undertake for a great deal more, without stipulating the least advantage for herself; and accept, as an equivalent, the mean condition of those *States* assisting to preserve the QUEEN on the throne, whom, by God's assistance, she is able to defend against all her majesty's *enemies* and *allies* put together?

Such a wild bargain could never have been made for us, if the *States* had not found it their interest to use very powerful motives with the chief advisers (I say nothing of the person immediately employed); and if a party here at home had not been resolved, for ends and purposes very well known, to continue the war as long as they had any occasion for it.

The *Counter-project* of this treaty, made here at *London*, was bad enough in all conscience: I have said something of it in the *preface*; her majesty's ministers were instructed to proceed by it in their negotiation. There was one point in that project, which would have been of consequence to *Britain*, and one or two more where the advantages of the *States* were not so very exorbitant, and where some care was taken of the house of *Austria*. Is it possible, that *our good allies and friends* could not be brought to any terms with us, unless by striking out every particular that might do us any good,
and

and adding still more to those whereby so much was already granted? For instance, the article about demolishing *Dunkirk* surely might have remained; which was of some benefit to the *States*, as well as of mighty advantage to us; and which the *French* king hath lately yielded in one of his preliminaries, although clogged with the demand of an equivalent, which will owe its difficulty only to this treaty.

But let me now consider the treaty itself: Among the one and twenty articles, of which it consists, only two have any relation to us, importing that the *Dutch* are to be guarantees of our succession, and are not to enter into any treaty until the QUEEN is acknowledged by *France*. We know very well, that it is in consequence the interest of the *States* as much as ours, that *Britain* should be governed by a *protestant* prince. Besides, what is there more in this guarantee, than in all common leagues offensive and defensive between two powers, where each is obliged to defend the other against any invader with all there strength? Such was the grand alliance between the *Emperor*, *Britain*, and *Holland*; which was, or ought to have been, as good a guarantee of our succession to all intents and purposes, as this in the *Barrier-treaty*, and the mutual engagements in such alliances have been always reckoned sufficient without any separate benefit to either party.

It is, no doubt, for the interest of *Britain*, that the *States* should have a sufficient barrier against
France;

France; but their high mightinesses, for some years past, have put a different meaning upon the word *barrier*, from what it formerly used to bear when applied to them. When the late king was prince of *Orange*, and commanded their armies against *France*, it was never once imagined, that any of the towns taken should belong to the *Dutch*; they were all immediately delivered up to their lawful monarch; and *Flanders* was only a *barrier* to *Holland*, as it was in the hands of *Spain*, rather than *France*. So in the grand alliance of 1701, the several powers promising to endeavour to recover *Flanders* for a barrier, was understood to be the recovering those provinces to the king of *Spain*; but in this treaty the style is wholly changed: here are about twenty towns and forts of great importance, with their chatellanies and dependencies (which dependencies are likewise to be enlarged as much as possible) and the whole revenues of them to be under the perpetual military government of the *Dutch*, by which that republic will be entirely master of the richest part of all *Flanders*; and upon any appearance of war, they may put their garrisons into any other place of the *Low-countries*; and farther, the king of *Spain* is to give them a revenue of four hundred thousand crowns a year to enable them to maintain those garrisons.

Why should we wonder that the *Dutch* are inclined to perpetuate the war, when, by an article in this treaty, the king of *Spain* is *not to possess one single town in the Low-countries, until a peace be*

2 made?

made? The duke of *Anjou*, at the beginning of this war, maintained six and thirty thousand men out of those *Spanish* provinces he then possessed: to which, if we add the many towns since taken, which were not in the late king of *Spain's* possession at the time of his death, with all their territories and dependencies; it is visible what forces the *States* may be able to keep, even without any charge to their peculiar dominions.

The towns and chatellanies of this barrier always maintained their garrisons, when they were in the hands of *France*; and, as it is reported, returned a considerable sum of money into the king's coffers; yet the kingdom of *Spain* is obliged, by this treaty (as we have already observed), to add over and above a revenue of four hundred thousand crowns a year. We know likewise, that a great part of the revenue of the *Spanish Netherlands* is already pawned to the *States*; so that, after a peace, nothing will be left to the sovereign, nor will the people be much eased of the taxes they at present labour under.

Thus the *States*, by virtue of this *Barrier-treaty*, will, in effect, be absolute sovereigns of all *Flanders*, and of the whole revenues of the utmost extent.

And here I cannot, without some contempt, take notice of a sort of reasoning offered by several people; that the many towns we have taken for the *Dutch* are of no advantage, because the whole revenues of those towns are spent in maintaining them. For first, the fact is manifestly false, particularly

cularly as to *Lisle* and some others. Secondly, the *States*, after a peace, are to have four hundred thousand crowns a year out of the remainder of *Flanders*, which is then to be left to *Spain*. And lastly, suppose all these acquired dominions will not bring a penny into their treasury, what can be of greater consequence, than to be able to maintain a mighty army out of their new conquests, which before they always did by taxing their natural subjects?

How shall we be able to answer it to king *Charles II.* that, while we pretend to endeavour restoring him to the entire monarchy of *Spain*, we join, at the same time, with the *Dutch* to deprive him of his natural right to the *Low-countries*?

But suppose by a *Dutch* barrier must now be understood only what is to be in possession of the *States*; yet, even under this acceptation of the word, nothing was originally meant except a *barrier* against *France*; whereas several towns, demanded by the *Dutch* in this treaty, can be of no use at all in such a *barrier*. And this is the sentiment even of prince *Eugene* himself (the present oracle and idol of the party here) who says, *that Dendermond, Ostend, and the castle of Gand, do in no sort belong to the barrier; nor can be of other use, than to make the States-general masters of the Low-countries, and hinder their trade with England. And further: that those who are acquainted with the country know very well, that to fortify Lier and Halle can give no security to the States as a barrier, but only raise a jealousy*

jealousy in the people, that those places are only fortified in order to block up Brussels, and the other great towns of Brabant.

In those towns of *Flanders*, where the *Dutch* are to have garrisons, but the ecclesiastical and civil power to remain to the king of *Spain* after a peace, the *States* have power to send arms, ammunition, and victuals, without paying customs; under which pretence, they will engross the whole trade of those towns, exclusive of all other nations.

This prince *Eugene* likewise foresaw; and, in his observations upon this treaty, here annexed, proposed a remedy for it.

And if the *Dutch* shall please to think, that the whole *Spanish Netherlands* are not a sufficient barrier for them, I know no remedy from the words of this treaty, but that we must still go on and conquer for them as long as they please. For the QUEEN is obliged, whenever a peace is treated, to procure for them *whatever shall be thought necessary* besides; and where their necessity will terminate, is not very easy to foresee.

Could any of her majesty's subjects conceive, that, in those very towns we have taken for the *Dutch*, and given into their possession as a barrier, either the *States* should demand, or our ministers allow, that the subjects of *Britain* should, in respect to their trade, be used worse, than they were under the late king of *Spain*? yet this is the fact, as monstrous as it appears: all goods going to or coming from *Newport*, or *Ostend*, are to pay the

same duties, as those that pass by the *Scheld* under the *Dutch* forts: and this, in effect, is to shut out all other nations from trading to *Flanders*. The *English* merchants at *Bruges* complain, that, after they have paid the king of Spain's duty for goods imported at *Ostend*, the same goods are made liable to further duties, when they are carried from thence into the towns of the *Dutch* new conquests; and desire only the same privileges of trade they had before the death of the late king of Spain, *Charles II.* And, in consequence of this treaty, the *Dutch* have already taken off eight *per cent.* from all goods they send to the *Spanish Flanders*, but left it still upon us.

But what is very surprizing, in the very same article, where *our good friends and allies* are wholly shutting us out from trading in those towns we have conquered for them with so much blood and treasure, the *QUEEN* is obliged to procure, that the *States* shall be used as favourably in their trade over all the king of *Spain's* dominions, as her own subjects, or as the people most favoured. This I humbly conceive to be perfect boys play; *cross I win, and pile [p] you lose, or what's yours is mine, and what's mine is my own.* Now, if it should happen, that in a treaty of peace some ports or towns should be yielded us for the security of our trade, in any part of the *Spanish* dominions at how great a distance soever, I suppose the *Dutch* would go on

[p] The two sides of our coin were once nominally distinguished by *cross* and *pile*, as they are now by *heads* and *tails*.

with

with their *boys* play, and *challenge half* by virtue of that article: or would they be content with the military government and revenues, and reckon them among *what shall be thought necessary* for their barrier?

This prodigious article is introduced as subsequent to the treaty of *Munster*, made about the year 1648, at the time when *England* was in the utmost confusion, and very much to our disadvantage. Those parts in that treaty, so unjust in themselves, and so prejudicial to our trade, ought, in reason, to have been remitted rather than confirmed upon us for the time to come. But this is *Dutch* partnership; to share in all our *beneficial bargains*, and exclude us wholly from theirs, even from those which we have got for them.

In one part of *The Conduct of the Allies*, &c. among other remarks upon this treaty I make it a question, whether it were right, in point of policy or prudence, to call in a foreign power to be a guarantee to our succession; because, by that means, *we put it out of the power of our legislature to alter the succession, how much soever the necessity of the kingdom may require it [q]*? To comply with the cautions of some people, I explained *my meaning in the following editions*. I was assured, that my lord chief-justice affirmed, that passage was treason. One of my answerers, I think, decides as favourably; and I am told, that paragraph was read very

lately, during a debate, with a comment in very injurious terms, which perhaps might have been spared. That the legislature should have power to change the succession, whenever the necessities of the kingdom require, is so very useful towards preserving our religion and liberty, that I know not how to recant. The worst of this opinion is, that at first sight it appears to be *whiggish*; but the distinction is thus: The *whigs* are for changing the succession when they think fit, although the entire legislature do not consent; I think it ought never to be done but upon great necessity, and that with the sanction of the whole legislature. Do these gentlemen of revolution principles think it impossible, that we should ever have occasion again to change our succession? And, if such an incident should fall out, must we have no remedy until the seven provinces will give their consent? Suppose that this virulent party among us were as able, as some are willing, to raise a rebellion for re-instating them in power, and would apply themselves to the *Dutch*, as guarantees of our succession, to assist them with all their force, under pretence that the *QUEEN* and ministry, a great majority of both houses, and the bulk of the people, were for bringing over *France*, popery, and the pretender? Their *high mightinesses* would, as I take it, be sole judges of the controversy, and probably decide it so well, that, in some time, we might have the happiness of becoming a province to *Holland*. I am humbly of opinion, that there are two qualities necessary to a reader

before

before his judgment should be allowed; these are, common honesty, and common sense; and that no man could have misrepresented that paragraph in my discourse, unless he were utterly destitute of one, or both.

The presumptive successor, and her immediate heirs, have so established a reputation in the world for their piety, wisdom, and humanity, that no necessity of this kind is like to appear in their days; but I must still insist, that it is a diminution to the independency of the imperial crown of *Great-Britain*, to call at every door for help to put our laws in execution. And we ought to consider, that if, in ages to come, such a prince should happen to be in succession to our throne, as should be entirely unable to govern; that very motive might incline our guarantees to support him, the more effectually to bring the rivals of their trade into confusion and disorder.

But to return; the QUEEN is here put under the unreasonable obligation of being guarantee of the whole Barrier-treaty; of the *Dutch* having possession of the said barrier, and the revenues thereof before a peace; of the payment of four hundred thousand crowns by the king of *Spain*; that the *States* shall possess the barrier, even before king *Charles* is in possession of the *Spanish Netherlands*; although, by the fifth article of the grand alliance, her majesty is under no obligation to do any thing of this nature, except in a general treaty.

All kings, princes, and states are invited to enter into this treaty, and to be guarantees of its execution. This article, though very frequent in treaties, seems to look very oddly in that of the barrier. Popish princes are here among others to become guarantees of our protestant succession; every petty prince in *Germany* must be intreated to preserve the QUEEN of *Great-Britain* upon her throne. The king of *Spain* is invited particularly, and by name, to become guarantee of the execution of a treaty, by which his allies, who pretend to fight his battles and recover his dominions, strip him, in effect, of all his ten provinces; a clear reason why they never sent any forces to *Spain*, and why the obligation, not to enter into a treaty of peace with *France* until that entire monarchy was yielded as a preliminary, was struck out of the counter-project by the *Dutch*. They fought only in *Flanders*, because there they only fought for themselves. King *Charles* must needs accept this invitation very kindly, and stand by with great satisfaction, while the *Belgic* lion divides the prey, and assigns it all to himself. I remember there was a parcel of soldiers, who robbed a farmer of his poultry, and then made him wait at table, while they devoured his victuals without giving him a morsel; and, upon his expostulating, had only for answer, Why, sirrah, are we not come here to protect you? And thus much for his generous invitation to all kings and princes to lend their assistance, and become guarantees out
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of pure good-nature for securing *Flanders* to the *Dutch*.

In the treaty of *Ryswick*, no care was taken to oblige the *French* king to acknowledge the right of succession in her present majesty; for want of which point being then settled, *France* refused to acknowledge her for QUEEN of *Great-Britain* after the late king's death. This unaccountable neglect (if it were a neglect) is here called an omission [r], and care is taken to supply it in the next general treaty of peace. I mention this occasionally, because I have some stubborn doubts within me, whether it were a wilful omission or no. Neither do I herein reflect in the least upon the memory of his late majesty, whom I entirely acquit of any imputation upon this matter. But when I recollect the behaviour, the language, and the principles of some certain persons in those days, and compare them with that omission; I am tempted to draw some conclusions, which a certain party would be more ready to call false and malicious, than to prove them so.

I must here take leave (because it will not otherwise fall in my way) to say a few words in return to a gentleman, I know not of what character or calling, who hath done me the honour to write three discourses against that treatise of *The Conduct of the Allies*, &c. and promises, for my comfort, to conclude all in a fourth. I pity answerers with all

[r] Article XX.

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my heart, for the many disadvantages they lie under. My book did a world of mischief (as he calls it) before his first part could possibly come out; and so went on through the kingdom, while his limped slowly after; and, if it arrived at all, it was too late; for people's opinions were already fixed. His manner of answering me is thus: of those facts which he pretends to examine, some he resolutely denies, others he endeavours to extenuate, and the rest he distorts with such unnatural turns, that I would engage, by the same method, to disprove any history either ancient or modern. Then the whole is interlarded with a thousand injurious epithets and appellations, which heavy writers are forced to make use of, as a supply for that want of spirit and genius they are not born to: yet, after all, he allows a very great point for which I contend, confessing in plain words, that the burthen of the war hath chiefly lain upon us; and thinks it sufficient for the *Dutch*, that, next to *England*, they have borne the greatest share. And is not this the great grievance of which the whole kingdom complains? I am inclined to think that my intelligence was at least as good as his; and some of it, I can assure him, came from persons of his own party, although, perhaps, not altogether so inflamed. Hitherto therefore the matter is pretty equal, and the world may believe him or me as they please. But, I think, the great point of controversy between us is, whether the effects and consequences of things follow better from his premises or mine?

And there I will not be satisfied, unless he will allow the whole advantage to be on my side. Here is a flourishing kingdom brought to the brink of ruin by a most successful and glorious war of ten years, under an able, diligent, and loyal ministry; a most faithful, just, and generous commander, and in conjunction with the most hearty, reasonable, and sincere allies. This is the case, as that author represents it. I have heard a story, I think it was of the duke of **, who playing at hazard at the *groom-porters* in much company, held in a great many hands together, and drew a huge heap of gold; but, in the heat of play, never observed a sharper, who came once or twice under his arm, and swept a great deal of it into his hat; the company thought it had been one of his servants. When the duke's hand was out, they were talking how much he had won. Yes, said he, I held in very long; yet, methinks I have won but very little. They told him his SERVANT had got the rest in his hat; and then he found he was cheated.

It hath been my good fortune to see the most important facts that I have advanced justified by the public voice; which, let this author do what he can, will incline the world to believe, that I may be right in the rest. And I solemnly declare, that I have not wilfully committed the least mistake. I stopt the second edition, and made all possible enquiries among those who I thought could best inform me, in order to correct any error I could hear of; I did the same to the third and fourth

fourth editions, and then left the printer to his liberty. This I take for a more effectual answer to all cavils, than an hundred pages of controversy.

But what disgusts me from having any thing to do with the race of answer-jobbers, is, that they have no sort of conscience in their dealings: to give one instance in this gentleman's third part, which I have been lately looking into. When I talk of the most petty princes, he says, that I mean crowned heads; when I say the soldiers of those petty princes are ready to rob or starve at home, he says, I call kings and crowned heads robbers and highwaymen. This is what the *whigs* call answering a book.

I cannot omit one particular concerning this author, who is so positive in asserting his own facts, and contradicting mine; he affirms, that the business of *Toulon* was discovered by the clerk of a certain great man, who was then secretary of state. It is neither wise, nor for the credit of his party, to put us in mind of that secretary, or of that clerk; however, so it happens, that nothing relating to the affair of *Toulon* did ever pass through that secretary's office: which I here affirm with great phlegm, leaving the epithets of false, scandalous, villainous, and the rest, to the author and his fellows.

But to leave this author; let us consider the consequence of our triumphs, upon which some set so great a value, as to think that nothing less than the crown can be a sufficient reward for the merit
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of the *general*. We have not enlarged our dominions by one foot of land : our trade, which made us considerable in the world, is either given up by treaties, or clogged with duties, which interrupt and daily lessen it. We see the whole nation groaning under excessive taxes of all sorts, to raise three millions of money for payment of the interest of those debts we have contracted. Let us look upon the reverse of the medal ; we shall see our neighbours, who, in their utmost distress, called for our assistance, become, by this treaty, even in time of peace, masters of a more considerable country than their own ; in a condition to strike terror into us, with fifty thousand *veterans* ready to invade us from that country which we have conquered for them ; and to commit insolent hostilities upon us in all other parts, as they have lately done in the *East-Indies*.

T H E
B A R R I E R T R E A T Y

B E T W E E N

Her MAJESTY and the STATES-
GENERAL.

*H*ER majesty the QUEEN of Great-Britain and the lords the States-general of the United provinces, having considered how much it concerns the quiet and security of their kingdoms and states, and the public tranquillity, to maintain and to secure on one side, the succession to the crown of Great-Britain in such manner as it is now established by the laws of the kingdom; and on the other side, that the States-general of the United provinces should have a strong and sufficient barrier against France, and others who would surprize or attack them: and her majesty and the States-general apprehending, with just reason, the troubles and the mischiefs which may happen in relation to this succession, if at any time there should be any person, or any power, who should call it in question; and that the countries and states of the said lords the States-general were not furnished with such a barrier: For these said reasons her said majesty the QUEEN of Great-Britain, although in the vigour of her age, and enjoying perfect health (in which may God preserve her many years) out of an effect of her usual prudence and piety, has thought fit to enter with the States-general of the United provinces into a particular

ticular alliance and confederacy; the principal end and only aim of which shall be the public quiet and tranquillity; and to prevent, by measures taken in time, all the events which might one day excite new war. It is with this view, that her British majesty has given her full power to agree upon some articles of a treaty, in addition to the treaties and alliances that she hath already with the lords the States-general of the United provinces, to her ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, Charles, viscount Townshend, baron of Lyme-Regis, privy counsellor to her British majesty, captain of her majesty's yeomen of the guard, and her lieutenant in the county of Norfolk; and the lords the States-general of the United provinces, the sieur John de Welderen, lord of Valburgh, great bailiff of the Lower Betewe, of the body of the nobility of the province of Guelder; Frederick, baron of Reede, lord of Lier, St. Anthony, and T'er Lee, of the order of the nobility of the province of Holland and West-Friezeland; Anthony Heinsius, counsellor-pensionary of the province of Holland and West-Friezeland, keeper of the great seal, and super-intendant of the siefs of the same province; Cornelius Van Gheet, lord of Spranbrook, Bulkestyen, &c. Gedeon Hoeuft, canon of the chapter of the church of St. Peter at Utrecht, and elected counsellor in the states of the province of Utrecht; Hassel Van Sminia, secretary of the chamber of the accounts of the province of Frieze-land; Ernest Ittersum, lord of Osterbos, of the body of the nobility of the province of Overysfel; and Wicher Wichers, senator of the city of Groningen;

all

all deputies to the assembly of the said lords the States-general on the one part, respectively of the province of Guelder, Holland, West-Friezeland, Zeland, Utrecht, Friezeland, Overysfel and Groningen, and Ommelands, who, by virtue of their full powers, have agreed upon the following articles :

A R T I C L E I.

THE treaties of peace, friendship, alliance, and confederacy between her *Britannic* majesty and the *States-general* of the United provinces shall be approved and confirmed by the present treaty, and shall remain in their former force and vigour as if they were inserted word for word.

A R T I C L E II.

The succession to the crown of *England* having been settled by an act of parliament, passed the twelfth year of the reign of his late majesty king *William III.* the title of which is, *An act for the further limitation of the crown, and better securing the rights and liberties of the subject*; and lately, in the sixth year of the reign of her present majesty, this succession having been again established and confirmed, by another act made for the greater security of her majesty's person and government, and the succession to the crown of *Great-Britain*, &c. in the line of the most serene house of *Hanover*, and in the person of the princess *Sophia*, and of her heirs, successors, and descendants, male and female, already born or to be born : and although no power
hath

hath any right to oppose the laws made upon this subject by the crown and parliament of *Great-Britain*; if it shall happen, nevertheless, that, under any pretence, or by any cause whatever, any person or any power or state may pretend to dispute the establishment which the parliament hath made of the aforesaid succession, in the most serene house of *Hanover*, to oppose the said succession, to assist or favour those who may oppose it, whether directly or indirectly, by open war, or by fomenting seditions and conspiracies against her or him to whom the crown of *Great-Britain* shall descend, according to the acts aforesaid; the *States-general* engage and promise to assist and maintain, in the said succession, her or him to whom it shall belong, by virtue of the said acts of parliament, to assist them in taking possession, if they should not be in actual possession, and to oppose those who would disturb them in the taking of such possession, or in the actual possession of the aforesaid succession.

A R T I C L E III.

Her said majesty and the *States-general*, in consequence of the fifth article of the alliance concluded between the *Emperor*, the late king of *Great-Britain*, and the *States-general*, the seventh of *September 1701*, will employ all their force to recover the rest of the *Spanish Low-countries*.

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ARTICLE IV.

And further, they will endeavour to conquer as many towns and forts as they can, in order to their being a barrier and security to the said *States*.

ARTICLE V.

And whereas, according to the ninth article of the said alliance, it is to be agreed, amongst other matters, how and in what manner the *States* shall be made safe by means of this barrier, the QUEEN of *Great-Britain* will use her endeavours to procure that, in the treaty of peace, it may be agreed, that all the *Spanish Low-countries*, and what else may be found necessary, whether conquered or unconquered places, shall serve as a barrier to the *States*.

ARTICLE VI.

That, to this end, their high mightinesses shall have the liberty to put and keep garrison, to change, augment, and diminish it as they shall judge proper, in the places following: namely, *Newport, Furnes*, with the fort of *Knocke, Ypres, Menin*, the town and citadel of *Lisle, Tournay*, and its citadel, *Conde, Valenciennes*; and the places which shall from hence forward be conquered from *France, Maubeuge, Charleroy, Namur*, and its citadel, *Lier, Halle*, to fortify the ports of *Perle, Philippe, Damme*, the castle of *Gand*, and *Dendermonde*. The fort of *St. Donas*, being joined to the fortification of the *Sluce*, and being entirely incorporated with it,

it, shall remain and be yielded in property to the *States*. The fort of *Rodenhuysse*, on this side *Gand*, shall be demolished.

ARTICLE VII.

The said *States-general* may, in case of an apparent attack, or war, put as many troops as they shall think necessary in all the towns, places, and forts in the *Spanish Low-countries*, where the reason of war shall require it.

ARTICLE VIII.

They may likewise send into the towns, forts, and places, where they shall have their garrisons (without any hindrance, and without paying any duties), provisions, ammunitions of war, arms, and artillery, materials for the fortifications, and all that shall be found convenient and necessary for the said garrisons and fortifications.

ARTICLE IX.

The said *States-general* shall also have liberty to appoint, in the towns, forts, and places, of their barrier mentioned in the foregoing sixth article, where they may have garrisons, such governors and commanders, majors, and other officers, as they shall find proper, who shall not be subject to any other orders, whatsoever they may be, or from whence soever they may come, relating to the security and military government of the said places, but only to those of their high mightinesses (exclusive of all

others); still preserving the rights and privileges, as well ecclesiastical as political, of king *Charles* the third.

A R T I C L E X.

That, besides, the *States* shall have liberty to fortify the said towns, places, and forts, which belong to them, and repair the fortifications of them in such manner as they shall judge necessary; and further to do whatever shall be useful for their defence.

A R T I C L E XI.

It is agreed, that the *States-general* shall have all the revenues of the towns, places, jurisdictions, and their dependencies, which they shall have for their barrier from *France*, which were not in the possession of the crown of *Spain* at the time of the death of the late king *Charles* II; and besides, a million of livres shall be settled for the payment of one hundred thousand crowns every three months out of the clearest revenues of the *Spanish Low-countries*, which the said king was then in possession of; both which are for maintaining the garrisons of the *States*, and for supplying the fortifications, as also the magazines, and other necessary expences, in the towns and places above-mentioned. And that the said revenues may be sufficient to support these expences, endeavours shall be used for enlarging the dependencies and jurisdictions aforesaid as much as possible; and particularly for including, with the jurisdiction of *Ypres*, that of *Cassel*, and the forest of *Neipe*; and,

with the jurisdiction of *Lisle*, the jurisdiction of *Douay*, both having been so joined before the present war.

A R T I C L E XII.

That no town, fort, place, or country of the *Spanish Low-countries*, shall be granted, transferred, or given, or descend to the crown of *France*, or any of the line of *France*, neither by virtue of any gift, sale, exchange, marriage, agreement, inheritance, succession by will, or through want of will, from no title whatsoever, nor in any other manner whatsoever, nor be put into the power, or under the authority, of the most Christian king, or any one of the line of *France*.

A R T I C L E XIII.

And whereas the said *States-general*, in consequence of the ninth article of the said alliance, are to make a convention or treaty with king *Charles* the third, for putting the *States* in a condition of safety by means of the said barrier, the QUEEN of *Great Britain* will do what depends upon her, that all the foregoing particulars, relating to the barrier of the *States*, may be inserted in the aforesaid treaty or convention ; and that her said majesty will continue her good offices, until the above-mentioned convention, between the *States* and the said king *Charles* the third, be concluded, agreeably to what is before mentioned ; and that her majesty will be guarantee of the said treaty or convention.

A R T I C L E XIV.

And that the said *States* may enjoy, from henceforward, as much as possible, a barrier for the *Spanish Low-countries*, they shall be permitted to put their garrisons in the towns already taken, and which may hereafter be so, before the peace be concluded and ratified. And in the mean time, the said king *Charles* the third shall not be allowed to enter into possession of the said *Spanish Low-countries*, neither entirely nor in part; and, during that time, the QUEEN shall assist their high mightinesses to maintain them in the enjoyment of the revenues, and to find the million of livres a year abovementioned.

A R T I C L E XV.

And whereas their high mightinesses have stipulated, by the treaty of *Munster*, in the fourteenth article, that the river *Scheld*, as also the canals of *Sas*, *Swan*, and other mouths of the sea bordering thereupon, should be kept shut on the side of the *States* :

And in the fifteenth article, that the ships and commodities, going in and coming out of the harbours of *Flanders*, shall be and remain charged with all such imposts and other duties as are raised upon commodities going and coming along the *Scheld*, and the other canals abovementioned :

The QUEEN of *Great Britain* promises and engages, that their high mightinesses shall never be disturbed in their right and possession in that respect,
neither

neither directly nor indirectly ; as also, that the commerce shall not, in prejudice of the said treaty, be made more easy by the sea-ports than by the rivers, canals, and mouths of the sea, on the side of the *States* of the United provinces, neither directly nor indirectly.

And whereas, by the sixteenth and seventeenth articles of the same treaty of *Munster*, his majesty the king of *Spain* is obliged to treat the subjects of their high mightinesses as favourably as the subjects of *Great Britain* and *Hans* towns, who were then the people most favourably treated ; her *Britannic* majesty and their high mightinesses promise likewise to take care, that the subjects of *Great Britain* and of their high mightinesses shall be treated in the *Spanish Low-countries*, as well as in *Spain*, the kingdoms and states belonging to it, equally, and as well the one as the other, as the people most favoured.

A R T I C L E XVI.

The said *QUEEN* and *States-general* oblige themselves to furnish, by sea and land, the succours and assistance necessary to maintain, by force, her said majesty in the quiet possession of her kingdoms, and the most serene house of *Hanover* in the said succession, in the manner it is settled by the acts of parliament beforementioned ; and to maintain the said *States-general* in the possession of the said barrier.

ARTICLE XVII.

After the ratifications of the treaty, a particular convention shall be made of the conditions, by which the said QUEEN and the said lords the *States-general* will engage themselves to furnish the succours which shall be thought necessary, as well by sea as by land.

ARTICLE XVIII.

If her *British* majesty, or the *States-general* of the United provinces, be attacked by any body whatsoever by reason of this convention, they shall mutually assist one another with all their forces, and become guarantees of the execution of the said convention.

ARTICLE XIX.

There shall be invited and admitted into the present treaty, as soon as possible, all the kings, princes, and states, who shall be willing to enter into the same, particularly his *Imperial* majesty, the kings of *Spain* and *Prussia*, and the elector of *Hanover*. And her *British* majesty and the *States-general* of the United provinces, and each of them in particular, shall be permitted to require and invite those, whom they shall think fit to require and invite, to enter into this treaty, and to be guarantees of its execution.

ARTICLE XX.

And as time hath shewn the omission, which was made in the treaty signed at *Ryswick* in the year

1697, between *England* and *France*, in respect of the right of the succession of *England* in the person of her majesty the QUEEN of *Great Britain*, now reigning; and that, for want of having settled in that treaty this indisputable right of her majesty, *France* refused to acknowledge her for QUEEN of *Great Britain* after the death of the late king *William* the third of glorious memory: her majesty the QUEEN of *Great Britain* and the lords the *States-general* of the United provinces do agree, and engage themselves, likewise not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with *France*, before the title of her majesty to the crown of *Great Britain*, as also the right of succession of the most serene house of *Hanover* to the aforefaid crown, in the manner it is settled and established by the beforementioned acts of parliament, be fully acknowledged as a preliminary by *France*; and that *France* hath promised, at the same time, to remove, out of its dominions, the person who pretends to be king of *Great Britain*; and that no negotiation, or formal discussion of the articles of the said treaty of peace, shall be entered into, but jointly, and at the same time, with the said QUEEN, or with her ministers.

A R T I C L E X X I .

Her *British* majesty, and the lords the *States-general* of the United provinces, shall ratify and confirm all that is contained in the present treaty within the space of four weeks, to be reckoned from the day of the signing. In testimony whereof the un-

derwritten ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her *British* majesty, and the deputies of the lords the *States-general*, have signed this present treaty, and have affixed their seals thereunto.

At the Hague the 29th of October, in the year 1709.

(L. S.) *Townshend.*

(L. S.) *J. B. Van Reede.*

(L. S.) *G. Hoeuft.*

(L. S.) *E. V. Iiterfum.*

(L. S.) *J. V. Welderen.*

(L. S.) *A. Heinsius.*

(L. S.) *H. Sminia.*

(L. S.) *W. Wichers.*

THE SEPARATE ARTICLE.

AS in the preliminary articles signed here at the Hague the 28th of May 1709, by the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial majesty, of her majesty the QUEEN of Great Britain, and of the lords the States-general of the United provinces, it is stipulated, amongst other things, that the lords the States-general shall have, with entire property and sovereignty, the upper quarter of Guelder, according to the fifty-second article of the treaty of Munster of the year 1648; as also, that the garrisons which are, or hereafter shall be, on the part of the lords the States-general, in the town of Huy, the citadel of Liege, and in the town of Bonne, shall remain there, until it shall be otherwise agreed upon with his Imperial majesty and the empire: and as the barrier, which is this day agreed upon, in the princi-

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pal treaty for the mutual guarantee, between her British majesty and the lords the States-general, cannot give, to the United provinces, the safety for which it is established, unless it be well secured from one end to the other, and that the communication of it be well joined together, for which the upper quarter of Guelder, and the garrisons in the citadel of Liege, Huy, and Bonne are absolutely necessary (experience having thrice shewn, that France, having a design to attack the United provinces, has made use of the places abovementioned, in order to come at them, and to penetrate into the said provinces). And further, as in respect to the equivalent for which the upper quarter of Guelder is to be yielded to the United provinces, according to the fifty-second article of the treaty of Munster abovementioned, his majesty king Charles III, will be much more gratified and advantaged in other places, than that equivalent can avail. To the end therefore that the lords the States-general may have the upper quarter of Guelder, with entire property and sovereignty; and that the said upper quarter of Guelder may be yielded, in this manner, to the said lords the States-general, in the convention, or the treaty that they are to make with his majesty king Charles III, according to the thirteenth article of the treaty concluded this day; as also that their garrisons in the citadel of Liege, in that of Huy, and in Bonne, may remain there, until it be otherwise agreed upon with his Imperial majesty and the empire; her majesty the QUEEN of Great Britain engages herself, and promises, by this separate article, which shall have the same force as if it were inserted in the principal

cipal treaty, to make the same efforts for all this, as she hath engaged herself to make for the obtaining the barrier in the Spanish Low-countries. In testimony whereof the underwritten ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her British majesty, and deputies of the lords the States-general, have signed the present separate article, and have affixed their seals thereunto.

At the Hague, the 29th of October, 1709.

(L. S.) Townshend.

(L. S.) J. B. Van Reede.

(L. S.) G. Hoeuft.

(L. S.) E. V. Ittersum.

(L. S.) J. V. Welderen.

(L. S.) A. Heinfius.

(L. S.) H. Sminia.

(L. S.) W. Wichers.

THE SECOND SEPARATE ARTICLE.

AS the lords the States-general have represented, that in Flanders the limits, between Spanish Flanders and that of the States, are settled in such a manner, as that the land, belonging to the States, is extremely narrow there; so that, in some places, the territory of Spanish Flanders extends itself to the fortifications, and under the cannon, of the places, towns, and forts of the States, which occasions many inconveniences, as hath been seen, by an example, a little before the beginning of the present war, when a fort was designed to have been built under the cannon of the Sas Van Gand, under pretence that it was upon the territory

tory of Spain : and as it is necessary, for avoiding these and other sorts of inconveniencies, that the land of the States, upon the confines of Flanders, should be enlarged, and that the places, towns, and forts should, by that means, be better covered : her British majesty, entering into the just motives of the said lords the States-general in this respect, promises and engages herself, by this separate article, that, in the convention which the said lords the States-general are to make with his majesty king Charles III, she will assist them, as that it may be agreed, that, by the cession to the said lords the States-general of the property of an extent of land necessary to obviate such like and other inconveniencies, their limits in Flanders shall be enlarged more conveniently for their security ; and those of the Spanish Flanders removed further from their towns, places, and forts, to the end that these may not be so exposed any more. In testimony whereof the under-written ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of her British majesty, and deputies of the lords the States general, have signed the present separate article, and have affixed their seals thereunto.

At the Hague, the 29th of October, 1709.

(L. S.) Townshend.

(L. S.) J. B. Van Reede.

(L. S.) A. Heinsius.

(L. S.) G. Hoeuft.

(L. S.) H. Sminia.

(L. S.) E. V. Ittersum.

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The articles of the Counter-project, which were struck out, or altered, by the Dutch in the Barrier treaty ; with some Remarks.

A R T I C L E V I.

TO this end their mightinesses shall have power to put and keep garrisons in the following places, *viz. Newport, Knocke, Menin, the citadel of Lisse, Tournay, Conde, Valenciennes, Namur, and its citadel, Lier, Halle, to fortify the fort of Perle, Damme, and the castle of Gand,*

R E M A R K S.

In the Barrier treaty, the *States* added the following places to those mentioned in this article, *viz. Furnes, Ypres, towns of Lisse, Maubeuge, Charleroy, Philippe, fort of St. Donas* (which is to be in property to the *States*), and the fort of *Rhodenhuysen* to be demolished. To say nothing of the other places, *Dendermonde* is the key of all *Brabant* ; and the demolishing of the fort of *Rhodenhuysen*, situate between *Gand* and *Sas vas Gand*, can only serve to defraud the king of *Spain* of the duties upon goods imported and exported there.

A R T I C L E V I I.

The said *States* may put into the said towns, forts, and places, and, in case of open war with *France*, into all the other towns, places, and forts, whatever troops the reason of war shall require.

R E M A R K S.

But, in the Barrier treaty, it is said : *In case of an apparent attack, or war, without specifying against France* : neither is the number of troops limited to what the reason of war shall require, but what the *States* shall think necessary.

A R T I C L E IX.

Besides some smaller differences, ends with a salvo, not only for the ecclesiastical and civil rights of the king of *Spain*, but likewise for his revenues in the said towns ; which revenues, in the Barrier treaty, are all given to the *States*.

A R T I C L E XI.

The revenues of the chatellanies and dependencies of the towns and places, which the *States* shall have for their barrier against *France*, and which were not in the possession of the crown of *Spain* at the late king of *Spain's* death, shall be settled to be a fund for maintaining garrisons, and providing for the fortifications and magazines, and other necessary charges, of the said towns of the barrier.

R E M A R K S.

I desire the reader to compare this with the eleventh article of the Barrier treaty, where he will see how prodigiously it is enlarged.

A R T I-

ARTICLE XIV.

All this to be without prejudice to such other treaties and conventions as the *QUEEN of Great Britain*, and their high mightinesses may think fit to make for the future with the said king *Charles III*, relating to the said *Spanish Netherlands*, or to the said barrier.

ARTICLE XV.

And to the end, that the said *States* may enjoy at present, as much as it is possible, a barrier in the *Spanish Netherlands*, they shall be permitted to put their garrisons in the chief towns already taken, or that may be taken before a peace be made.

REMARKS.

These two articles are not in the barrier treaty, but two others in their stead; to which I refer the reader. And indeed it was highly necessary for the *Dutch* to strike out the former of these articles, when so great a part of the treaty is so highly and manifestly prejudicial to *Great Britain*, as well as to the king of *Spain*; especially in the two articles inserted in the place of these, which I desire the reader will examine.

ARTICLE XX.

And whereas, by the fifth and ninth articles of the alliance between the *Emperor*, the late king of *Great Britain*, and the *States-general*, concluded the seventh

seventh of *September* 1701, it is agreed and stipulated, that the kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, with all the dependencies of the crown of *Spain* in *Italy*, shall be recovered from the possession of *France*, as being of the last consequence to the trade of both nations, as well as the *Spanish Netherlands* for a barrier for the *States-general*; therefore the said QUEEN of *Great Britain* and the *States-general* agree and oblige themselves not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with *France*, before the restitution of the said kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily*, with all the dependencies of the crown of *Spain* in *Italy*, as well as the *Spanish Low-countries*, with the other towns and places in the possession of *France* above-mentioned in this treaty; and also after the manner specified in this treaty; as likewise all the rest of the entire monarchy of *Spain* be yielded by *France* as a preliminary.

ARTICLE XXII.

And whereas experience hath shewn of what importance it is to *Great Britain* and the *United provinces*, that the fortrefs and port of *Dunkirk* should not be in the possession of *France* in the condition they are at present; the subjects of both nations having undergone such great losses, and suffered so much in their trade, by the prizes taken from them by privateers set out from that port; insomuch that *France*, by her unmeasurable ambition, may be always tempted to make some enterprizes upon the territories of the QUEEN of *Great Britain* and their
high

high mightinesses, and interrupt the public repose and tranquillity; for the preservation of which, and the balance of *Europe* against the exorbitant power of *France*, the allies engaged themselves in this long and burthensome war; therefore the said QUEEN of *Great Britain* and their high mightinesses agree and oblige themselves not to enter into any negotiation or treaty of peace with *France*, before it shall be yielded and stipulated by *France* as a preliminary, that all the fortifications of the said town of *Dunkirk*, and the forts that depend upon it, be entirely demolished and razed, and that the port be entirely ruined and rendered impracticable.

R E M A R K S.

These two articles are likewise omitted in the Barrier treaty; whereof the first regards particularly the interest of the house of *Austria*; and the other, about demolishing *Dunkirk*, those of *Great Britain*. It is something strange, that the late ministry, whose advocates raise such a clamour about the necessity of recovering *Spain* from the house of *Bourbon*, should suffer the *Dutch* to strike out this article, which, I think, clearly shews the reason why the *States* never troubled themselves with the thoughts of reducing *Spain* or even recovering *Milan*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*, to the *Emperor*; but were wholly fixed upon the conquest of *Flanders*, because they had determined those provinces as a property for themselves.

As

As for the article about demolishing of *Dunkirk*, I am not at all surprized to find it struck out; the destruction of that place, although it would be useful to the *States*, doth more nearly import *Britain*, and was therefore a point that such ministers could more easily get over.

The sentiments of prince EUGENE of SAVOY, and of the count DE SINZENDORF, relating to the barrier of the States-general, to the upper quarter of Guelder, and to the towns of the electorate of Cologne, and of the bishoprick of Liege.

ALTHOUGH the orders and instructions of the courts of *Vienna* and *Barcelona*, upon the matters above-mentioned, do not go so far as to give directions for what follows; notwithstanding the PRINCE and COUNT above-mentioned, considering the present state of affairs, are of the following opinion:

First, that the counter-project of *England*, relating to the places where the *States-general* may put and keep garrisons, ought to be followed, except *Lier*, *Halle* to fortify, and the castle of *Gand*. Provided likewise, that the sentiments of *England* be particularly conformed to, relating to *Dendermond* and *Ostend*, as places in no wise belonging to the barrier; and which, as well as the castle of *Gand*, can only serve to make the *States general* masters of the *Low-countries*, and hinder trade with *England*. And as to *Lier* and *Halle*, those who are

acquainted with the country know that these towns cannot give any security to the *States-general*; but can only make people believe, that these places being fortified, would rather serve to block up *Brussels* and the other great cities of *Brabant*.

Secondly, as to what is said in the seventh article of the counter-project of *England*, relating to the augmentation of garrisons, in the towns of the barrier, in case of an open war: This is agreeable to the opinions of the said *prince* and *count*; who think likewise, that there ought to be added to the eighth article, that no goods nor merchandize should be sent into the towns where the *States-general* shall have garrisons, nor be comprehended under the name of such things as the said garrisons and fortifications shall have need of. And that to this end, the said things shall be inspected in those places where they are to pass; as likewise the quantity shall be settled that the garrisons may want.

Thirdly, as to the ninth article, relating to the governours and commanders of those towns, forts, and places where the *States-general* shall have their garrisons; the said *prince* and *count* are of opinion, that the said governours and commanders ought to take an oath as well to the king of *Spain*, as to the *States-general*: but they may take a particular oath to the latter, that they will not admit foreign troops without their consent; and that they will depend exclusively upon the said *States*, in whatever regards the military power. But, at the same time, they ought exclusively to promise the king of *Spain*, that
they

they will not intermeddle in the affairs of law, civil power, revenues, or any other matters, ecclesiastical or civil, unless at the desire of the king's officers to assist them in the execution; in which case, the said commanders should be obliged not to refuse them.

Fourthly, as to the tenth article, there is nothing to be added, unless that the *States-general* may repair and encrease the fortifications of the towns, places, and forts, where they shall have their garrisons; but this at their own expence. Otherwise, under that pretext, they might seize all the revenues of the country.

Fifthly, as to the eleventh article, they think the *States* ought not to have the revenues of the chartellanies and dependencies of these towns and places, which are to be their barrier against *France*; this being a sort of sovereignty, and very prejudicial to the ecclesiastical and civil œconomy of the country. But the said *prince* and *count* are of opinion, that the *States-general* ought to have, for the maintenance of their garrisons and fortifications, a sum of money of a million and a half, or two millions of florins, which they to ought receive from the king's officers, who shall be ordered to pay that sum before any other payment.

Sixthly, And the convention, which shall be made on this affair, between his *Catholic* majesty and the *States-general*, shall be for a limited time.

These are the utmost conditions to which the said *prince* and *count* think it possible for his *Catho-*

lick majesty to be brought; and they declare at the same time, that their *Imperial* and *Catholic* majesties will sooner abandon the *Low-countries*, than take them upon other conditions, which would be equally expensive, shameful, and unacceptable to them.

On the other side, the said *prince* and *count* are persuaded that the advantages, at this time, yielded to the *States-general*, may hereafter be very prejudicial to themselves; forasmuch, as they may put the people of the *Spanish Netherlands* to some dangerous extremity, considering the antipathy between the two nations; and that extending of frontiers is entirely contrary to the maxims of their government.

As to the upper quarter of *Guelder*, the said *prince* and *count* are of opinion, that the *States-general* may be allowed the power of putting in garrisons into *Venlo*, *Ruremond*, and *Steffenswaert*, with orders to furnish the said *States* with the revenues of the country, which amount to one hundred thousand florins.

As to *Bonne*, belonging to the electorate of *Cologne*, *Liege*, and *Huy* to the bishoprick of *Liege*, it is to be understood, that these being *imperial* towns, it doth not depend upon the *Emperor* to consent that foreign garrisons should be placed in them upon any pretence whatsoever. But whereas the *States-general* demand them not only for their security, it is proposed to place, in those towns, a garrison of

salmon, hides, beef, and all other product of her majesty's dominions, which we import at *Ostend*, and there pay the duty of entry to the king of *Spain*; and, consequently, ought not to be liable to any new duty, when they carry the same goods and all others from their dominions, by a free pass or *transfire* to the said new conquests; and we are under apprehension, that, if the said new conquests be settled, or given entirely into the possession of the *States-general* for their barrier (as we are made believe, by a treaty lately made by her majesty's ambassador, the lord viscount *Townshend*, at the *Hague*) that the *States-general* may also soon declare all goods and merchandizes, which are contraband in their provinces, to be also contraband or prohibited in these new conquests, or new barrier; by which her majesty's subjects will be deprived of the sale and consumption of the following products of her majesty's dominions, which are, and have long been, declared contraband in the United provinces, such as *English* and *Scotch* salt, malt spirits or corn brandy, and all other sorts of distilled *English* spirits, whale and rape oil, *etc.*

It is therefore humbly conceived, that her majesty, out of her great care and gracious concern for the benefit of her subjects and dominions, may be pleased to direct, by a treaty of commerce, or some other way, that their trade may be put on an equal foot in all the *Spanish Netherlands*, and the new conquests of barrier, with the subjects of *Holland*, by paying no other duty than that of importation.

tation to the king of *Spain*; and, by a provision, that no product of her majesty's dominions shall ever be declared contraband in these new conquests, except such goods as were esteemed contraband before the death of *Charles II*, king of *Spain*. And it is also humbly prayed, that the product and manufacture of the new conquests may be also exported without paying any new duty, besides that of exportation at *Ostend*, which was always paid to the king of *Spain*; it being impossible for any nation in *Europe* to afford an entire cargoe for the *Spanish West-Indies*, without a considerable quantity of several of the manufactures of *Lisle*; such as caradors, cajant, picoses, boratten, and many other goods.

The chief things to be demanded of *France* are, to be exempted from tonnage, to have a liberty of importing herrings and all other fish to *France*, on the same terms as the *Dutch* do, and as was agreed by them at the treaty of commerce immediately after the treaty of peace at *Ryswick*. The enlarging her majesty's plantations in *America*, &c. is naturally recommended.

A

P R E F A C E

To the RIGHT REVEREND

Dr. BURNET, Bishop of SARUM'S

I N T R O D U C T I O N

To the THIRD VOLUME of the

HISTORY of the REFORMATION

OF THE

CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

*Spargere voces
In vulgum ambiguas, & quærere conscius arma.*

Written in the Year 1712.

TO THE
BOOKSELLER.

Mr. MORPHEW,

YOUR care in putting an advertisement in the *Examiner* hath been of very great use to me. I now send you my preface to the bishop of *Sarum's introduction* to his third volume, which I desire you to print in such a form as, in the bookseller's phrase, will make a *six-penny touch*: hoping it will give such a public notice of my design, that it may come into the hands of those, who, perhaps, look not into the bishop's *introduction* (s). I desire you will prefix to this a passage out of *Virgil*, which doth so perfectly agree with my present thoughts of his lordship, that I cannot express them better, nor more truly, than those words do.

I am,

S I R,

Your humble Servant.

[s] The bishop's introduction is prefaced with a letter to his bookseller, of which this is a burlesque.

A P R E-

P R E F A C E.

To the RIGHT REVEREND

Dr. BURNET, Bishop of *Sarum's*

INTRODUCTION, &c.

THIS way of publishing introductions to books that are, God knows when, to come out, is either wholly new, or so long unpractised, that my small reading cannot trace it. However, we are to suppose, that a person of his lordship's great age and experience would hardly act such a piece of singularity without some extraordinary motives. I cannot but observe, that his fellow labourer, the author of the paper called [1] *The Englishman*, seems, in some of his late performances, to have almost transcribed the notions of the bishop: these notions, I take to have been dictated by the same masters, leaving to each writer that peculiar manner of expressing himself, which the poverty of our language forceth me to call their style. When the *Guardian* changed his title, and professed to engage in faction I was sure the word was given; that grand preparations were making against next session; that all advantages would be taken of the little dissensions reported to be among those in power; and that the

[1] Mr. Steele.

Guardian would soon be seconded by some other *piquers* from the same camp. But I will confess my suspicions did not carry me so far as to conjecture, that this venerable champion would be in such a mighty haste to come into the field, and serve in the quality of an *enfant* [u] *perdu* armed only with a *pocket-pistol*, before his great *blunderbuss* could be got ready, his old rusty *breast-plate* scoured, and his cracked *head-piece* mended.

I was debating with myself, whether this hint of producing a small pamphlet, to give notice of a large folio, was not borrowed from the ceremonial in *Spanish* romances, where a *dwarf* is sent out upon the battlements to signify to all passengers what a mighty *giant* there is in the castle; or whether the bishop copied this proceeding from the *fanfaronnade* [w] of monsieur *Bouffleurs*, when the earl of *Portland* and that general had an interview. Several men were appointed, at certain periods, to ride in great haste towards the *English* camp, and cry out, *Monseigneur vient, Monseigneur vient* [x]: then small parties advanced with the same speed, and the same cry; and this foppery held for many hours, until the *mareschal* himself arrived. So here the bishop (as we find by his dedication to Mr. *Churchill* the bookseller) hath, for a long time,

[u] *Enfant perdu*, one of the forlorn hope; the forlorn hope is a number of men selected for any desperate enterprize, or appointed for the first onset in a battle.

[w] *Fanfaronnade*, vain ostentation.

[x] My lord is coming, my lord is coming.

sent

sent warning of his arrival by advertisements in *gazettes*; and now his *introduction* advanceth to tell us again, *Monseigneur vient*: in the mean time we must gape, and wait, and gaze, the lord knows how long, and keep our spirits in some reasonable agitation, until his lordship's real self shall think fit to appear in the habit of a folio.

I have seen the same sort of management at a puppet-show. Some puppets of little or no consequence appeared several times at a window to allure the boys and the rabble; the trumpeter sounded often, and the door-keeper cried an hundred times, until he was hoarse, that they were *just going to begin*; yet after all we were forced sometimes to wait an hour before *punch* himself in person made his entry.

But why this ceremony among old acquaintance? The world and he have long known one another: let him appoint his hour, and make his visit, without troubling us all day with a succession of messages from his lacquies and pages.

With submission, these little arts of getting off an edition do ill become any author above the size of *Marten* the surgeon. My lord tells us, that *many thousands of the two former parts of his history are in the kingdom*; and now he perpetually advertiseth in the *gazette*, that he intends to publish the third. This is exactly in the method and style of *Marten*: the seventh edition (many thousands of the former editions having been sold off in a small time) of *Mr. Marten's book concerning secret diseases, &c.*

Doth

Doth his lordship intend to publish his great volume by subscription, and is this introduction only by way of *specimen*? I was inclined to think so, because in the prefixed letter to Mr. *Churchill*, which introduces this introduction, there are some dubious expressions; he says, *the advertisements he published were in order to move people to furnish him with materials, which might help him to finish his work with great advantage*. If he means half-a-guinea upon the subscription, and the other half at the delivery, why doth he not tell us so in plain terms?

I am wondering how it came to pass, that this diminutive letter to Mr. *Churchill* should understand the business of *introducing* better than the *introduction* itself; or why the bishop did not take it into his head to send the former into the world some months before the latter, which would have been yet a greater improvement upon the solemnity of the procession?

Since I write these last lines, I have perused the whole pamphlet (which I had only dipt in before) and found I have been hunting upon a wrong scent; for the author hath, in several parts of his piece; discovered the true motives, which put him upon sending it abroad at this juncture. I shall therefore consider them as they come in my way.

My lord begins his *introduction* with an account of the reasons, why he was guilty of so many mistakes in the first volume of his *history of the reformation*: his excuses are just, rational, and extremely consistent. He says, *he wrote in haste*, which he con-

firms by adding, *that it lay a year after he wrote it before it was put into the press.* At the same time, he mentions a passage extremely to the honour of that pious and excellent prelate, archbishop *Sancroft*, which demonstrates his grace to have been a person of great sagacity, and almost a prophet. Doctor *Burnet*, then a private divine, *desired admittance to the Cotton library, but was prevented [y] by the archbishop, who told Sir John Cotton, that the said doctor was no friend to the prerogative of the crown, or to the constitution of the kingdom.* This judgment was the more extraordinary, because the doctor had not long before published a book in *Scotland* with his name prefixed, which carries the

[y] It is somewhat remarkable to see the progress of this story. In the first edition of this *introduction* it should seem, "he was PREVENTED by the archbishop," &c. When the *introduction* was reprinted a year after with the *history*, it stands: "A GREAT PRELATE had been before-hand, and possessed him (Sir John Cotton) against me—That unless the archbishop of *Canterbury* would recommend me—he desired to be excused—The bishop of *Worcester* could not prevail on the archbishop to INTERPOSE." This is somewhat less than PREVENTING; unless the archbishop be meant by the GREAT PRELATE; which is not very probable, 1. Because, in the preface to this very 3d volume, p. 4. he says, "It was by archbishop *Sancroft's* order he had the free use of every thing that lay in the *Lambeth* library." 2. Because the author of *Speculum Sarisburianum*, p. 6. tells us, "His access to the library was owing SOLELY to the recommendation of archbishop *Sancroft*, as I have been informed (says the author) by some of the family." 3. Because bishop *Burnet*, in his *History of his own times*, vol. i. p. 396, says it was "DOLEEN, bishop of *Rocheſter*, [at the instigation of the duke of *Lauderdale*,] that diverted Sir John Cotton from suffering him to search his library."

regal prerogative higher than any writer of the age: however, the good archbishop lived to see his opinion become universal in the kingdom.

The bishop goes on, for many pages, with an account of certain facts relating to the publishing his two former volumes of the *Reformation*; the great success of that work, and the adversaries who appeared against it. These are matters out of the way of my reading; only I observe that poor Mr. *Henry Wharton*, who hath deserved so well of the commonwealth of learning, and who gave himself the trouble of detecting some hundreds of the bishop's mistakes, meets with very ill quarter from his lordship; upon which I cannot avoid mentioning a peculiar method, which this prelate takes to revenge himself upon those who presume to differ from him in print. The bishop of *Rocheſter* [z] happened, some years ago, to be of this number. My lord of *Sarum*, in his reply, ventured to tell the world, that the gentleman, who had writ against him, meaning Dr. *Atterbury*, was one upon whom he had conferred great obligations; which was a very generous Christian contrivance of charging his adversary with ingratitude. But it seems the truth happened to be on the other side, which the doctor made appear in such a manner as would have silenced his lordship for ever, if he had not been writing-proof. Poor Mr. *Wharton*, in his grave, is charged with the same accusation, but with circumstances the most aggravating that malice and

[z] Dr. *Atterbury*.

some-

something else could invent : and which I will no more believe than five hundred passages in a certain book of travels [a]. See the character he gives of a divine and a scholar, who shortened his life in the service of God and the church. *Mr. Wharton desired me to intercede with Tillotson for a prebend of Canterbury. I did so ; but Wharton would not believe it ; said, he would be revenged, and so writ against me. Soon after, he was convinced I had spoke for him ; said, he was set on to do what he did, and, if I would procure any thing for him, he would discover every thing to me. What a spirit of candour, charity and good-nature, generosity and truth, shines through this story, told of a most excellent and pious divine, twenty years after his death, without one single voucher !*

Come we now to the reasons, which moved his lordship to set about this work at this time. *He could delay it no longer, because the reasons of his engaging in it at first seemed to return upon him. He was then frightened with the danger of a popish successor in view, and the dreadful apprehensions of the power of France. England hath forgot these dangers, and yet is nearer to them than ever ; and therefore he is resolved to awaken them with his third volume ; but, in the mean time, sends this introduction to let them know they are asleep. He then goes on in describing the condition of the kingdom after such a manner, as if destruction hung over us by a sin-*

[a] *Burnet's Travels,*

gle hair; as if the *pope*, the *devil*, the *pretender*, and *France* were just at our doors.

When the bishop published his history, there was a *popish* plot on foot: the duke of *York*, a known *papist*, was presumptive heir to the crown: the house of commons would not hear of any expedient for securing their religion under a *popish* prince, nor would the king, or lords, consent to a bill of exclusion: the *French* king was in the height of his grandeur, and the vigour of his age. At this day, the presumptive heir, with that whole illustrious family, are *protestants*; the *popish* *pretender* excluded for ever by several acts of parliament; and every person in the smallest employment, as well as the members of both houses, obliged to *abjure* him. The *French* king is at the lowest ebb of life; his armies have been conquered, and his towns won from him for ten years together; and his kingdom is in danger of being torn, by divisions, during a long minority. Are these cases parallel? Or are we now in more danger of *France* and *popery*, than we were thirty years ago? What can be the motive for advancing such false, such detestable assertions? What conclusions would his lordship draw from such premisses as these? If injurious appellations were of any advantage to a cause (as the style of our adversaries would make us believe) what appellations would those deserve, who thus endeavour to sow the seeds of sedition, and are impatient to see the fruits? *But*, saith he, *the deaf adder stoppeth her ears, let the charmer charm*
never

never so wisely. True, my lord, there are, indeed, too many *adders* in this nation's bosom; *adders* in all shapes and in all habits, whom neither the QUEEN nor parliament can *charm* to loyalty, truth, religion, or honour.

Among other instances, produced by him, of the dismal condition we are in, he offers one which could not easily be guessed. It is this, *that the little factious pamphlets, written about the end of king Charles the second's reign, lie dead in shops, are looked on as waste paper, and turned to pasteboard.* How many are there of his lordship's writing, which could otherwise never have been of any real service to the publick? Hath he, indeed, so mean an opinion of our taste to send us, at this time of day, into all the corners of *Holborn, Duck-lane, and Moorfields*, in quest after the factious trash published in those days, by *Julian Johnson, Hicker-ingil, Dr. Oates*, and himself?

His lordship, taking it for a *postulatum*, that the QUEEN and ministry, both houses of parliament, and a vast majority of the landed gentlemen throughout *England*, are running headlong into *popery*, layeth hold on the occasion to describe *the cruelties in queen Mary's reign: an inquisition setting up faggots in Smithfield, and executions all over the kingdom.* Here is that, says he, which those, that look towards a *popish successor*, must look for. And he insinuates through his whole pamphlet, that all, who are not of his party, look towards a *popish successor*. These he divides into two parts, the *tory*

lality, and the *tory* clergy. He tells the former: *although they have no religion at all, but resolve to change with every wind and tide; yet they ought to have compassion on their countrymen and kindred.* Then he applies himself to the *tory* clergy, assures them, that *the fires revived in Smithfield, and all over the nation, will have no amiable view, but least of all to them, who, if they have any principles at all, must be turned out of their livings, leave their families, be hunted from place to place into parts beyond the seas, and meet with that contempt with which they treated foreigners, who took sanctuary among us.*

This requires a recapitulation, with some remarks. First, I do affirm, that in every hundred of professed *atheists, deists, and socinians* in the kingdom, ninety-nine, at least, are staunch thorough-paced *whigs*, entirely agreeing with his lordship in politicks and discipline; and therefore will venture all the fires of hell, rather than singe one hair of their beards in *Smithfield*. Secondly, I do likewise affirm, that those whom we usually understand by the appellation of *tory*, or high-church clergy, were the greatest sticklers against the exorbitant proceedings of king *James* the second, the best writers against *popery*, and the most exemplary sufferers for the established religion. Thirdly, I do pronounce it to be a most false and infamous scandal upon the nation in general, and on the clergy in particular, to reproach them for *treating foreigners with haughtiness and contempt.* The *French Hugonots* are many thousand witnesses to the contrary; and I wish they deserved

deserved the thousandth part of the good treatment they have received.

Lastly, I observe, that the author of a paper called *The Englishman* hath run into the same cant, gravely advising the whole body of the clergy not to bring in *popery*; because that will put them under a necessity of parting with their wives, or losing their livings.

The bulk of the kingdom, both clergy and laity, happen to differ extremely from this prelate in many principles both of politicks and religion. Now I ask, whether, if any man of them had signed his name to a system of *atheism*, or *popery*, he could have argued with them otherwise than he doth? Or, if I should write a grave letter to his lordship with the same advice, taking it for granted, that he was half an *atheist* and half a *papist*, and conjuring him, by all he held dear, to have compassion upon all those who believed a God; *not to revive the fires in Smithfield; that he must either forfeit his bishoprick, or not marry a fourth wife*; I ask, whether he would not think I intended him the highest injury and affront?

But as to the *tory* laity, he gives them up in a lump for abandoned atheists: they are a sett of men so *impiously corrupted in the point of religion*, that no scene of cruelty can fright them from leaping into it [*popery*], and, perhaps, *aëling such a part in it as may be assigned them*. He therefore despairs of influencing them by any topicks drawn from religion or compassion, and advances the consideration of

interest, as the only powerful argument to persuade them against *popery*.

What he offers upon this head is so very amazing from a *Christian*, a *clergyman*, and a *prelate* of the church of *England*, that I must, in my own imagination, strip him of those three capacities, and put him among the number of *that sett of men* he mentions in the paragraph before; or else it will be impossible to shape out an answer.

His lordship, in order to dissuade the *tories* from their design of bringing in *popery*, tells them, *how valuable a part of the whole soil of England, the abby lands, the estates of the bishops, of the cathedrals, and the tithes are*: how difficult such a resumption would be to many families; yet all these must be thrown up; for sacrilege in the church of Rome is a mortal sin. I desire it may be observed, what a jumble here is made of ecclesiastical revenues, as if they were all upon the same foot, were alienated with equal justice, and the clergy had no more reason to complain of one than the other; whereas the four branches mentioned by him are of very different consideration. If I might venture to guess the opinion of the clergy upon this matter, I believe they could wish, that some small part of the *abby lands* had been applied to the augmentation of poor bishopricks; and a very few acres to serve for glebes in those parishes, where there are none; after which, I think, they would not repine that the laity should possess the rest. If the estates of some bishops and cathedrals were exorbitant before
the

the Reformation, I believe the present clergy's wishes reach no further, than that some reasonable temper had been used, instead of paring them to the quick. But as to the *tithes*, without examining whether they be of divine institution, I conceive there is hardly one of that sacred order in *England*, and very few even among the *laimy* who love the *church*, who will not allow the misapplying those revenues to secular persons to have been at first a most flagrant act of injustice and oppression; although, at the same time, God forbid they should be restored any other way than by gradual purchase, by the consent of those who are now the lawful possessors, or by the piety and generosity of such worthy spirits as this nation sometimes produceth. The bishop knows very well, that the application of *tithes* to the maintenance of monasteries was a scandalous usurpation, even in *popish* times: that the monks usually sent out some of their fraternity to supply the cures; and that when the monasteries were granted away by *Henry VIII.* the parishes were left destitute, or very meanly provided, of any maintenance for a pastor. So that, in many places, the whole ecclesiastical dues, even to *mortuaries*, *Easter-offerings*, and the like, are in lay hands, and the incumbent lies wholly at the mercy of his patron for his daily bread. By these means there are several hundred parishes in *England* under twenty pounds a year, and many under ten. I take his lordship's bishoprick to be worth near 2500*l.* annual income; and I will engage, at half a year's

warning, to find him above an hundred beneficial clergymen, who have not so much among them all to support themselves and their families: most of them orthodox, of good life and conversation: as loth to see the fires kindled in *Smithfield* as his lordship; and at least as ready to face them under a *popish* persecution. But nothing is so hard for those, who abound in riches, as to conceive how others can be in want. How can the neighbouring vicar feel cold or hunger, while my lord is seated by a good fire, in the warmest room of his palace, with a dozen dishes before him? I remember one other prelate much of the same stamp, who, when his clergy would mention their wishes that some act of parliament might be thought of for the good of the church, would say: *Gentlemen, we are very well as we are; if they would let us alone, we should ask no more.*

Sacrilege (says my lord) *in the church of Rome is a mortal sin*: and is it only so in the church of *Rome*? or, is it but a venial sin in the church of *England*? Our litany calls *fornication a deadly sin*; and I would appeal to his lordship, for fifty years past, whether he thought that or *sacrilege the deadliest*? To make light of such a sin, at the same moment that he is frightening us from an idolatrous religion, should seem not very consistent. *Thou that sayest a man should not commit adultery, dost thou commit adultery? Thou that abhorrest idols, dost thou commit sacrilege?*

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To smoothe the way for the return of popery in queen *Mary's* time, the grantees were confirmed by the *pope* in the possession of the abby lands. But the bishop tells us, that *this confirmation was fraudulent and invalid*. I shall believe it to be so, although I happen to read it in his lordship's history. But he adds, *that although the confirmation had been good, the priests would have got their land again by these two methods: First, The statute of Mortmain was repealed for twenty years; in which time, no doubt, they reckoned they would recover the best part of what they had lost: besides that, engaging the clergy to renew no leases was a thing entirely in their own power; and this, in forty years time, would raise their revenues to be about ten times their present value*. These two expedients, for increasing the revenues of the church, he represents as pernicious designs, fit only to be practised in times of popery, and such as the laity ought never to consent to: from whence, and from what he said before about tithes, his lordship hath freely declared his opinion, that the clergy are rich enough, and that the least addition to their subsistence would be a step towards popery. Now it happens, that the two only methods, which could be thought on, with any probability of success, towards some reasonable augmentation of ecclesiastical revenues, are here rejected by a bishop as a means for introducing popery, and the nation publicly warned against them: whereas the continuance of the statute of *Mortmain* in full force, after the church had been

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so terribly stripped, appeared to her majesty and the kingdom a very unnecessary hardship; upon which account it was, at several times, *relaxed* by the legislature. Now, as the relaxation of that statute is manifestly one of the reasons, which gives the bishop those terrible apprehensions of *popery* coming on us; so I conceive another ground of his fears is the remission of the *first-fruits* and *tithes*. But where the inclination of *popery* lay, whether in her majesty, who proposed this benefaction, the parliament which confirmed, or the clergy who accepted it, his lordship hath not thought fit to determine.

The other *popish* expedient for augmenting church revenues is, *engaging the clergy to renew no leases*. Several of the most eminent clergymen have assured me, that nothing has been more wished for, by good men, than a law to prevent (at least) bishops from letting leases for lives. I could name ten bishopricks in *England*, whose revenues, one with another, do not amount to 600 pounds a year for each: and if his lordship's, for instance, would be above ten times the value when the lives are expired, I should think the overplus would not be ill disposed towards an augmentation of such as are now shamefully poor. But I do assert, that such an expedient was not always thought *popish* and dangerous by this right reverend historian. I have had the honour formerly to converse with him; and he hath told me several years ago, that he lamented extremely the power which bishops had of letting

letting leases for lives ; whereby, as he said, they were utterly deprived of raising their revenues, whatever alterations might happen in the value of money by length of time. I think the reproach of betraying private conversation will not, upon this account, be laid to my charge. Neither do I believe he would have changed his opinion upon any score, but to take up another more agreeable to the maxims of his party, *That the least addition of property to the church is one step towards popery.*

The bishop goes on with much earnestness and prolixity to prove, *That the pope's confirmation of the church lands, to those who held them by king Henry's donation, was null and fraudulent ; which is a point that, I believe, no protestant in England would give three-pence to have his choice, whether it should be true or false. It might, indeed, serve as a passage in his history, among a thousand other instances, to detect the knavery of the court of Rome : but I ask, Where could be the use of it in this introduction ? or why all this haste in publishing it at this juncture ; and so out of all method, apart, and before the work itself ? He gives his reasons in very plain terms : We are now, it seems, in more danger of popery than towards the end of king Charles the second's reign. That sett of men (the tories) is so impiously corrupted in the point of religion, that no scene of cruelty can frighten them from leaping into it ; and, perhaps, from acting such a part in it as may be assigned them. He doubts whether the high-church clergy have any principles ; and there-*
fore

fore will be ready to turn off their wives, and look on the fires kindled in *Smithfield* as an *amiable view*. These are the facts he all along takes for granted, and argues accordingly. Therefore, in despair of dissuading the nobility and gentry of the land from introducing *popery* by any motives of honour, religion, alliance, or mercy, he assures them, *That the pope hath not duly confirmed their titles to the church lands in their possession*: which therefore must be infallibly restored as soon as that religion is established among us.

Thus, in his lordship's opinion, there is nothing wanting to make the majority of the kingdom, both for number, quality, and possession, immediately embrace *popery*, except a *firm bull from the pope* to secure the abby and other church lands and tithes to the present proprietors and their heirs. If this only difficulty could now be adjusted, the *pretender* would be restored next session, the two houses reconciled to the church of *Rome* against *Easter* term, and the fires lighted in *Smithfield* by *Midsummer*. Such horrible calumnies against a nation are not the less injurious to decency, good-nature, truth, honour, and religion, because they may be vented with safety; and I will appeal to any reader of common understanding, whether this be not the most natural and necessary deduction from the passages I have cited and referred to.

Yet all this is but friendly dealing, in comparison with what he affords the clergy upon the same article. He supposes that whole reverend body, who

differ from him in principles of *church or state*, so far from disliking *popery* upon the abovementioned motives of *perjury, quitting their wives, or burning their relations*; that the hopes of *enjoying the abby lands* would soon bear down all such considerations, and be an effectual incitement to their perversion: and so he goes gravely on, as with the only argument which he thinks can have any force, to assure them, that the *parochial priests in Roman catholic countries, are much poorer than in ours; the several orders of regulars, and the magnificence of their church, devouring all their treasure; and, by consequence, their hopes are vain of expecting to be richer after the introduction of popery.*

But after all, his lordship despairs that even this argument will have any force with our abominable clergy, because, to use his own words, *They are an insensible and degenerate race, who are thinking of nothing but their present advantages; and, so that they may now support a luxurious and brutal course of irregular and voluptuous practices, they are easily hired to betray their religion, to sell their country, and give up that liberty and those properties, which are the present felicities and glories of this nation.*

He seems to reckon all these evils as matters fully determined on, and therefore falls into the last usual form of despair, by threatening the authors of these miseries with *lasting infamy, and the curses of posterity upon perfidious betrayers of their trust.*

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Let me turn this paragraph into vulgar language for the use of the poor; and strictly adhere to the sense of the words. I believe, it may be faithfully translated in the following manner: *The bulk of the clergy, and one third of the bishops, are stupid sons of whores, who think of nothing but getting money as soon as they can; if they may but procure enough to supply them in gluttony, drunkenness, and whoring, they are ready to turn traitors to God and their country, and make their fellow-subjects slaves.* The rest of the period, about threatening infamy and the curses of posterity upon such dogs and villains, may stand as it doth in the bishop's own phrase; and so make the paragraph all of a piece.

I will engage, on the other side, to paraphrase all the rogues and rascals in the *Englishman*, so as to bring them up exactly to his lordship's style: but, for my own part, I much prefer the plain *Billingsgate* way of calling names, because it expresseth our meaning full as well, and would save abundance of time, which is lost by circumlocution: So, for instance, *John Dunton*, who is retained on the same side with the bishop, calls my lord *Treasurer* and lord *Bolingbroke* traitors, whoremongers, and jacobites; which three words cost our right reverend author thrice as many lines to define them; and I hope his lordship doth not think there is any difference in point of morality, whether a man calls me *traitor* in one word, or says I am one *hired to betray my religion, and sell my country.*

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I am not surprized to see the bishop mention, with contempt, all convocations of the clergy; for *Toland, Aſgil, Monmouth, Collins, Tindal*, and others of the fraternity, talk the very ſame language. His lordſhip confeſſeth he is *not inclined to expect much from the aſſemblies of clergymen*. There lies the miſfortune; for, if he and ſome more of his order would correct their *inclinations*, a great deal of good might be expected from ſuch aſſemblies; as much as they are now cramped by that ſubmiſſion, which a corrupt clergy brought upon their innocent ſucceſſors. He *will not deny that his copiouſneſs in theſe matters is, in his own opinion, one of the meanest parts of his new work*. I will agree with him, unleſs he happens to be more *copious* in any thing elſe. However, it is not eaſy to conceive, why he ſhould be ſo *copious* upon a ſubject he ſo much deſpiſeth, unleſs it were to gratify his talent of railing at the *clergy*, in the number of whom he diſdains to be reckoned, becauſe he is a *bishop*; for it is a ſtyle I obſerve ſome prelates have fallen into of late years, to talk of the clergymen as if themſelves were not of the number. You will read, in many of their ſpeeches at Dr. *Sacheverel's* trial, expreſſions to this or the like effect: *My lords, if clergymen be ſuffered, &c.* wherein they ſeem to have reaſon; and I am pretty confident, that a great majority of the clergy were heartily inclined to diſown any relation they had to the *managers in law*n. However, it was a confounding argument againſt *preſbytery*, that thoſe prelates, who are moſt ſuſpected to lean that way

way, treated their inferior brethren with *haughtiness, rigour, and contempt*; although, to say the truth, nothing better could be hoped for; because, I believe, it may pass for an universal rule, that, in every diocese governed by bishops of the *whig* species, the clergy (especially the poorer sort) are under double discipline; and the *laity* left to themselves. The opinion of Sir *Thomas More*, which he produceth to prove the ill consequences or insignificancy of convocations, advanceth no such thing; but says, *if the clergy assembled often, and might act as other assemblies of clergy in Christendom, much good might have come*; but the misfortune lay in their long *disuse*, and that, in his own and a good part of his father's time, they never came together, except at the command of the prince.

I suppose, his lordship thinks there is some original impediment in the study of divinity, or secret incapacity in a gown and cassock *without lawn*, which disqualifies all inferior clergymen from debating upon subjects of doctrine or discipline in the church. It is a famous saying of his, *That he lookt upon every layman to be an honest man, until he is, by experience, convinced to the contrary; and on every clergymen as a knave, until he finds him to be an honest man*. What opinion then must we have of a lower house of convocation; where, I am confident, he will hardly find three persons that ever convinced him of their honesty, or will ever be at the pains to do it? Nay, I am afraid they would think such a conviction might be no very advantageous bargain,

gain, to gain the character of an honest man with his lordship, and lose it with the rest of the world.

In the famous *concordate* that was made between *Francis I.* of *France* and pope *Leo X.* the bishop tells us, that *the king and pope came to a bargain, by which they divided the liberties of the Gallican church between them, and indeed quite enslaved it.* He intends, in the third part of his history, which he is going to publish, to open this whole matter to the world. In the mean time, he mentions some ill consequences to the Gallican church from that concordate, which are worthy to be observed: *The church of France became a slave; and this change in their constitution put an end not only to national, but even to provincial synods in that kingdom. The assemblies of the clergy there meet now only to give subsidies, &c. and he says, our nation may see, by that proceeding, what it is to deliver up the essential liberties of a free constitution to a court.*

All I can gather from this matter is, that our king *Henry* made a better bargain than his contemporary *Francis*, who divided the liberties of the church between himself and the pope, while the king of *England* seized them all to himself. But how comes he to number the want of synods in the Gallican church among the grievances of that concordate, and as a mark of their slavery, since he reckons all convocations of the clergy in *England* to be useless and dangerous? Or what difference, in point of liberty, was there between the Gallican church under *Francis*, and the *English* under *Harry*?

For the latter was as much a *papist* as the former, unless in the point of obedience to the see of *Rome*; and in every quality of a good man or a good prince (except personal courage, wherein both were equal) the *French* monarch had the advantage by as many degrees as is possible for one man to have over another.

Henry the eighth had no manner of intention to change religion in his kingdom; he continued to persecute and burn *protestants*, after he had cast off the *pope's* supremacy; and, I suppose, his seizure of ecclesiastical revenues (which *Francis* never attempted) cannot be reckoned as a mark of the church's *liberty*. By the quotation the bishop sets down to shew the slavery of the *French* church, he represents it as a grievance, that *bishops* are not now elected there as formerly, but wholly appointed by the prince; and that those made by the court have been ordinarily the chief advancers of schisms, heresies, and oppressions of the church. He cites another passage from a *Greek* writer, and plainly insinuates, that it is justly applicable to her majesty's reign: *princes chuse such men to that charge (of a bishop) who may be their slaves, and in all things obsequious to what they prescribe, and may lie at their feet, and have not so much as a thought contrary to their commands.*

These are very singular passages for his lordship to set down, in order to shew the dismal consequences of the *French concordate*, by the slavery of the *Gallican* church compared with the freedom of ours. I shall not enter into a long dispute, whether
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ther it were better for religion, that bishops should be chosen by the clergy, or people, or both together: I believe, our author would give his vote for the second (which, however, would not have been of much advantage to himself, and some others that I could name); but I ask, whether bishops are any more elected in *England* than in *France*? And the want of synods are, in his own opinion, rather a blessing than a grievance, unless he will affirm, that more good can be expected from a *papish* synod than an *English convocation*. Did the *French* clergy ever receive a greater blow to their liberties than the submission made to *Henry* the eighth; or so great a one as the seizure of their lands? The Reformation owed nothing to the good intentions of king *Henry*: he was only an instrument of it (as the logicians speak) by accident; nor doth he appear, throughout his whole reign, to have had any other views than those of gratifying his insatiable love of power, cruelty, oppression, and other irregular appetites. But this kingdom, as well as many other parts of *Europe*, was, at that time, generally weary of the corruptions and impositions of the *Roman* court and church; and disposed to receive those doctrines, which *Luther* and his followers had universally spread. *Cranmer* the archbishop, *Cromwell*, and others of the court, did secretly embrace the Reformation; and the king's abrogating the *pope's* supremacy made the people in general run into the new doctrine with greater freedom, because they hoped to be supported in it by the au-

thority and example of their prince; who disappointed them so far, that he made no other step, than rejecting the *pope's* supremacy as a clog upon his own power and passions; but retained every corruption besides, and became a cruel persecutor, as well of those who denied his own supremacy, as of all others who professed any *protestant* doctrine. Neither hath any thing disgusted me more in reading the histories of those times, than to see one of the worst princes of any age or country celebrated as an instrument in that glorious work of the Reformation.

The bishop, having gone over all the matters that properly fall within his *introduction*, proceeds to expostulate with several sorts of people: first with *protestants*, who are no *Christians*, such as *atheists*, *deists*, *freethinkers*, and the like enemies to Christianity: but these he treats with the tenderness of a friend, because they are all of them of sound *whig* principles in church and state. However, to do him justice, he lightly toucheth some old topicks for the truth of the gospel; and concludes, by *wishing that the freethinkers would consider well, if (anglice, whether) they think it is possible to bring a nation to be without any religion at all; and what the consequences of that may prove*; and in case they allow the negative, he gives it clearly for Christianity.

Secondly, he applieth himself (if I take his meaning right) to Christian papists, *who have a taste of liberty*; and desires them to *compare the absurdity*
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of their own religion with the reasonableness of the reformed: against which, as good luck would have it, I have nothing to object.

Thirdly, he is somewhat rough against his own party, *who, having tasted the sweets of protestant liberty, can look back so tamely on popery coming on them; it looks as if they were bewitched, or that the devil were in them, to be so negligent. It is not enough, that they resolve not to turn papists themselves; they ought to awaken all about them, even the most ignorant and stupid, to apprehend their danger, and to exert themselves with their utmost industry to guard against it, and to resist it. If, after all their endeavours to prevent it, the corruption of the age, and the art and power of our enemies, prove too hard for us; then, and not until then, we must submit to the will of God, and be silent; and prepare ourselves for all the extremities of suffering and of misery, with a great deal more of the same strain.*

With due submission to the profound sagacity of this prelate, who can smell *popery* at five hundred miles distance, better than *fanaticism* just under his nose, I take leave to tell him, that this reproof to his friends, for want of zeal and clamour against *popery, slavery, and the pretender*, is what they have not deserved. Are the pamphlets and papers, daily published by the sublime authors of his party, full of any thing else? Are not the QUEEN, the ministers, the majority of lords and commons, loudly taxed, in print, with this charge against them at full length? Is it not the perpetual echo of every

whig coffee-house and club? Have they not quartered *popery* and the *pretender* upon the peace and treaty of commerce; upon the possessing, and quitting, and keeping, and demolishing of *Dunkirk*? Have they not clamoured, because the *pretender* continued in *France*, and because he left it? Have they not reported that the town swarmed with many thousand *papists*; when, upon search, there were never found so few of that religion in it before? If a clergyman preacheth obedience to the higher powers, is he not immediately traduced as a *papist*? Can mortal man do more? To deal plainly, my lord, your friends are not strong enough yet to make an insurrection; and it is unreasonable to expect one from them, until their neighbours be ready.

My lord, I have a little seriousness at heart upon this point, where your lordship affects to shew so much. When you can prove, that one single word hath ever dropt from any minister of state, in *public* or *private*, in favour of the *pretender*, or his cause; when you can make it appear, that, in the course of this administration, since the QUEEN thought fit to change her servants, there hath one step been made towards weakening the *Hanover* title, or giving the least countenance to any other whatsoever; then, and not until then, go dry your chaff and stubble, give fire to the zeal of your faction, and reproach them with lukewarmness.

Fourthly, the bishop applies himself to the *tories* in general; taking it for granted, after his charitable

able manner, that they are all ready prepared to introduce *popery*. He puts an excuse into their mouths, by which they would endeavour to justify their change of religion: *Popery is not what it was before the Reformation: things are now much mended, and further corrections might be expected, if we would enter into a treaty with them: in particular, they see the error of proceeding severely with hereticks; so that there is no reason to apprehend the returns of such cruelties, as were practised an age and a half ago.*

This, he assures us, is a plea offered by the *tories*, in defence of themselves, for going about, at this juncture, to establish the *popish* religion among us: what argument doth he bring to prove the fact itself?

Quibus indiciiis, quo teste probavit?

Nil horum: verbosa et grandis epistola venit.

Nothing but this tedious *Introduction*, wherein he supposeth it all along as a thing granted. That there might be a perfect union in the whole Christian church, is a blessing which every good man wisheth, but no reasonable man can hope. That the more polite *Roman* catholicks have, in several places, given up some of their superstitious fopperies, particularly concerning *legends, relicks*, and the like, is what no body denies. But the material points in difference between us and them are universally retained and asserted in all their controversial writings. And if his lordship really thinks that every man, who differs from him under the name of a *tory* in some church and state opinions,

is ready to believe *transubstantiation*, *purgatory*, the *infallibility* of pope or councils, to *worship saints* and *angels*, and the like; I can only pray God to enlighten his understanding, or graft in his heart the first principles of charity; a virtue, which some people ought not, by any means, wholly to renounce, *because it covereth a multitude of sins*.

Fifthly, the bishop applies himself to his own party in both houses of parliament, whom he exhorts to *guard their religion and liberty against all danger, at what distance soever it may appear. If they are absent and remiss on critical occasions*; that is to say, if they do not attend close next session, to vote upon all occasions whatever against the proceedings of the QUEEN and her ministry, *or if any views of advantage to themselves prevail on them*: in other words, if any of them vote for the bill of commerce, in hopes of a place or a pension, a title or a garter; God may work a deliverance for us another way (that is to say, by inviting the Dutch); *but they and their families, i. e. those who are negligent, or revolters, shall perish*; by which is meant, they shall be hanged, as well as the present ministry and their abettors, as soon as we recover our power; *because they let in idolatry, superstition and tyranny*; because they stood by and suffered the peace to be made, the bill of commerce to pass, and *Dunkirk* to lie undemolished longer than we expected, without raising a rebellion?

His last application is to the tory clergy, a parcel of blind, ignorant, dumb, sleeping, greedy drunken dogs.

dogs. A pretty artful episcopal method is this, of calling his brethren as many injurious names as he pleaseth. It is but quoting a text of scripture, where the characters of evil men are described, and the thing is done; and, at the same time, the appearances of piety and devotion preserved. I would engage, with the help of a good *concordance*, and the liberty of perverting holy writ, to find out as many injurious appellations, as the *Englishman* throws out in any of his politic papers, and apply them to those persons *who call good evil, and evil good*; to those who cry without cause, *Every man to his tent, O Israel!* and to those who curse the *QUEEN in their hearts!*

These decent words, he tells us, make up a *lively description of such pastors as will not study controversy, nor know the depths of Satan.* He means, I suppose, the controversy between us and the *papists*; for as to the *freethinkers* and *dissenters* of every denomination, they are some of the best friends to the cause. Now I have been told, there is a body of that kind of controversy published by the *London* divines, which is not to be matched in the world. I believe likewise, there is a good number of the clergy at present thoroughly versed in that study; after which I cannot but give my judgment, that it would be a very idle thing for pastors in general to busy themselves much in disputes against *popery*; it being a dry heavy employment of the mind at best, especially when, God be thanked, there is so little occasion for it, in the generality of parishes, through-
out

out the kingdom, and must be daily less and less, by the just severity of the laws, and the utter aversion of our people from that idolatrous superstition.

If I might be so bold to name those who have the honour to be of his lordship's party, I would venture to tell him, that *pastors* have much more occasion to study *controversies* against the several classes of *freethinkers* and *dissenters*: the former (I beg his lordship's pardon for saying so) being a little worse than *papists*, and both of them more dangerous *at present* to our constitution both in church and state. Not that I think *presbytery* so corrupt a system of Christian religion as *popery*; I believe it is not above one third as bad: but I think the *presbyterians*, and their clans of other *fanaticks*, of *freethinkers* and *atheists* that dangle after them, are as well inclined to pull down the present establishment of monarchy and religion, as any sett of *papists* in Christendom; and therefore that our danger, as things now stand, is infinitely greater from our *protestant* enemies; because they are much more able to ruin us, and full as willing. There is no doubt, but *presbytery* and a commonwealth are less formidable evils than *popery*, *slavery*, and the *pretender*; for if the *fanaticks* were in power, I should be in more apprehension of being starved than burned. But there are, probably, in *England* forty *dissenters* of all kinds, including their brethren the *freethinkers*, for one *papist*; and allowing one *papist* to be as terrible as three *dissenters*, it will appear, by arithmetick, that we are thirteen times and one third

third more in danger of being ruined by the latter than the former.

The other qualification, necessary for all pastors, if they will not be *blind, ignorant, greedy, drunken dogs, &c.* is *to know the depths of Satan*. This is harder than the former; that a poor gentleman ought not to be parson, vicar, or curate of a parish, except he be cunninger than the devil. I am afraid it will be difficult to remedy this defect, for one manifest reason, because whoever had only half the cunning of the devil, would never take up with a vicarage of ten pounds a year *to live on at his ease*, as my lord expresseth it; but seek out for some better livelihood. His lordship is of a nation very much distinguished for that quality of *cunning* (although they have a great many better); and, I think, he was never accused for wanting his share. However, upon a trial of skill, I would venture to lay six to four on the *devil's* side, who must be allowed to be at least the older *practitioner*. *Telling truth* shames him, and *resistance* makes him fly; but to attempt outwitting him, is to fight him at his own weapon, and, consequently, no cunning at all. Another thing I would observe is, that a man may be *in the depths of Satan* without knowing them all; and such a man may be so far in *Satan's depths*, as to be out of his own. One of the *depths of Satan* is to *counterfeit an angel of light*. Another, I believe, is to stir up the people against their governors by false suggestions of danger. A third, is to be a *prompter to false brethren*; and to send *wolves* about

about in *sheep's cloathing*. Sometimes he sends *Jesuits* about *England* in the habit and cant of *fanaticks*; at other times he hath *fanatic* missionaries in the habits of——. I shall mention but one more of *Satan's depths*; for I confess I know not the hundredth part of them; and that is, to employ his emissaries in crying out against remote imaginary dangers, by which we may be taken off from defending ourselves against those which are really just at our elbows.

But his lordship draws towards a conclusion, and bids us *look about, to consider the danger we are in before it is too late*; for he assures us, we are already going into *some of the worst parts of popery*; like the man, who was so much in haste for his new coat, that he put it on the wrong side out. *Auricular confession, priestly absolution, and the sacrifice of the mass*, have made great progress in *England*, and nobody hath observed it: several other *popish* points are carried higher with us, than by the priests themselves: and somebody, it seems, had the impudence to propose an union with the *Gallican church*. I have, indeed, heard that Mr. *Leslie* published a discourse to that purpose, which I have never seen; nor do I perceive the evil in proposing an union between any two churches in *Christendom*. Without doubt, Mr. *Leslie* is most unhappily misled in his politicks; but, if he be the author of the late [b] tract against *popery*, he hath given the world such

[b] The Case stated,

a proof of his soundness in religion, as *many a bishop* ought to be proud of. I never saw the gentleman in my life: I know he is the son of a great and excellent prelate, who, upon several accounts, was one of the most extraordinary men of his age. Mr. *Leslie* hath written many useful discourses upon several subjects, and hath so well deserved of the Christian religion, and the church of *England* in particular, that to accuse him of *impudence for proposing an union* in two very different faiths, is a style which, I hope, few will imitate. I detest Mr. *Leslie's* political principles as much as his lordship can do for his heart; but I verily believe he acts from a mistaken conscience, and therefore I distinguish between the principles and the person. However, it is some mortification to me, when I see an *avowed nonjuror* contribute more to the confounding of *popery*, than could ever be done by a hundred thousand such *introductions* as this.

His lordship ends with discovering a small ray of comfort. *God be thanked, there are many among us that stand upon the watch-tower, and that give faithful warning; that stand in the breach, and make themselves a wall for their church and country; that cry to God day and night, and lie in the dust mourning before him, to avert those judgments that seem to hasten towards us. They search into the mystery of iniquity that is working among us, and acquaint themselves with that mass of corruption that is in popery. He prays, That the number of these may increase, and that he may be of that number, ready either to die in peace, or to*

seal that doctrine he hath been preaching above fifty years with his blood. This being his last paragraph, I have made bold to transcribe the most important parts of it. His design is to end after the manner of orators, with leaving the strongest impression possible upon the minds of his hearers. A great *breach* is made, *the mystery of popish iniquity is working among us*; may God avert those judgments that are *hastening towards us*; I am an old man, a *preacher above fifty years*, and I now expect, and am ready, to die a martyr for the doctrines I have preached. What an amiable idea doth he here leave upon our minds of her majesty and her government! he hath been poring so long upon *Fox's* book of martyrs, that he imagines himself living in the reign of queen *Mary*, and is resolved to set up for a *knight-errant* against *popery*. Upon the supposition of his being in earnest (which I am sure he is not), it would require but a very little more heat of imagination to make a history of such a knight's adventures. What would he say to behold the *fires kindled in Smithfield, and all over the town*, on the seventeenth of *November*? to behold the *pope* borne in triumph on the shoulders of the people, with a *cardinal on one side, and the pretender on the other*? He would never believe it was queen *Elizabeth's* day, but that of her persecuting sister: In short, how easily might a *windmill be taken for the whore of Babylon*, and a *puppet-show* for a *popish procession*?

But *Enthusiasm* is none of his lordship's faculty: I am inclined to believe, he might be melancholy enough, when he writ this *Introduction*: the despair, at his age, of seeing a faction restored, to which he hath sacrificed so great a part of his life: the little success he can hope for in case he should resume those high-church principles in defence of which he first employed his pen: no visible expectation of removing to *Farnham*, or *Lasneth*: and lastly, the misfortune of being hated by every one, who either wears the habit, or values the profession, of a clergyman. No wonder such a spirit, in such a situation, is provoked beyond the regards of truth, decency, religion, or self-conviction. To do him justice, he seems to have nothing else left, but to cry out *halters, gibbets, faggots, inquisition, popery, slavery, and the pretender*. But in the mean time, he little considers what a world of mischief he doth to his cause. It is very convenient for the present designs of that faction, to spread the opinion of our immediate danger from *popery* and the *pretender*. His directors therefore ought, in my humble opinion, to have employed his lordship in publishing a book, wherein he should have affirmed, by the most solemn asseverations, that all things were safe and well; for the world hath contracted so strong a habit of believing him backwards, that I am confident nine parts in ten of those, who have read or heard of his *Introduction*, have slept in greater security ever since. It is like the melancholy tone of a watchman at midnight, who

thumps

thumps with his pole as if some thief were breaking in ; but you know, by the noise, that the door is fast.

However, he *thanks God there are many among us who stand in the breach*. I believe there may ; it is a *breach* of their own making, and they design to come forward, and storm and plunder, if they be not driven back. *They make themselves a wall for their church and country*. A *south wall*, I suppose, for all the best fruits of the *church and country* to be nailed on. Let us examine this metaphor. The *wall of our church and country* is built of those, who love the constitution in both : our domestic enemies undermine some parts of the *wall*, and place themselves in the *breach*, and then they cry, *We are the wall*. We do not like such patch-work ; they build with untempered mortar ; nor can they ever cement with us, till they get better materials and better workmen. God keep us from having our *breaches* made up with such rubbish. *They stand upon the watch-tower !* they are, indeed, pragmatical enough to do so ; but who assigned them that post, to give us false intelligence, to alarm us with false dangers, and send us to defend one gate, while their accomplices are breaking in at another ? *They cry to God day and night to avert the judgment of popery, which seems to hasten towards us*. Then I affirm, they are *hypocrites by day, and filthy dreamers by night* : when they cry unto him, he will not hear them ; for they cry against the plainest dictates of their own conscience, reason, and belief.

But,

But, lastly, *they lie in the dust mourning before him*. Hang me if I believe that, unless it be figuratively spoken. But suppose it to be true, why do *they lie in the dust*? Because they love to *raise* it. For what do *they mourn*? Why, for power, wealth, and places. There let the enemies of the QUEEN and monarchy of the church *lie and mourn*, and *lick the dust* like *serpents*, till they are truly sensible of their ingratitude, falshood, disobedience, slander, blasphemy, sedition, *and every evil work*.

I cannot find in my heart to conclude, without offering his lordship a little humble advice upon some certain points.

First, I would advise him, if it be not too late in his life, to endeavour a little at mending his style, which is mighty defective in the *circumstances* of grammar, propriety, politeness, and smoothness. I fancied at first it might be owing to the prevalence of his passion, as people sputter out nonsense for haste, when they are in a rage. And, indeed, I believe this before me hath received some additional imperfections from that occasion. But whoever hath heard his sermons, or read his other tracts, will find him very unhappy in the choice and disposition of his words; and, for want of variety, repeating them, especially the particles, in a manner very grating to an *English* ear. But I confine myself to this *Introduction*, as his last work, where, endeavouring at rhetorical *flowers*, he gives us only bunches of *thistles*; of which I could pre-

sent the reader with a plentiful crop ; but I refer him to every page and line of the pamphlet itself.

Secondly, I would most humbly advise his lordship to examine a little into the nature of *Truth*, and sometimes to hear what *she* says. I shall produce two instances among an hundred. When he asserts, that we are *now in more danger of popery than towards the end of king Charles the second's reign* ; and gives the broadest hints, that the QUEEN, the ministry, the parliament, and the clergy, are just going to introduce it ; I desire to know whether he really thinks *Truth* is of his side, or whether he be not sure *she* is against him ? If the latter, then *Truth* and he will be found in two different stories, and which are we to believe ? Again, when he gravely advises the *tories* not to *light the fires in Smithfield*, and goes on, in twenty places already quoted, as if the bargain was made for *popery* and *slavery* to enter ; I ask again, whether he hath rightly considered the nature of *Truth* ? I desire to put a parallel case. Suppose his lordship should take it into his fancy to write and publish a letter to any gentleman of no infamous character for his religion or morals ; and there advise him with great earnestness not to rob or fire churches, ravish his daughter, or murder his father ; shew him the sin and danger of these enormities ; that, if he flattered himself he could escape in disguise, or bribe his jury, he was grievously mistaken ; that he must, in all probability, forfeit his goods and chattels, die an ignominious death, and be curst by posterity :

posterity : would not such a gentleman justly think himself highly injured, although his lordship did not affirm, that the said gentleman had picklocks or combustibles ready ; that he had attempted his daughter, and drawn his sword against his father in order to stab him ? whereas, in the other case, this writer affirms over and over, that all attempts for introducing *popery* and *slavery* are already made, the whole business concerted, and that little less than a miracle can prevent our ruin.

Thirdly, I could heartily wish his lordship would not undertake to charge the opinions of one or two, and those probably *nonjurors*, upon the whole body of the nation that differs from him. Mr. *Leslie* writ a *proposal for an union with the Gallican church* : somebody else hath carried the necessity of *priesthood* in the point of *baptism* farther than *popery* : a third hath asserted the independency of the church on the state, and in many things arraigned the supremacy of the crown. Then he speaks in a dubious insinuating way, as if some other *popish* tenets had been already advanced, and at last concludes in this affected strain of despondency ; *What will all these things end in ? And on what design are they driven ? Alas, it is too visible !* It is as clear as the sun, that these authors are encouraged, by the *ministry*, with a design to bring in *popery* ; and in *popery* all these things will end.

I never was so uncharitable to believe that the whole party, of which his lordship professeth himself a member, had a real formed design of establish-

ing *atheism* among us. The reason why the *whigs* have taken the *atheists* or *freethinkers* into their body is, because they wholly agree in their political schemes, and differ very little in church power and discipline. However, I could turn the argument against his lordship with very great advantage by quoting passages from fifty pamphlets wholly made up of *whiggism* and *atheism*, and then conclude, *What will all these things end in? And on what design are they driven? Alas, it is too visible!*

Lastly, I would beg his lordship not to be so exceedingly outrageous upon the memory of the dead; because it is highly probable, that, in a very short time, he will be one of the number. He hath, in plain words, given Mr. *Wharton* the character of a most malicious, revengeful, treacherous, lying, mercenary villain. To which I shall only say, that the direct reverse of this amiable description is what appears from the works of that most learned divine, and from the accounts given me by those, who knew him much better than the bishop seems to have done. I meddle not with the moral part of this treatment. God Almighty forgive his lordship this manner of revenging himself; and then there will be but little consequence from an accusation, which the *dead* cannot *feel*, and which none of the *living* will *believe*.

S O M E

S O M E
A R G U M E N T S
A G A I N S T E N L A R G I N G
T H E P O W E R
O F
B I S H O P S
I N
L E T T I N G L E A S E S.

*Mihi credite, major hæreditas venit unicuique vestrum in
iisdem bonis a jure et a legibus, quam ab iis a quibus illa
ipsa bona relicta sunt.* Cicero pro A. Cæcina.



S O M E
A R G U M E N T S

Against ENLARGING the
POWER OF BISHOPS, &c.

Written in the Year 1723 [c].

I N handling this subject, I shall proceed wholly upon the supposition, that those of *our party*, who profess themselves members of the church established, and under the apostolical government of bishops, do desire the continuance and transmission of it to posterity, at least in as good a condition as it is at present: because, as this discourse is not calculated for dissenters of any kind, so neither will it suit the talk or sentiments of those persons, who, with the denomination of churchmen, are oppressors of the inferior clergy, and perpetually quarrelling at the great incomes of the bishops; which is a traditional cant delivered down from former times, and continued with great reason, although it be now near two hundred years since almost three parts.

[c] The general subject of this pamphlet leads me to recollect a circumstance much to the dean's honour; he could never be induced to take fines for any of the chapter lands; he always chose to raise the rents, as the method least oppressive to the present tenant, and most advantageous to all future tenants and landlords. ORRERY.

in four of the church revenues have been taken from the clergy, besides the spoils that have been gradually made ever since of glebes and other lands, by the confusion of times, the fraud of encroaching neighbours, or the power of oppressors too great to be encountered.

About the time of the Reformation, many *popish* bishops of this kingdom, knowing they must have been soon rejected if they would not change their religion, made long leases and fee-farms of great part of their lands, reserving very inconsiderable rents, sometimes only a chiefry, by a power they assumed directly contrary to many ancient canons, yet consistent enough with the common law. This trade held on for many years after the bishops became protestants; and some of their names are still remembered with infamy, on account of enriching their families by such sacrilegious alienations. By these means episcopal revenues were so low reduced, that three or four sees were often united to make a tolerable competency. For some remedy to this evil, king *James* the first, by a bounty, that became a good Christian prince, bestowed several forfeited lands on the *northern* bishopricks: but, in all other parts of the kingdom, the church continued still in the same distress and poverty; some of the sees hardly possessing enough to maintain a country vicar. About the middle of king *Charles* the first's reign, the legislature here thought fit to put a stop at least to any farther alienations; and so a law was enacted, prohibiting all bishops and
other

other ecclesiastical corporations from setting their lands for above the term of twenty-one years; the rent reserved to be one half of the real value of such lands at the time they were set, without which condition the lease to be void.

Soon after the Restoration of king *Charles* the second, the parliament taking into consideration the miserable estate of the church, certain lands, by way of augmentation, were granted to eight bishops in the act of settlement, and confirmed in the act of explanation; of which bounty, as I remember, three fees were, in a great measure defeated; but by what accidents, it is not here of any importance to relate.

This, at present, is the condition of the church in *Ireland* with regard to episcopal revenues: which I have thus briefly (and perhaps imperfectly) deduced for some information to those, whose thoughts do not lead them to such considerations.

By virtue of the statute already mentioned, under king *Charles* the first, limiting ecclesiastical bodies to the term of twenty-one years under the reserved rent of half real value, the bishops have had some share in the gradual rise of lands, without which they could not have been supported with any common decency that might become their station. It is above eighty years since the passing of that act: the see of *Meath*, one of the best in the kingdom, was then worth about 400*l. per annum*; the poorer ones in the same proportion. If this were their present condition, I cannot conceive how they
would

would have been able to pay for their patents, or buy their robes ; but this will certainly be the condition of their successors, if such a bill should pass, as they say is now intended, which I will suppose ; and believe many persons, who may give a vote for it, are not aware of.

However, this is the act which is now attempted to be repealed, or at least eluded ; some are for giving bishops leave to lett fee-farms, others would allow them to lett leases for lives ; and the most moderate would repeal that clause, by which the bishops are bound to lett their lands at half value.

The reasons for the rise of value in lands are of two kinds. Of the first kind, are long peace and settlement after the devastations of war ; plantations, improvements of bad soil, recovery of bogs and marshes, advancement of trade and manufactures, increase of inhabitants, encouragement of agriculture, and the like.

But there is another reason for the rise of land, more gradual, constant and certain ; which will have its effects in countries that are very far from flourishing in any of the advantages I have just mentioned : I mean *the perpetual decrease in the value of gold and silver*. I shall discourse upon these two different heads with a view towards the bill now attempted.

As to the first : I cannot see how this kingdom is at any height of improvement, while four parts in five of the plantations for thirty years past have been real dis-improvements ; nine in ten of the
quickset-

quickset-hedges being ruined for want of care or skill. And as to forest trees, they being often taken out of woods, and planted in single rows on the tops of ditches, it is impossible they should grow to be of use, beauty, or shelter. Neither can it be said, that the soil of *Ireland* is improved to its full height, while so much lies all winter under water, and the bogs made almost desperate by the ill cutting of the turf. There hath indeed been some little improvement in the manufactures of linen and woollen, although very short of perfection; but our trade was never in so low a condition; and as to agriculture, of which all wise nations have been so tender, the desolation made in the country, by engrossing graziers, and the great yearly importation of corn from *England*, are lamentable instances under what discouragement it lies.

But, notwithstanding all these mortifications, I suppose there is no well-wisher to his country without a little hope, that in time the kingdom may be on a better foot in some of the articles above-mentioned. But it would be hard, if ecclesiastical bodies should be the only persons excluded from any share in public advantages, which yet can never happen, without a greater share of profit to their tenants. If God *sends rain equally upon the just and the unjust*, why should those, who wait at his altars, and are instructors of the people, be cut off from partaking in the general benefits of law, or of nature?

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But, as this way of reasoning may seem to bear a more favourable eye to the clergy than perhaps will suit with the present disposition or fashion of the age; I shall therefore dwell more largely upon the second reason for the rise of land, which is *the perpetual decrease of the value of gold and silver.*

This may be observed from the course of the *Roman* history above two thousand years before those inexhaustible silver mines of *Potosi* were known. The value of an *obolus*, and of every other coin, between the time of *Romulus* and that of *Augustus*, gradually sunk above five parts in six, as appears by several passages out of the best authors. And yet the prodigious wealth of that state did not arise from the increase of bullion in the world by the discovery of new mines, but from a much more accidental cause, which was the spreading of their conquests, and thereby importing into *Rome* and *Italy* the riches of the *east* and *west*.

When the seat of empire was removed to *Constantinople*, the tide of money flowed that way without ever returning; and was scattered in *Asia*. But when that mighty empire was overthrown by the *northern* people, such a stop was put to all trade and commerce, that vast sums of money were buried to escape the plundering of the conquerors; and what remained was carried off by those ravagers.

It were no difficult matter to compute the value of money in *England* during the *Saxon* reigns; but the monkish, and other writers, since the Conquest,

quest, have put that matter in a clearer light, by the several accounts they have given us of the value of corn and cattle in years of dearth and plenty. Every one knows that king *John's* whole portion, before he came to the crown, was but five thousand pounds, without a foot of land.

I have likewise seen the steward's account of an ancient noble family in *England*, written in *Latin* between three and four hundred years ago, with the several prices of wine and victuals, to confirm my observations.

I have been at the trouble of computing (as others have done) the different values of money for about four hundred years past. *Henry* duke of *Lancaster*, who lived about that period, founded an hospital in *Leicester* for a certain number of old men, charging his lands with a groat a week to each for their maintenance, which is to this day duly paid them. In those times, a penny was equal to ten pence half-penny, and somewhat more than half a farthing in ours; which makes about eight ninths difference.

This is plain also from the old custom upon many estates in *England* to lett for leases of lives (renewable at pleasure) where the reserved rent is usually about twelve pence a pound, which then was near the half real value: and, although the fines be not fixed, yet the landlord gets altogether not above three shillings in the pound of the worth of his land: and the tenants are so wedded to this custom,

custom, that, if the owner suffer three lives to expire, none of them will take a lease on other conditions; or, if he brings in a foreigner who will agree to pay a reasonable rent, the other tenants, by all manner of injuries, will make that foreigner so uneasy, that he must be forced to quit the farm; as the late earl of *Bath* felt by the experience of above ten thousand pounds loss.

The gradual decrease, for about two hundred years after, was not considerable; and therefore I do not rely on the account given by some historians, that *Harry* the seventh left behind him eighteen hundred thousand pounds; for, although the *West-Indies* were discovered before his death, and altho' he had the best talents and instruments for exacting of money ever possessed by any prince since the time of *Vespasian* (whom he resembled in many particulars), yet, I conceive, that in his days the whole coin of *England* could hardly amount to such a sum. For, in the reign of *Philip* and *Mary*, Sir — *Cockain* of *Derbyshire*, the best house-keeper of his quality in the county, allowed his lady fifty pounds a year for maintaining the family, one pound a year wages to each servant, and two pounds to the steward; as I was told by a person of quality, who had seen the original account of his oeconomy. Now, this sum of fifty pounds, added to the advantages of a large domain, might be equal to about five hundred pounds a year at present, or somewhat more than four *fifts*.

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The great plenty of silver in *England* began in queen *Elizabeth's* reign, when *Drake* and others took vast quantities of coin and bullion from the *Spaniards*, either upon their own *American* coasts, or in their return to *Spain*. However, so much hath been imported annually from that time to this, that the value of money in *England*, and most parts of *Europe*, is sunk above one half within the space of an hundred years, notwithstanding the great export of silver, for above eight years past, to the *East-Indies*, from whence it never returns. But gold, not being liable to the same accident, and by new discoveries growing every day more plentiful, seems in danger of becoming a drug.

This hath been the progress of the value of money in former ages; and must, of necessity, continue so for the future, without some new invasion of *Goths* and *Vandals*, to destroy law, property, and religion, alter the very face of nature, and turn the world upside down.

I must repeat, that what I am to say upon the subject is intended only for the conviction of those among our *own party*, who are true lovers of the church, and would be glad it should continue in a tolerable degree of prosperity to the end of the world.

The church is supposed to last for ever both in its discipline and doctrine; which is a privilege common to every petty corporation, who must likewise observe the laws of their foundation. If a
gentleman's

gentleman's estate, which now yields him a thousand pounds a year, had been set for ever at the highest value even in the flourishing days of king *Charles* the second, would it now amount to above four or five hundred at most? What if this had happened two or three hundred years ago; would the reserved rent at this day be any more than a small chiefry? Suppose the revenues of a bishop to have been under the same circumstances; could he now be able to perform works of hospitality and charity? Thus, if the revenues of a bishop be limited to a thousand pounds a year; how will his successor be in a condition to support his station with decency, when the same denomination of money shall not answer an half, a quarter, or an eighth part of that sum? Which must, unavoidably, be the consequence of any bill to elude the limiting act, whereby the church was preserved from utter ruin.

The same reason holds good in all corporations whatsoever, who cannot follow a more pernicious practice than that of granting perpetuities, for which many of them smart to this day; although the leaders among them are often so stupid as not to perceive it, or sometimes so knavish as to find their private account in cheating the community.

Several colleges in *Oxford* were aware of this growing evil about an hundred years ago; and, instead of limiting their rents to a certain sum of money, prevailed with their tenants to pay the price
of

of so many barrels of corn to be valued as the market went at two seasons (as I remember) in the year. For a barrel of corn is of a real intrinsic value, which gold and silver are not: and, by this invention, these colleges have preserved a tolerable subsistence for their fellows and students to this day.

The present bishops will, indeed, be no sufferers by such a bill; because, their ages considered, they cannot expect to see any great decrease in the value of money; or at worst they can make it up in the fines, which will, probably, be greater than usual upon the change of leases into fee-farms or lives; or without the power of obliging their tenants to a real half value. And, as I cannot well blame them for taking such advantages (considering the nature of human kind) when the question is only, whether the money shall be put into their own or another man's pocket: so they will never be excusable before God or man, if they do not, to their death, oppose, declare, and protest against any such bill, as must, in its consequences, complete the ruin of the church, and of their own order in this kingdom.

If the fortune of a private person be diminished by the weakness or inadvertency of his ancestors, in letting leases for ever at low rents, the world lies open to his industry for purchasing of more; but the church is barred by a *dead hand*; or, if it were otherwise, yet the custom of making bequests to it hath been out of practice for almost two hun-

dred years, and a *great deal directly contrary* hath been its fortune.

I have been assured by a person of some consequence, to whom I am likewise obliged for the account of some other facts already related, that the late [d] bishop of *Salisbury* (the greatest *whig* of that bench in his days) confessed to him, that the liberty which bishops in *England* have of letting leases for lives, would, in his opinion, be one day the ruin of episcopacy there; and thought the church, in this kingdom, happy by the limitation act.

And have we not already found the effect of this different proceeding in both kingdoms? Have not two *English* prelates quitted their peerage and seats in parliament, in a *nation of freedom*, for the sake of a more ample revenue even in this unhappy kingdom, rather than lie under the mortification of living below their dignity at home? For which, however, they cannot be justly censured. I know, indeed, some persons, who offer as an argument for repealing the limiting bill, that it may, in future ages, prevent the practice of providing this kingdom with bishops from *England*, when the only temptation will be removed. And they alledge, that, as things have gone for some years past, gentlemen will grow discouraged from sending their sons to the university, and from suffering them to enter into holy orders, when they are likely to languish under a curacy or small vicarage to the

[d] Dr. Burnet.

end of their lives: But this is all a vain imagination; for the decrease, in the value of money, will equally affect both kingdoms: and besides, when bishopricks here grow too small to invite over men of credit and consequence, they will be left more fully to the disposal of a chief governor, who can never fail of some worthless illiterate chaplain, fond of a title and precedence. Thus will that whole bench, in an age or two, be composed of mean, ignorant, fawning gownmen, humble suppliants and dependents upon the *court* for a morsel of bread, and ready to serve every turn that shall be demanded from them in hopes of getting some *commendam* tacked to their fees; which must then be the trade, as it is now too much in *England*, to the great discouragement of the inferior clergy. Neither is that practice without example among us.

It is now about eighty-five years since the passing of that limiting act, and there is but one instance; in the memory of man, of a bishop's lease broken upon the plea of not being statutable; which, in every body's opinion, could have been lost by no other person than he, who was then tenant, and happened to be very ungracious in his country. In the present [*e*] bishop of *Meath's* case that plea did not avail, although the lease were notoriously unstatutable; the rent reserved being, as I have been told, not a seventh part of the real value; yet the jury, upon their oaths, *very gravely* found it to

[*e*] Dr. Evans, a *Welshman*.

be according to the statute; and one of them was heard to say, that he would *eat his shoes*, before he would give a verdict for the bishop. A very few more have made the same attempt with as little success. Every bishop and other ecclesiastical body reckon forty pounds in an hundred to be a reasonable half value; or, if it be only a third part, it seldom or never breeds any difference between landlord and tenant. But when the rent is from five to nine, or ten parts, less than the worth, the bishop, if he consults the good of his see, will be apt to expostulate; and the tenant, if he be an honest man, will have some regard to the reasonableness and justice of the demand, so as to yield to a moderate advancement, rather than engage in a suit, where law and equity are directly against him. By these means, the bishops have been so true to their trusts, as to procure some small share in the advancement of rents; although it be notorious, that they do not receive the third penny (fines included) of the real value of their lands throughout the kingdom.

I was never able to imagine what inconvenience could accrue to the publick by one or two thousand pounds a year in the hands of a protestant bishop, any more than of a lay person [f]. The former, generally speaking, liveth as piously and hospitably as the other; pays his debts as honestly, and spends

[f] This part of the paragraph is to be applied to the period when the whole was written, which was in 1723, when several of queen Anne's bishops were living.

as much of his revenue among his tenants: besides, if they be his immediate tenants, you may distinguish them at first sight by their habits and horses; or, if you go to their houses, by their comfortable way of living. But the misfortune is, that such immediate tenants, generally speaking, have others under them, and so a third and fourth in subordination, till it comes to the *welder* (as they call him) who sits at a rack-rent, and lives as miserably as an *Irish* farmer upon a new lease from a lay landlord. But suppose a bishop happens to be avaricious (as being composed of the same stuff with other men) the consequence to the publick is no worse than if he were a squire; for he leaves his fortune to his son, or near relation, who, if he be rich enough, will never think of entering into the church.

And as there can be no disadvantage to the publick in a protestant country, that a man should hold lands as a *bishop*, any more than if he were a *temporal* person; so it is of great advantage to the community, where a bishop lives as he ought to do. He is bound in conscience to reside in his diocese, and, by a solemn promise, to keep hospitality; his estate is spent in the kingdom, not remitted to *England*; he keeps the clergy to their duty, and is an example of virtue both to them and the people. Suppose him an ill man; yet his very character will withhold him from any great or open exorbitancies. But in fact it must be allowed, that some bishops of this kingdom, within twenty years past, have done very signal and lasting acts of public

§ 3

charity;

charity ; great instances whereof are the [g] late and [b] present primate, and the lord [i] archbishop of *Dublin* that now is, who hath left memorials of his bounty in many parts of his province. I might add the bishop of [k] *Raphoe*, and several others : not forgetting the late dean of *Down*, Dr. *Pratt*, who bestowed one thousand pounds upon the university ; which foundation (that I may observe by the way) if the bill proposed should pass, would be in the same circumstances with the bishops, nor ever able again to advance the stipends of the fellows and students, as lately they found it necessary to do ; the determinate sum appointed by the statutes for commons being not half sufficient, by the fall of money, to afford necessary sustenance. But the passing of such a bill must put an end to all ecclesiastical beneficence for the time to come ; and whether this will be supplied by those who are to reap the benefit, better than it hath been done by the grantees of impropriate tithes, who received them upon the old church conditions of keeping hospitality, it will be easy to conjecture.

To alledge, that passing such a bill would be a good encouragement to improve bishops lands, is a great error. Is it not the general method of landlords to wait the expiration of a lease, and then cant their lands to the highest bidder ? and what should hinder the same course to be taken in church leases, when the limitation is removed of paying half the

[g] Dr. *Marsh*,

[i] Dr. *King*,

[b] Dr. *Lindsay*,

[k] Dr. *Foster*,

real value to the bishop? In riding through the country, how few improvements do we see upon the estates of laymen, farther than about their own domains? To say the truth, it is a great misfortune as well to the publick, as to the bishops themselves, that their lands are generally let to lords and great squires, who, in reason, were never designed to be tenants; and therefore may naturally murmur at the payment of rent, as a subserviency they were not born to. If the tenants to the church were honest farmers, they would pay their fines and rents with chearfulness, improve their lands, and thank God they were to give but a moderate half value for what they held. I have heard a man, of a thousand pounds a year, talk with great contempt of bishops leases, as being on a worse foot than the rest of his estate; and he had certainly reason: My answer was, that such leases were originally intended only for the benefit of industrious husbandmen, who would think it a great blessing to be so provided for, instead of having his farm screwed up to the heighth, not eating one comfortable meal in a year, nor able to find shoes for his children.

I know not any advantage that can accrue by such a bill, except the preventing perjury in jury-men, and false dealing in tenants; which is a remedy like that of giving my money to an highway-man, before he attempts to take it by force; and so I shall be sure to prevent the sin of robbery.

I had wrote thus far, and thought to have made an end; when a bookseller sent me a small pamphlet,

entitled, *The case of laity, with some queries*; full of the strongest malice against the clergy, that I have any where met with since the reign of *Toland*, and others of that tribe. These kinds of advocates do infinite mischief to OUR GOOD CAUSE, by giving grounds to the unjust reproaches of *TORIES* and *JACOBITES*, who charge us with being enemies to the church. If I bear an hearty unfeigned loyalty to his majesty king *GEORGE* and the house of *Hannover*, not shaken in the least by the hardships we lie under, which never can be imputable to so gracious a prince; if I sincerely adjure the *PRETENDER*, and all *POPISH SUCCESSORS*; if I bear a due veneration to the glorious memory of the late king *WILLIAM*, who preserved these kingdoms from *POPERY* and *SLAVERY* with the expence of his blood, and hazard of his life; and lastly, if I am for a proper indulgence to all *dissenters*, I think nothing more can be reasonably demanded of *me* as a *WHIG*, and that my political catechism is full and complete. But whoever, under the shelter of that party denomination, and of many great professions of loyalty, would destroy, or undermine, or injure the *CHURCH* established; I utterly disown him, and think he ought to chuse another name of distinction for himself and his adherents. I came into the cause upon other principles, which, by the grace of God, I mean to preserve as long as I live. Shall we justify the accusations of our adversaries? *Hoc Ithacus valet.*—The *TORIES* and *JACOBITES* will behold us, with a malicious pleasure, determined upon the ruin
of

of our *friends*. For is not the present sett of bishops almost intirely of that number, as well as a great majority of the principal clergy? And a short time will reduce the whole by vacancies upon death.

An impartial reader, if he pleases to examine what I have already said, will easily answer the bold *queries* in the pamphlet I mentioned; he will be convinced, that *the reason still strongly exists, for which* that limiting law was enacted. A reasonable man will wonder, where can be *the insufferable grievance*, that an *ecclesiastical* landlord should expect a moderate or a third part value in rent for his lands, when his title is *at least* as ancient and as legal as that of a layman; who is yet but seldom guilty of giving such beneficial bargains. Has *the nation been thrown into confusion?* and have *many poor families been ruined* by rack-rents paid for the lands of the church? does *the nation cry out* to have a law that must, in time, send their bishops a begging? But, God be thanked, the clamours of enemies to the church is not yet the *cry*, and, I hope, will never prove the *voice* of the nation. The clergy, I conceive, will hardly allow *that the people maintain them*, any more than in the sense that all landlords whatsoever are maintained by the people. Such assertions as these, and the insinuations they carry along with them, proceed from principles which cannot be avowed by those, who are for preserving the happy *constitution* in church and state. Whoever were the proposers of such *queries*, it might have provoked a bold writer to retaliate, perhaps
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with more justice than prudence, by shewing at whose door the grievance lies, and that the bishops *at least* are not to answer for the poverty of tenants.

To gratify this great reformer, who enlarges the *episcopal* rent-roll almost one half, let me suppose that all the church lands in the kingdom were thrown up to the laity; would the tenants, in such a case, sit easier in their rents than they do now? or would the money be equally spent in the kingdom? No; the farmer would be screwed up to the utmost penny by the agents and stewards of *absentees*, and the revenues employed in making a figure at *London*; to which city a full third part of the whole *income* of *Ireland* is annually returned, to answer that single *article* of *maintenance* for *Irish* landlords.

Another of his quarrels is against *pluralities* and *non-residence*. As to the former, it is a word of ill name, but not well understood. The clergy having been stripped of the greatest part of their revenues, the *glebes* being generally lost, the *tithes* in the hands of laymen, the churches demolished, and the country depopulated; in order to preserve a face of *Christianity*, it was necessary to unite small *vicarages* sufficient to make a tolerable maintenance for a *minister*. The profit of ten or a dozen of these *unions*, seldom amounts to above eighty or an hundred pounds a year. If there be a very few *dignitaries*, whose preferments are, perhaps, more liable to this accusation, it is to be supposed, they
may

may be *favorites of the times*; or persons of *superior merit*, for whom there hath ever been some indulgence in all governments.

As to *non-residence*, I believe there is no Christian country upon earth, where the clergy have less to answer for upon that *article*. I am confident there are not ten clergymen in the kingdom, who, properly speaking, can be termed *non-residents*: for surely we are not to reckon in that number those, who, for want of *glebes*, are forced to retire to the nearest neighbouring village for a *cabbin* to put their heads in; the leading man of the parish, when he makes the greatest clamour, being least disposed to accommodate the *minister* with an acre of ground. And, indeed, considering the *difficulties* the clergy lie under upon this head, it hath been frequent matter of wonder to *me*, how they are able to perform that part of their duty so well as they do.

There is a [1] noble author, who hath lately addressed to the house of COMMONS an excellent discourse for the *encouragement of agriculture*; full of most useful *hints*, which, I hope, that honourable assembly will consider as they deserve. I am not a stranger to his lordship; and, excepting in what relates to the church, there are few persons with whose opinions I am better pleased to agree; and am therefore grieved when I find him charging the inconveniencies in the payment of *tithes* upon the clergy and their *proctors*. His lordship is above con-

[1] *The late lord Moleſworth.*

sidering a very known and vulgar truth, that the meanest farmer hath all manner of advantages against the most *powerful* clergyman, by whom it is impossible he can be wronged, although the *minister* were ever so evil disposed; the whole system of *teizing*, *perplexing*, and *defrauding* the *proctor*, or his *master*, being as well known to every *plowman*, as the reaping or sowing of his corn, and much more artfully practised. Besides, the leading man in the parish must have his *tithes* at his own rate, which is hardly ever above one quarter of the value. And I have heard it computed by many skilful observers, whose interest was not concerned, that the clergy did not receive, throughout the kingdom, one half of what the laws have made their due.

As to his lordship's discontent against the *bishop's court*, I shall not interpose farther than in venturing my private opinion, that the clergy would be very glad to recover their just *dues* by a more *short*, *decisive*, and *compulsive* method, than such a cramped and limited jurisdiction will allow.

His lordship is not the only person disposed to give the clergy the honour of being the *sole* encouragers of all new improvements. If *hops*, *hemp*, *flax*, and twenty *things* more are to be planted, the clergy *alone* must reward the industrious farmer by abatement of the *tithe*. What if the owner of nine parts in ten would please to abate proportionably in his rent for every acre thus improved? Would not a man just dropt from the clouds, upon a
full

full hearing, judge the demand to be at least as reasonable?

I believe no man will dispute his lordship's title to his estate; nor will I the *jus divinum* of *tithes*, which he mentions with some emotion. I suppose the affirmative would be of little advantage to the clergy, for the same reason, that a *maxim* in *law* hath more weight in the world, than an *article* of *faith*. And yet, I think, there may be such a thing as *sacrilege*; because it is frequently mentioned by *Greek* and *Roman* authors, as well as described in *Holy-writ*. This I am sure of; that his lordship would, at any time, excuse a PARLIAMENT for not concerning itself in his properties without his own consent.

The observations I have made upon his lordship's discourse, have not, I confess, been altogether proper to my subject: however, since he hath been pleased therein to offer some proposals to the house of commons with relation to the clergy, I hope he will excuse me for differing from him; which proceeds from his own principle, the desire of defending *liberty* and *property*, that he hath so strenuously and constantly maintained.

But the other writer openly declares for a law impowering the bishops to set *fee-farms*; and says, *Whoever intimates that they will deny their consent to such a reasonable law, which the whole nation cries for, are enemies to them and the church*. Whether this be his real opinion, or only a strain of mirth and irony, the matter is not much. However, my sentiments
are

are so directly contrary to his, that, I think, whoever impartially reads and considers what I have written upon this argument, hath either no regard for the church established under the hierarchy of bishops, or will never consent to any law, that shall repeal or elude the limiting clause relating to the real half value, contained in the act of parliament *decimo Caroli, For the preservation of the inheritance, rights, and profits of lands belonging to the church and persons ecclesiastical*; which was grounded upon reasons that do still and must for ever subsist.

October 21,

1723.

T H E

THE
PRESBYTERIANS
PLEA OF MERIT

In order to take off

THE TEST

IMPARTIALLY EXAMINED.

Written in the Year 1731 [m].

WE have been told, in the common news papers, that all attempts are to be made this session by the *presbyterians* and their abettors for taking off the test; as a kind of preparatory step to make it go down smoother in *England*. For, if once *their light would so shine*, the *papists*, delighted with the blaze, would all come in and dance about it. This I take to be a prudent method; like that of a discreet physician, who first gives a new medicine to a *dog*, before he prescribes it to a human creature.

The *presbyterians* have, ever since the Revolution, directed their learned casuists to employ their pens on this subject, by shewing the merits and preten-

[m] See a letter on this subject, vol. iii. which was re-printed in *Ireland* on the same occasion that produced this and the three following tracts.

sions,

sions, upon which they claim this *justice*, as founded upon the services they did towards the Restoration of king *Charles* the second, and at the *Revolution* under the prince of *Orange*: which pleas I take to be the most singular in their kind, that ever were offered in the face of the sun against the most glaring lights of truth, and against a continuation of public facts known to all *Europe* for twenty years together. I shall therefore impartially examine the merits and conduct of the *presbyterians* upon those two great events; and the pretensions to favour, which they challenge upon them.

Soon after the Reformation of the church in *England*, under *Edward* the sixth, upon queen *Mary's* succeeding to the crown (who restored *popery*), many *protestants* fled out of *England*, to escape the persecution raised against the church, as her brother had left it established. Some of these exiles went to *Geneva*; which city had received the doctrine of *Calvin*, and rejected the government of bishops; with many other refinements. These *English* exiles readily embraced the *Geneva* system; and having added further improvements of their own, upon queen *Mary's* death, returned to *England*; where they preached up their new opinions, inveighing bitterly against *episcopacy*, and all rites and ceremonies, however innocent and ancient in the church: building upon this foundation; to run as far as possible from *popery*, even in the most minute and indifferent circumstances. This faction, under the name of *puritan*, became very turbulent during

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during the whole reign of queen *Elizabeth*, and were always discouraged by that wise queen, as well as by her two successors. However, their numbers, as well as their insolence and perverseness, so far increased, that soon after the death of king *James* the first, many instances of their petulance and scurrility are to be seen in their pamphlets written for some years after (which was a trade they began in the days of queen *Elizabeth*) particularly with great rancour against the bishops, the habits, and the ceremonies: such were those scurrilous libels under the title of *Martin Marprelate*, and several others. And although the earl of *Clarendon* tells us, until the year 1640 (as I remember) the kingdom was in a state of perfect peace and happiness, without the least appearance of thought or design towards making any alterations in religion and government; yet I have found, by often ruminating for old books in *Little-Britain* and *Duck-Lane*, a great number of pamphlets, printed from the year 1630, to 1640, full of as bold and impious railing expressions against the lawful power of the crown, and the order of bishops, as ever were uttered during the rebellion, or the whole subsequent tyranny of that fanatic anarchy. However, I find it manifest, that *puritanism* did not erect itself into a new separate species of religion till some time after the rebellion began. For, in the latter times of king *James* the first, and the former part of his son, there were several *puritan* bishops, and many *puritan* private clergy-

men; while people went, as there inclinations led them, to hear preachers of each party in the parish churches, for the *puritan* clergy had received episcopal orders as well as the rest. But soon after the rebellion broke out, the term *puritan* gradually dropt, and that of *presbyterian* succeeded; which sect was, in two or three years, established in all its forms, by what they called an ordinance of the lords and commons, without consulting the king, who was then at war against his rebels. And from this period the church continued under persecution, until monarchy was restored in the year 1660.

In a year or two after, we began to hear of a new party risen, and growing in the parliament as well as the army, under the name of *independent*: it spread, indeed, somewhat more in the latter; but not equal with the *presbyterians* either in weight or number, until the very time the king was murdered.

When the king, who was then a prisoner in the Isle of *Wight*, had made his last concessions for a peace to the commissioners of the parliament, who attended him there; upon their return to *London*, they reported his majesty's answer in the house. Whereupon a number of moderate members, who, as *Ludlow* says, had secured their own terms with that prince, managed with so much art as to obtain a majority in a thin house for passing a vote, that *the king's concessions were a ground for a future settlement*. But the great officers of the army, joining

ing with the discontented members, came to a resolution of excluding all those, who had consented to that vote; which they executed in a military way. *Ireton* told *Fairfax* the general, a rigid *presbyterian*, of this resolution; who thereupon issued his orders for drawing out the army the next morning, and placing guards in *Westminster-hall*, the *court of requests*, and the *lobby*; who, in obedience to the general in conjunction with those members who had opposed the vote, would let no member enter the house, except those of their own party. Upon which the question, for bringing the king to justice, was, immediately, put and carried, without opposition, that I can find. Then an order was made for his trial; the time and place appointed; the judges named, of whom *Fairfax* himself was one; although, by the advice or threats of his wife, he declined sitting among them. However, by fresh orders under his own hand, which I have seen in print, he appointed guards to attend the judges at the trial, and to keep the city in quiet; as he did likewise to prevent any opposition from the people upon the day of execution.

From what I have already deduced, it appears manifest, that the differences between those two sects, *presbyterian* and *independent*, did not then amount to half so much as what there is between a *whig* and *tory* at present among us. The design of utterly extirpating monarchy and episcopacy was equally the same in both; evidently the consequence of the very same principles, upon which the

presbyterians alone began, continued, and would have ended in the same events; if, towards the conclusion, they had not been bearded by that new party, with whom they could not agree about dividing the spoil. However, they held a good share of civil and military employments during the whole time of the usurpation, and their names, actions, and preferments are frequent in the accounts of those times. For I make no doubt, that all the prudent *presbyterians* complied in proper seasons, falling in with the stream; and thereby got that share in employments, which many of them held to the restoration; and, perhaps, too many of them after. In the same manner we find our wisest *tories* in both kingdoms, upon the change of hands and measures at the queen's death, have endeavoured for several years, by due compliances, to recover the time they had lost by a temporary obstinacy; wherein they have well succeeded, according to their degrees of merit; of whose names I could here make honourable mention, if I did not fear it might offend their modesty. As to what is alledged, that some of the *presbyterians* declared openly against the king's murder; I allow it to be true. But from what motives? No other can possibly be assigned than perfect spite, rage, and envy, to find themselves wormed out of all power by a new infant spawn of *independents* sprung from their own bowels. It is true, the differences in religious tenets between them are very few and trifling; the chief quarrel, as far as I remember, relating to

congre-

congregational and national assemblies. But wherever interest or power think fit to interfere, it little imports what principles the opposite parties think fit to charge upon each other: for we see, at this day, that the *tories* are more hated by the whole set of zealous *whigs*, than the very *papists* themselves; and, in effect, as much unqualified for the smallest office: although both these parties assert themselves to be of the same religion in all its branches of doctrine and discipline; and profess the same loyalty to the same *protestant* king and his heirs.

If the reader would know what became of this *independent* party, upon whom all the mischief is charged by their *presbyterian* brethren, he may please to observe, that, during the whole usurpation, they contended, by degrees, with their parent sect, and, as I have already said, shared in employments; and gradually, after the Restoration, mingled with the mass of *presbyterians*; lying ever since undistinguished in the herd of *dissenters*.

The *presbyterian* merit is of as little weight when they alledge themselves instrumental towards the king's Restoration. The kingdom grew tired with those ridiculous models of government: first, by a house of lords and commons without a king; then without bishops; afterwards by a rump [n] and

[n] This name was given to that part of the house of commons, which remained after the moderate men had been expelled by military force.

lords temporal ; then by a rump alone ; next by a single person for life, in conjunction with a council ; by agitators ; by major-generals ; by a new kind of representatives from the three kingdoms ; by the keepers of the liberties of *England* ; with other schemes that have slipped out of my memory. *Cromwell* was dead ; his son *Richard*, a weak ignorant wretch, who gave up his monarchy much in the same manner with the two usurping kings of *Brentford* [o] ; the people harassed with taxes, and other oppressions. The king's party, then called the *Cavaliers*, began to recover their spirits. The few nobility scattered through the kingdom, who lived in a most retired manner, observing the confusion of things, could no longer endure to be ridden by bakers, cobblers, brewers, and the like, at the head of armies, and plundering every where like *French* dragoons. The *rump* assembly grew despicable to those, who had raised them : the city of *London* exhausted, by almost twenty years contributing to their own ruin, declared against them. The *rump*, after many deaths and resurrections, was, in the most contemptuous manner, kicked out, and burnt in effigy. The excluded members were let in : a free parliament called in as legal a manner as the times would allow ; and the king restored.

The second claim of *presbyterian* merit is founded upon their services against the dangerous designs of

[o] In the *Rehearsal*.

king *James* the second; while that prince was using all his endeavours to introduce *popery*, which he openly professed upon his coming to the crown: to this they add their eminent services at the Revolution under the prince of *Orange*.

Now the *quantum* of *presbyterian* merit, during the four years reign of that weak, bigotted, and ill-advised prince, as well as at the time of the Revolution, will easily be computed by a recourse to a great number of histories, pamphlets, and public papers, printed in those times and some afterwards; besides the verbal testimonies of many persons yet alive, who are old enough to have known and observed the *dissenters* conduct in that critical period.

It is agreed, that, upon king *Charles* the second's death, soon after his successor had publickly owned himself a *Roman catholick*, he began with his first caresses to the church party; from whom, having received very cold discouraging answers, he applied to the *presbyterian* leaders and teachers: being advised, by his priests and *popish* courtiers, that the safest method towards introducing his own religion would be by taking off the *sacramental test*, and giving a full liberty of conscience to all religions (I suppose that professed Christianity). It seems that the *presbyterians*, in the latter years of king *Charles* the second, upon account of certain plots (allowed by bishop *Burnet* to be genuine) had been, for a short time, forbid to hold their conventicles. Whereupon these charitable *Christians*, out of perfect resentment against the church, received the

gracious offers of king *James* with the strongest professions of loyalty, and highest acknowledgments for his favour. I have seen several of their addressees, full of thanks and praises, with bitter insinuations of what they had suffered; putting themselves and the *papists* upon the same foot, as fellow-sufferers for conscience; and with the style of *our brethren the Roman catholicks*. About this time began the project of *closeting* (which hath since been practised many times with more art and success) where the principal gentlemen of the kingdom were privately catechised, by his majesty, to know whether, if a new parliament were called, they would agree to pass an act for repealing the *sacramental test*, and establishing a general liberty of conscience. But he received so little encouragement, that, despairing of success, he had recourse to his dispensing power, which the judges had determined to be part of his prerogative. By colour of this determination he preferred several *presbyterians*, and many *papists*, to civil and military employments. While the king was thus busied, it is well known that monsieur *Fagel*, the *Dutch* envoy in *London*, delivered the opinion of the prince and princess of *Orange* concerning the repeal of the *test*; whereof the king had sent an account to their highnesses, to know how far they approved of it. The substance of their answer, as reported by *Fagel*, was this, *That their highnesses thought very well of a liberty of conscience; but by no means of giving employments to any other persons than those who were of the*
national

national church. This opinion was confirmed by several reasons: I cannot be more particular, not having the paper by me, although it hath been printed in many accounts of those times. And thus much every moderate churchman would, perhaps, submit to: but to trust any part of the civil power in the hands of those whose interest, inclination, conscience, and former practices have been wholly turned to introduce a different system of religion and government, hath very few examples in any christian state; nor any at all in *Holland*, the great patroness of universal toleration.

Upon the first intelligence king *James* received of an intended invasion by the prince of *Orange*, among great numbers of *papists*, to increase his troops, he gave commissions to several *presbyterians*; some of whom had been officers under the *rump*; and particularly he placed one *Richards*, a noted *presbyterian*, at the head of a regiment, who had been governor of *Wexford* in *Cromwell's* time, and is often mentioned by *Ludlow* in his *memoirs*. This regiment was raised in *England* against the prince of *Orange*: the colonel made his son a captain, whom I knew, and who was as zealous a *presbyterian* as his father. However, at the time of the prince's landing, the father, easily foreseeing how things would go, went over, like many others, to the prince, who continued him in his regiment; but, coming over a year or two after to assist in raising the siege of *Derry*, he behaved himself so
like

like either a coward or a traitor, that his regiment was taken from him.

I will now consider the conduct of the church-party during the whole reign of that unfortunate king. They were so unanimous against promising to pass an act for repealing the test, and establishing a general liberty of conscience, that the king durst not trust a parliament; but, encouraged by the professions of loyalty given him by his *presbyterian* friends, went on with his dispensing power.

The church clergy, at that time, are allowed to have written the best collection of tracts against *popery*, that ever appeared in *England*; which are, to this day, in the highest esteem. But, upon the strictest enquiry, I could never hear of above one or two papers published by the *presbyterians* at that time upon the same subject. Seven great prelates (he of *Canterbury* among the rest) were sent to the tower for presenting a petition, wherein they desired to be excused in not obeying an illegal command from the king. The bishop of *London*, Dr. *Compton*, was summoned to answer before the commissioners for ecclesiastical affairs, for not suspending Dr. *Sharp* (afterwards archbishop of *York*) by the king's command. If the *presbyterians* expressed the same zeal upon any occasion, the instances of it are not, as I can find, left upon record, or transmitted by tradition. The proceedings against *Magdalen-college* in *Oxford*, for refusing to comply with the king's mandate for admitting a professed *papist* upon their foundation, are a standing proof
of

of the courage and firmness in religion shewn by that learned society to the ruin of their fortunes. The *presbyterians* know very well, that I could produce many more instances of the same kind. But these are enough in so short a paper as I intend at present.

It is indeed very true, that, after king *William* was settled on the *English* throne, the *presbyterians* began to appear, and offer their credentials, and demand favour: and the new king, having been originally bred a *Calvinist*, was desirous enough to make them easy (if that would do it) by a legal toleration; although, in his heart, he never bore much affection to that sect: nor designed to favour them farther than as it stood with the present scheme of politicks; as I have long since been assured by the greatest men of whig principles at that time in *England*.

It is likewise true, nor will it be denied, that when the king was possessed of the *English* crown, and the remainder of the quarrel was left to be decided in this kingdom; the *presbyterians* wisely chose to join with the *protestant* army, rather than with that of king *James* their old friend, whose affairs were then, in a manner, desperate. They were wise enough to know, that this kingdom, divided against itself, could never prevail against the united power of *England*. They fought *pro aris et focis*; for their estates and religion; which latter will never suffer so much by the church of *England*, - as by that of *Rome*, where they are counted

counted hereticks as well as we: and, consequently, they have no other game to play. But what merit they can build upon having joined with a *protestant* army, under a king they acknowledged, to defend their own liberties and properties against a *papist* enemy under an abdicated king; is, I confess, to me absolutely inconceivable; and, I believe, will equally be so for ever to any reasonable man.

When these sectaries were, several years ago, making the same attempt for abolishing the test, many groundless reports were industriously and seasonably spread of an invasion threatened by the *pretender* on the north of *Ireland*. At which time the *presbyterians*, in their pamphlets, argued in a menacing manner, that, if the *pretender* should invade those parts of the kingdom, where the numbers and estates of the *dissenters* chiefly lay, they would sit still, and *let us fight our own battles*; since they were to reap no advantage, which ever side should be victors. If this were the course they intended to take in such a case, I desire to know how they could contrive safely to stand neuters, otherwise than by a compact with the *pretender* and his army to support their neutrality, and protect them against the forces of the crown? This is a necessary supposition; because they must otherwise have inevitably been a prey to both. However, by this frank declaration they sufficiently shewed their good will, and confirmed the common charge laid at their door; that a *Scottish* or northern *presbyterian* hates

hates our episcopal established church more than *popery* itself. And the reason for this hatred is natural enough; because it is the church alone that stands in the way between them and power; which *popery* doth not.

Upon this occasion I am in some doubt, whether the political spreaders of those chimerical invasions made a judicious choice in fixing the northern parts of *Ireland* for that romantic enterprize. Nor can I well understand the wisdom of the *presbyterians* in countenancing and confirming those reports; because, it seems to cast a most infamous reflexion upon the loyalty and religious principles of their whole body: for, if there had been any truth in the matter, the consequence must have been allowed that the *pretender* counted upon more assistance from his father's friends, the *presbyterians*, by chusing to land in those very parts, where their number, wealth, and power most prevailed, rather than among those of his own religion. And therefore, in charity to this sect, I rather incline to believe, that those reports of an invasion were formed and spread by the race of small politicians, in order to do a seasonable job.

As to *popery* in general, which, for a thousand years past, hath been introducing and multiplying corruptions both in doctrine and discipline; I look upon it to be the most absurd system of Christianity, professed by any nation. But I cannot apprehend this kingdom to be in much danger from it. The estates of *papists* are very few; crumbling into
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small parcels, and daily diminishing; their common people are sunk in poverty, ignorance, and cowardice; and of as little consequence as women and children. Their nobility and gentry are at least one half ruined, banished, or converted: they all soundly feel the smart of what they suffered in the last *Irish* war: some of them are already retired into foreign countries; others, as I am told, intend to follow them; and the rest, I believe, to a man, who still possess any lands, are absolutely determined never to hazard them again for the sake of establishing their superstition. If it hath been thought fit, as some observe, to abate of the law's rigour against *popery* in this kingdom, I am confident it was done for very wise reasons, considering the situation of affairs abroad, at different times, and the interest of the *protestant* religion in general. And as I do not find the least fault in this proceeding; so I do not conceive, why a sunk discarded party, who neither expect nor desire any thing more than a quiet life, should, under the names of *high-flyers*, *jacobites*, and many other vile appellations, be charged so often in print, and at common tables, with endeavouring to introduce *popery* and the *pretender*; while the *papists* abhor them above all other men, on account of the severities against their priests in her late majesty's reign, when the *now disbanded reprobate party* was in power. This I was convinced of some years ago by a long journey into the southern parts; where I had the curiosity to send for many priests of the parishes I
passed

passed through, and, to my great satisfaction, found them every where abounding in professions of loyalty to the late king *George*; for which they gave me the reasons abovementioned; at the same time complaining bitterly of the hardships they suffered under the *QUEEN's last ministry*.

I return from this digression to the modest demands of the *presbyterians* for a repeal of the *sacramental test*, as a reward for their merits at the *Restoration* and the *Revolution*; which merits I have fairly represented, as well as my memory would allow me. If I have committed any mistakes, they must be of little moment. The facts and principal circumstances are what I have obtained and digested from reading the histories of those times written by each party; and many thousands have done the same as well as I, who, I am sure, have, in their minds, drawn the same conclusions.

This is the faction, and these the men, who are now resuming their applications, and giving in their bills of merit to both kingdoms upon two points, which of all others they have the least pretensions to offer. I have collected the facts with all possible impartiality from the current histories of those times; and have shewn, although very briefly, the gradual proceedings of those sectaries, under the denominations of *puritans*, *presbyterians*, and *independents*, for about the space of an hundred and eighty years, from the beginning of queen *Elizabeth* to this present time. But, notwithstanding all that can be said, these very schismatics
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(for such they are in temporals as well as spirituals) are now again expecting, soliciting, and demanding (not without insinuated threats, according to their custom) that the parliament should fix them upon an equal foot with their church established. I would fain know to what branch of the legislature they can have the forehead to apply. Not to my lords the bishops; who must have often read how the predecessors of this very faction, acting upon the same principles, drove the whole bench out of the house; who were then, and hitherto continue, one of the three estates: not to the temporal peers, the second of the three estates, who must have heard, that, immediately after those rebellious fanaticks had murdered their king, they voted a house of lords to be useless and dangerous, and would let them sit no longer, otherwise than when elected as commoners: not to the house of commons; who must have heard, that, in those fanatic times, the *presbyterian* and *independent* commanders in the army, by military power, expelled all the moderate men out of the house, and left a *rump* to govern the nation: lastly, not to the crown; which those very *saints* destined to rule the earth trampled under their feet, and then, in cold blood, murdered the blessed wearer.

But the session now approaching, and a clan of dissenting teachers being come up to town from their northern head quarters, accompanied by many of their elders and agents, and supported, by a general contribution, to solicit their establishment
with

with a capacity of holding all military, as well as civil, employments, I think it high time that this paper should see the light. However, I cannot conclude without freely confessing, that if the *presbyterians* should obtain their ends, I could not be sorry to find them mistaken in the point, which they have most at heart by the repeal of the *test*; I mean the benefit of 'employments. For after all, what assurance can a *Scottish* northern dissenter, born on *Irish* ground, have, that he shall be treated with as much favour as a *TRUE SCOT* born beyond the *Tweed*?

I am ready enough to believe, that all I have said will avail but little. I have the common excuse of other men, when I think myself bound, by all religious and civil ties, to discharge my conscience, and to warn my countrymen upon this important occasion. It is true, the advocates for this scheme promise a new world after this blessed work shall be completed; that all animosity and faction must immediately drop; that the only distinction in this kingdom will then be of *papist* and *protestant*: for as to *whig* and *tory*, *high-church* and *low-church*, *jacobite* and *Hanoverian*, *court* and *country party*, *English* and *Irish* interests, *dissenters* and *conformists*, *new light* and *old light*, *anabaptist* and *independent*, *quaker* and *muggletonian*; they will all meet and jumble together into a perfect harmony at the sessions and assizes, on the bench, and in the revenues; and upon the whole, in all civil and military trusts, not excepting the great councils of

the nation. For it is wisely argued thus: that a kingdom being no more than a larger knot of friends met together, it is against the rules of good manners to shut any person out of the company, except the *papists*, who profess themselves of another club.

I am at a loss to know, what arts the *presbyterian* sect intends to use in convincing the world of their loyalty to kingly government, which (long before the prevalence, or even the birth of their *independent* rivals) as soon as the king's forces were overcome, declared their principles to be against monarchy, as well as episcopacy and the house of lords, even until the king was restored: at which event, although they were forced to submit to the present power, yet I have not heard, that they did ever, to this day, renounce any one principle, by which their predecessors then acted; yet this they have been challenged to do, or at least to shew that others have done it for them, by a certain [p] doctor, who, as I am told, hath much employed his pen in the like disputes. I own, they will be ready enough to insinuate themselves into any government: but, if they mean to be honest and upright, they will and must endeavour by all means, which they shall think lawful, to introduce and establish their own scheme of religion, as nearest approaching to the word of God, by casting out all superstitious ceremonies, ecclesiastical titles, habits,

[p] The late Dr. TISDEL, who died *June 1731*.

distinction

distinctions, and superiorities, as rags of *popery*, in order to a *thorough reformation*; and as in charity bound to promote the salvation of their countrymen, wishing with *St. Paul*, that the whole kingdom were as they are. But what assurance will they please to give, that, when their sect shall become the national established worship, they will treat Us *DISSENTERS* as we have treated them? Was this their course of proceeding during the dominion of the *saints*? Were not all the remainders of the episcopal church in those days; especially the clergy, under a persecution for above a dozen years equal to that of the primitive Christians under the heathen emperors? That this proceeding was suitable to their principles, is known enough; for many of their preachers then writ books expressly against allowing any liberty of conscience in a religion different from their own; producing many arguments to prove that opinion, and among the rest one frequently insisted on; that allowing such a liberty would be to *establish iniquity by a law* [q]. Many of these writings are yet to be seen; and, I hear, have been quoted by the doctor abovementioned.

As to the great objection of prostituting that holy institution, the blessed sacrament, by way of a test before admittance into any employment; I ask, whether they would not be content to receive it *after their own manner* for the office of a judge, for

[q] See many hundred quotations to prove this, in the treatise called, *Scotch Presbyterian Eloquence*.

that of a commissioner in the revenue, for a regiment of horse, or to be a lord justice. I believe they would scruple it as little, as a long grace before and after dinner, which they can say without *bending a knee*; for, as I have been told, their manner of taking bread and wine, in their conventicles, is performed with little more solemnity than at their common meals. And therefore, since they look upon our practice, in receiving the elements, to be idolatrous, they neither can nor ought, in conscience, to allow us that liberty, otherwise than by connivance, and a bare toleration, like what is permitted to the *papists*. *But lest we should offend them*, I am ready to change this test for another; although I am afraid, that sanctified reason is, by no means, the point where the difficulty pinches, and is only offered by pretended churchmen; as if they could be content with our believing, that the impiety and profanation of making the sacrament a test were the only objection, I therefore propose, that before the present law be repealed, another may be enacted; that no man shall receive any employment before he swears himself to be a true member of the church of *Ireland*, in doctrine and discipline, &c. and that he will never frequent or communicate with any other form of worship. It shall likewise be further enacted, that whoever offends, &c. shall be fined five hundred pounds, imprisoned for a year and a day, and rendered incapable of all public trust for ever. Otherwise I do insist, that those pious, in-

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dulgent, external professors of our national religion shall either give up that fallacious hypocritical reason for taking off the test, or freely confess, that they desire to have a gate wide open for every sect without any test at all, except that of swearing loyalty to the king: which, however, considering their principles with regard to monarchy yet unre-nounced, might, if they would please to look deep enough into their own hearts, prove a more bitter test, than any other that the law hath yet invented.

For from the first time that these sectaries appeared in the world, it hath been always found, by their whole proceedings, that they professed an utter hatred to kingly government. I can recollect, at present, three civil establishments, where *Calvinists* and some other reformers, who rejected *episcopacy*, possess the supreme power; and these are all republicks; I mean, *Holland*, *Geneva*, and the reformed *Swiss* cantons. I do not say this in diminution or disgrace to commonwealths; wherein I confess I have much altered many opinions under which I was educated, having been led, by some observation, long experience, and a thorough detestation for the corruptions of mankind: inso-much, that I am now justly liable to the censure of *Hobbes*, who complains, that the youth of *England* imbibe ill opinions from reading the histories of ancient *Greece* and *Rome*, those renowned scenes of liberty and every virtue.

But as to monarchs, who must be supposed well to study and understand their own interest; they will best consider, whether those people, who in all their actions, preachings, and writings, have openly declared themselves against regal power, are to be safely placed in an equal degree of favour and trust, with those who have been always found the true and only friends to the *English* establishment. From which consideration I could have added one more article to my new test, if I had thought it worth my time.

I have been assured, by some persons who were present, that several of these dissenting teachers, upon the first arrival hither to solicit the repeal of the test, were pleased to express their gratitude by publicly drinking the healths of certain eminent patrons, whom they pretend to have found among us. If this be true, and that the test must be delivered up by the very *superiors appointed to defend it*; the affair is already, in effect, at an end. What *secret* reasons those patrons may have given for such a return of brotherly love, I shall not enquire: *For, O my soul, come not thou in their secret; unto their assembly, mine honour, be not thou united. For in their anger they slew a man, and in their self-will they digged down a wall. Cursed be their anger, for it was fierce; and their wrath, for it was cruel. I will divide them in Jacob, and scatter them in Israel.*

THE
ADVANTAGES

proposed by

Repealing the *Sacramental Test*.

IMPARTIALLY CONSIDERED.

Written in the Year 1732.

WHOEVER writes impartially upon this subject, must do it not only as a mere secular man; but as one who is altogether indifferent to any particular system of christianity. And, I think, in whatever country that religion predominates, there is one certain form of worship and ceremony, which is looked upon as the established; and consequently, only the priests of that particular form are maintained at the public charge; and all civil employments bestowed among those, who comply (at least outwardly) with the same establishment.

This method is strictly observed, even by our neighbours the *Dutch*, who are confessed to allow the fullest liberty of conscience of any christian state; and yet are never known to admit any persons into

civil offices, who do not conform to the legal worship. As to their military men, they are, indeed, not so scrupulous; being, by the nature of their government, under a necessity of hiring foreign troops, of whatever religious denomination, upon every great emergency, and maintaining no small number in time of peace.

This caution therefore of making one established faith, seems to be universal, and founded upon the strongest reasons; the mistaken or affected zeal of obstinacy and enthusiasm having produced such a number of horrible destructive events throughout all *Christendom*. For whoever begins to think the national worship is wrong in any important article of practice or belief, will, if he be serious, naturally have a zeal to make as many proselytes as he can; and a nation may possibly have an hundred different sects with their leaders; every one of which hath an equal right to plead, that they must *obey God rather than man*; must *cry aloud and spare not*; must *lift up their voice like a trumpet*.

This was the very case of *England* during the fanatic times. And against all this there seems to be no defence, but that of supporting one established form of doctrine and discipline; leaving the rest to a bare liberty of conscience, but without any maintenance or encouragement from the publick.

Wherever this national religion grows so corrupt, or is thought to do so by a very great majority of landed people joined to the governing party, whether

ther prince or senate, or both, it ought to be changed; provided the work might be done without blood or confusion. Yet, whenever such a change shall be made, some other establishment must succeed, although for the worse; allowing all deviations, that would break the union, to be only tolerated. In this sense, those who affirm that every law, which is contrary to the law of God, is void in itself, seem to be mistaken: for many laws in *popish* kingdoms and states, many more among the *Turks*, and, perhaps, not a few in other countries, are directly against the divine laws; and yet, God knows, are very far from being void in the executive part.

Thus for instance, if the three estates of parliament in *England* (whereof the lords spiritual, who represent the *church*, are one) should agree and obtain the royal assent to abolish episcopacy, together with the liturgy, and the whole frame of the *English* church, as *burthenfome, dangerous and contrary to holy scripture*, and that *presbytery, anabaptism, quakerism, independency, muggletonianism, brownism, familism*, or any other subdivided sect among us, should be established in its place: without question all peaceable subjects ought passively to submit; and the predominant sect must become the religion established; the publick maintaining no other teachers, nor admitting any persons of a different religious profession into civil offices, at least if their intention be to preserve the nation in peace.

Supposing then, that the present system of religion were abolished; and *presbytery*, which I find
stands

stands the fairest, with its synods and classes, and all its forms and ceremonies essential or circumstantial, were erected into the national worship: their teachers, and no others, could have any legal claim to be supported at the public charge, whether by stipends or tithes; and only the rest of the same faith to be capable of civil employments.

If there be any true reasoning in what I have laid down, it should seem, that the project now in agitation for repealing the *test act*, and yet leaving the name of an establishment to the present national church, is altogether inconsistent; and may admit of consequences, which those, who are the most indifferent to any religion at all, are possibly not aware of.

I presume, whenever the *test* shall be repealed, which obliges all men, who enter into office under the crown, to receive the sacrament according to the rites of the church of *Ireland*; the way to employments will immediately be left open to all *dissenters* (except *papists*) whose consciences can suffer them to take the common oaths in such cases prescribed; after which, they are qualified to fill any lay station in this kingdom, from that of chief governor to an excise-man.

Thus, of the three judges on each bench, the first may be a *presbyterian*, the second a *free-will baptist*, and the third a *churchman*, the lord chancellor may be an *independent*: the revenues may be managed by seven commissioners of as many different sects; and the like of all other employments: not to mention the strong probability, that the lawfulness

ness of taking oaths may be *revealed* to the quakers, who then will stand upon as good a foot for preferment, as any other loyal subjects. It is obvious to imagine, under such a motly administration of affairs, what a clashing there will be of interest and inclinations; what pullings and hawlings backwards and forwards; what a zeal and bias, in each religionist, to advance his own tribe, and depress the others. For, I suppose, nothing will be readier granted, than that how indifferent most men are in faith and morals, yet, whether out of artifice, natural complexion, or love of contradiction, none are more obstinate in maintaining their own opinions, and worrying all who differ from them, than those who publickly shew the least sense either of religion or common honesty.

As to the latter, bishop *Burnet* tells us, that the *presbyterians*, in the fanatic times, professed themselves to be above morality; which, as we find in some of their writings, was numbered among the *beggarly elements*: and accordingly, at this day, no scruples of conscience, with regard to conformity, are, in any trade or calling, inconsistent with the greatest fraud, oppression, perjury, or any other vice.

This brings to my memory a passage in *Montaigne*, of a common prostitute, who, in the storming of a town, when a soldier came up to her chamber and offered violence to her chastity, rather chose to venture her neck by leaping out of the window than suffer a rape; yet still continued her trade of lewdness, while she had any customers left.

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I confess, that, in my private judgment, an unlimited permission of all sects whatsoever (except *papists*) to enjoy employments would be less pernicious to the publick, than a fair struggle between two contenders; because in the former case, such a jumble of principles might possibly have the effect of contrary poisons mingled together; which a strong constitution might, perhaps, be able for some time to survive.

But however I shall take the other and more probable supposition, that this battle for employments is to be fought only between the *presbyterians*, and those of the church yet established. I shall not enter into the merits of either side by examining, which of the two is the better spiritual oeconomy, or which is most suited to our civil constitution; but the question turns upon this point: When the *presbyterians* shall have got their share of employments (which must be one full half, or else they cannot look upon themselves as fairly dealt with) I ask, whether they ought not, by their own principles, and by the strictest rules of conscience, to use the utmost of their skill, power, and influence, in order to reduce the whole kingdom to an uniformity in religion, both as to doctrine and discipline most agreeable to the word of God. Wherein, if they can succeed without blood (as under the present disposition of things it is very possible they may) it is to be hoped they will at last be satisfied: only I would warn them of a few difficulties. The first is of compromising among them-

themselves that important controversy about the *old light* and the *new*; which otherwise may, after this establishment, split them as wide as *papist* and *protestant*, *whig* and *tory*, or *churchman* and *dissenter*; and, consequently, the work will be to begin again: for, in religious quarrels, it is of little moment, how few or small the differences are: especially, when the dispute is only about power. Thus the zealous *presbyterians* of the *north* are more alienated from the established clergy, than from the *Romish* priests; taxing the former with idolatrous worship, as disguised *papists*, *ceremony-mongers*, and many other terms of art; and this for a very powerful reason; because the clergy stand in their way, which the *papist* priests do not. Thus I am assured, that the quarrel between *old* and *new light-men* is managed with more rage and rancour, than any other dispute of the highest importance; and this, because it serves to lessen or increase their several congregations, from whom they receive their contributions.

Another difficulty, which may embarrass the *presbyterians* after their establishment, will be, how to adjust their claim of the *kirk's* independency on the civil power, with the constitution of this monarchy; a point so delicate, that it hath often filled the heads of great patriots with dangerous notions of the church-clergy without the least ground of suspicion.

As to the *presbyterians* allowing liberty of conscience to those of episcopal principles, when their own *kirk* shall be predominant; their writings are so universally agreed in the negative, as well as their

practice

practice during *Oliver's* reign, that, I believe, no reasonable churchman (who must then be a *dissenter*) will expect it.

I shall here take notice, that, in the division of of employments among the *presbyterians*, after this approaching repeal of the *test-act*, supposing them, in proper time, to have an equal share, the odds will be three or four to one on their side in any farther scheme they may have towards making their religion national. For, I reckon all those gentlemen sent over from *England*, whatever religion they profess or have been educated in, to be of that party: since it is no mark of prudence for any person to oppose the current of a nation, where they are, in some sort, only sojourners; unless they *have it in direction*.

If there be any maxim in politics not to be controuled, it must be the following: That those, whose private interest is united with the interest of their country, supposing them to be of equal understanding with the rest of their neighbours, will heartily wish, that the nation should thrive. Out of these are indubitably excepted all persons, who are sent, from another kingdom, to be employed in places of profit or power; because they cannot possibly bear affection to the place where they sojourn, even for life; their sole business being to advance themselves by following the advice of their *principals*. I except likewise those persons, who are taken into offices, although natives of the land; because they are greater gainers while they keep their offices, than they could possibly be by mending the miserable condition of their country.

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I except, *thirdly*, all hoppers, who, by balancing accounts with themselves, turn the scale on the same side; because the strong expectation of a good certain salary will outweigh the loss by bad rents received out of lands in money-less times.

If my lords the bishops, who I hear are now employed in a scheme for regulating the conduct and maintenance of the inferior clergy, shall, in their wisdom and piety, and love of the church, consent to this repeal of the *test*, I have not the least doubt, that the whole reverend body will cheerfully submit to their spiritual fathers; of whose paternal tenderness for their welfare they have already found so many *amazing* instances.

I am not therefore under the least concern about the clergy on this account. They will (*for some time*) be no great sufferers by this repeal; because I cannot recollect, among all our sects, any one, that giveth latitude enough to take the oaths required at an institution to a church-living; and until that bar shall be removed, the present episcopal clergy are safe for two years. Although it may be thought somewhat unequal, that, in the *northern* parts, where there may be three *dissenters* to one *churchman*, the whole revenue shall be engrossed by him who hath so small a part of the cure.

It is true indeed, that this disadvantage, which the *dissenters* at present lie under, of a disability to receive church-preferments, will be easily remedied by the repeal of the *test*. For the *dissenting* teachers are under no incapacity of accepting civil and military

litary employments; wherein they agree perfectly with the *popish* clergy; among whom great cardinals and prelates have been commanders of armies, chief ministers, knights of many orders, ambassadors, secretaries of state, and in most high offices under the crown; although they assert the *indelible character*, which no sectaries among us did ever assume. But that many, both *presbyterians* and *independents*, commanders, as well as private soldiers, were professed preachers in the time of their dominion, is allowed by all. *Cromwell* himself was a preacher; and hath left us one of his sermons in print, exactly in the same style and manner with those of our modern *presbyterian* teachers: so was colonel *Howard*, Sir *George Downing*, and several others, whose names are on record. I can therefore see no reason, why a painful *presbyterian* teacher, as soon as the *test* shall be repealed, may not be privileged to hold, along with the spiritual office and stipend, a commission in the army, or the civil list in *commendam*: for, as I take it, the church of *England* is the only body of *Christians*, which, in effect, disqualifies those, who are employed to preach its doctrine, from sharing in the civil power, farther than as senators: yet this was a privilege begun in times of *popery*, many hundred years before the *reformation*, and woven with the very institution of our limited monarchy.

There is, indeed, another method, whereby the stipends of dissenting teachers may be raised, and the farmer much relieved; if it should be thought proper

proper to reward a people so deserving, and so loyal by their principles. Every bishop, upon the vacancy of a church-living, can sequester the profits for the use of the next incumbent. Upon a lapse of half a year, the donation falls to the archbishop, and after full year to the crown, during pleasure. Therefore it would be no hardship for any clergyman *alive*, if (in those parts of *Ireland*, where the number of sectaries much exceeds that of the conformists) the profits, when sequestered, might be applied to the support of the dissenting teacher, who hath so many souls to take care of: whereby the poor tenants would be much relieved in those hard times, and in a better condition to pay their rents.

But there is another difficulty in this matter, against which a remedy doth not so readily occur. For supposing a *test-act* repealed, and the dissenters, in consequence, fully qualified for all secular employments; the question may still be put, whether those of *Ireland* will be often the persons on whom they shall be bestowed; because it is imagined, there may be [*r*] another *seminary* in view, *more numerous* and *more needy*, as well as *more meriting*, and more easily contented with such low offices; which some nearer neighbours hardly think it worth stirring from their chimney sides to obtain. And I am told, it is the common practice of those who are skilled in the management of bees, that when

(*r*) *Scotland.*

they see a foreign swarm at some distance, approaching with an intention to plunder their hives, these artifts have a trick to divert them into some neighbouring apiary, there to make what havock they please. This I should not have hinted, if I had not known it already to have gotten ground in many fufpecting heads; for it is the peculiar talent of this nation to fee dangers afar off: to all which I can only fay, that our native *presbyterians* muft, by pains and induftry, raife fuch a fund of *merit*, as will answer to a birth fix degrees more to the *north*. If they cannot arrive at this perfection, as feveral of the eftablifhed church have compaffed by indefatigable pains, I do not well fee, how their affairs will much mend by repealing the *teft*: for to be qualified by law to accept an employment, and yet to be difqualified in fact, as it will much increafe the mortification, fo it will withdraw the pity of many among their well-wifhers, and utterly deprive them of that *merit* they have fo long made, of being a loyal *true proteftant* people, perfecuted only for religion.

If this happen to be their cafe, they muft wait maturity of time; until they can, by prudent, gentle fteps, make their faith become the religion eftablifhed in the nation; after which, I do not in the leaft doubt, that they will take the moft effectual methods to fecure their power againft thofe, who muft then be *difsenters* in their turn; whereof, if we may form a future opinion from prefent times, and the difpofitions of *difsenters*, who love to make

a *thorough reformation*, the number and qualities will be very inconsiderable.

Thus I have, with the utmost sincerity, after long thinking, given my judgment upon this arduous affair; but with the utmost deference and submission to publick wisdom and power.

Q U E R I E S.

Relating to the

S A C R A M E N T A L T E S T.

Written in the Year 1732.

QUERY, **W**HETHER hatred and violence between parties in a state be not more inflamed by different views of interest, than by the greater or lesser differences between them either in religion or government?

Whether it be any part of the question at this time, which of the two religions is worse, *popery* or *fanaticism*; or not rather, which of the two (having both the same good will) is in the hopefullest condition to ruin the church?

Whether the sectaries, whenever they come to prevail, will not ruin the church as infallibly and effectually as the *papists*?

Whether the prevailing sectaries could allow liberty of conscience to *dissenters* without belying all their former practice, and almost all their former writings?

Whether many hundred thousand *Scotch* presbyterians are not full as virulent against the episcopal church, as they are against the *papists*; or as they would have us think the *papists* are against them?

Whether the *Dutch*, who are most distinguished for allowing liberty of conscience, do admit any persons who profess a different scheme of worship from their own, into civil employments, although they *may* be forced, by the nature of their government, to receive mercenary troops of all religions?

Whether the *dissenters* ever pretended, until of late years, to desire more than a bare toleration?

Whether, if it be true, what a sorry pamphleteer asserts, who lately writ for repealing the *test*, that the *dissenters*, in this kingdom, are equally numerous with the churchmen, it would not be a necessary point of prudence, by all proper and lawful means, to prevent their further increase?

The great argument given by those, whom they call *low* churchmen, to justify the large tolerations allowed to *dissenters*, hath been; that, by such indulgencies, the rancour of sectaries would gradually wear off, many of them would come over to us, and their parties, in a little time, crumble to nothing.

Query, Whether, if what the above pamphleteer asserts, that the sectaries are equal in numbers with conformists, be true, it doth not clearly follow, that those repeated tolerations have operated directly contrary to what those *low* church politicians pretended to foresee and expect?

Whether any clergyman, however dignified or distinguished, if he think his own profession most agreeable to holy scripture and the primitive church, can really wish in his heart, that all sectaries should be upon an equal foot with the churchmen in the point of civil power and employments ?

Whether episcopacy, which is held by the church to be a divine and apostolical institution, be not a fundamental point of religion, particularly in that essential one of conferring holy orders ?

Whether, by necessary consequences, the several expedients among the sectaries to constitute their teachers are not absolutely null and void ?

Whether the sectaries will ever agree to accept ordination only from bishops ?

Whether the bishops and clergy will be content to give up episcopacy, as a point indifferent, without which the church can well subsist ?

Whether that great tenderness towards sectaries, which now so much prevails, be chiefly owing to the fears of *popery*, or to that spirit of atheism, deism, scepticism, and universal immorality, which all good men so much lament ?

Granting *popery* to have any more errors in religion than any one branch of the sectaries, let us examine the actions of both, as they have each effected the peace of these kingdoms, with allowance for the short time, which the sectaries had to act in, who are in a manner *but of yesterday*. The *papists*, in the time of king *James* the second, used all endeavours to establish their superstition, wherein they
failed

failed by the united power of *English* church-protestants with the prince of *Orange's* assistance. But it cannot be asserted, that these bigotted *papists* had the least design to oppose or murder their king, much less to abolish kingly government; nor was it their interest or inclination to attempt either.

On the other side, the *puritans*, who had, almost from the beginning of queen *Elizabeth's* reign, been a perpetual thorn in the church's side, joining with the *Scotch* enthusiasts in the time of king *Charles* the first, were the principal cause of the *Irish rebellion* and *massacre*, by distressing that prince, and making it impossible for him to send over timely succours. And after that pious prince had satisfied his parliament in every single point to be complained of, the same sectaries, by poisoning the minds and affections of the people with the most false and wicked representations of their king, were able, in the compass of a few years, to embroil the three nations in a bloody rebellion at the expence of many thousand lives; to turn the kingly power into anarchy; to murder their prince in the face of the world, and (in their own style) to destroy the church *root and branch*.

The account therefore stands thus. The *papists* aimed at one pernicious act, which was to destroy the *protestant* religion; wherein, by God's mercy, and the assistance of our glorious king *William*, they absolutely failed. The sectaries attempted the three most infernal actions, that could possibly enter into the hearts of men forsaken by God; which

were the murder of a most pious king, the destruction of the monarchy, and the extirpation of the church; and succeeded in them all.

Upon which I put the following queries: Whether any of those sectaries have ever yet, in a solemn publick manner, renounced any one of those principles, upon which their predecessors then acted?

Whether, considering the cruel persecutions of the episcopal church during the course of that horrid rebellion, and the consequences of it until the happy *restoration*, it is not manifest, that the persecuting spirit lies so equally divided between the *papists* and the sectaries, that a feather would turn the balance on either side?

And therefore, lastly, Whether any person of common understanding, who professeth himself a member of the church established, although, perhaps, with little inward regard to any religion (which is too often the case) if he loves the peace and welfare of his country, can, after cool thinking, rejoice to see a power placed again in the hands of so restless, so ambitious, and so merciless a faction, to act over all the same parts a second time?

Whether the candor of that expression, so frequent of late in sermons and pamphlets, of the *strength and number of the papists in Ireland*, can be justified? For as to their number, however great, it is always magnified in proportion to the zeal or politicks of the speaker and writer; but it is a gross imposition,

imposition, upon common reason, to terrify us with their strength. For *popery*, under the circumstances it lies in this kingdom, although it be offensive and inconvenient enough from the consequences it hath to encrease the rapine, sloth, and ignorance, as well as poverty of the natives, is not properly dangerous in that sense, as some would have us take it; because it is universally hated by every part of a different religious profession. It is the contempt of the wise; the best topick for clamours of designing men; but the real terror only of fools. The landed *papist* interest, in *England*, far exceeds that among us even in proportion to the wealth and extent of each kingdom. The little that remains here is daily dropping into *protestant* hands by purchase or descent; and that affected complaint of counterfeit converts will fall, with the cause of it, in half a generation, unless it be raised or kept alive as a continual fund of merit and eloquence. The *papists* are wholly disarmed; they have neither courage, leaders, money, nor inclinations to rebel; they want every advantage, which they formerly possessed, to follow that trade; and wherein even with those advantages they always miscarried: they appear very easy and satisfied under that connivance, which they enjoyed during the whole last reign; nor ever scrupled to reproach another party, under which they pretend to have suffered so much severity.

Upon these considerations, I must confess to have suspended much of my pity towards the great dreadsers of *popery*; many of whom appear to be hale, strong, active,

active, young men ; who, as I am told, eat, drink, and sleep heartily ; and are very chearful (as they have exceeding good reason) upon all other subjects. However, I cannot too much commend the generous concern, which our neighbours, and others who come from the same neighbourhood, are so kind to express for us upon this account ; although the former be farther removed from the danger of *popery* by twenty leagues of salt-water ; but this, I fear, is a digression.

When an artificial report was raised here, many years ago, of an intended invasion by the *pretender* which blew over, after it had done its office) the *dissenters* argued, in their talk and in their pamphlets, after this manner, applying themselves to those of the church : Gentlemen, if the *pretender* had landed, as the law now stands, we durst not assist you ; and therefore, unless you take off the *test*, whenever you shall happen to be invaded in earnest, if we are desired to take up arms in your defence, our answer shall be : Pray, gentlemen, fight your own battles : we will not do your drudgery. This way of reasoning I have heard from several of their chiefs and abettors in an hundred conversations ; and have read it in twenty pamphlets : and I am confident it will be offered again, if the project should fail to take off the *test*.

Upon which piece of oratory and reasoning, I form the following query. Whether, in case of an invasion from the *pretender* (which is not quite so probable as from the *grand signior*), the *dissenters* can,
with

with prudence and safety, offer the same plea; except they shall have made a previous stipulation with the invaders? And whether the full freedom of their religion and trade, their lives, properties, wives, and children, are not, and have not always been reckoned, sufficient motives for repelling invasions; especially in our sectaries, who call themselves the *truest protestants*, by virtue of their pretended or real fierceness against *popery*.

Whether omitting or neglecting to celebrate the day of the martyrdom of the blessed king *Charles* the first, enjoined by act of parliament, can be justly reckoned a particular and distinguishing mark of good affection to the present government?

Whether in those churches, where the said day is observed, it will fully answer the intent of the said act, if the preacher shall commend, excuse, palliate, or extenuate the murder of that royal martyr; and place the guilt of that horrid rebellion, with all its consequences, the following usurpations, the entire destruction of the church, the cruel and continual persecutions of those who could be discovered to profess its doctrines, with the ensuing *babel* of fanaticism, to the account of that blessed king, who, by granting the petition of right, and passing every bill that could be asked for the security of the subject, had, by the confession of those wicked men before the war began, left them nothing more to demand?

Whether such a preacher as I have named (whereof there have been more than *one*, not many years past,

even in the presence of viceroys) who takes that course as a means for promotion, may not be thought to step a little out of the common road, in a monarchy where the descendents of that most blessed martyr have reigned to this day?

I ground the reason of making these queries on the title of the act; to which I refer the reader.

R E A-

R E A S O N S

Humbly offered to the

PARLIAMENT OF IRELAND

For REPEALING the

SACRAMENTAL TEST, IN FAVOUR OF THE CATHOLICKS.

Written in the Year 1732 [s].

IT is well known, that the first conquerors of this kingdom were *English catholicks*, subjects to *English catholick* kings, from whom, by their valour and success, they obtained large portions of land, given them as a reward for their many victories over the *Irish*: to which merit our *brethren*, the dissenters of any denomination whatsoever, have not the least pretensions.

It is confessed, that the posterity of those first victorious *catholicks* were often forced to rise in their own defence against new colonies from *England*, who treated them, like mere native *Irish*, with innumerable oppressions, depriving them of their

[s] The author having before examined the presbyterians plea of merit, with respect to their own principles and practices, has, in this tract, put them in the balance against papists.

lands,

lands, and driving them, by force of arms, into the most desperate parts of the kingdom; till in the next generation the children of these tyrants were used in the same manner by new *English* adventurers, which practice continued for many centuries. But it is agreed on all hands, that no insurrections were ever made, except after great oppressions by fresh invaders. Whereas all the rebellions of *puritans*, *presbyterians*, *independents*, and other sectaries, constantly began before any provocations were given, except that they were not suffered to change the government in church and state, and seize both into their own hands; which, however, at last they did, with the murder of their king, and of many thousands of his best subjects.

The *catholicks* were always defenders of monarchy, as constituted in these kingdoms; whereas our *brethren*, the *dissenters*, were always republicans both in principle and practice.

It is well known, that all the *catholicks* of these kingdoms, both priests and laity, are true *whigs*, in the best and most proper sense of the word; bearing as well in their hearts, as in their outward profession, an entire loyalty to the royal house of *Hanover*, in the person and posterity of *George* the second, against the *pretender* and all his *adherents*. To which they think themselves bound in gratitude, as well as conscience, by the lenity wherewith they have been treated since the death of queen *Anne*, so different from what they suffered in the four last years of that princess, during the
admini-

administration of that *wicked* minister the earl of Oxford.

The *catholicks* of this kingdom humbly hope, that they have at least as fair a title as any of their *brother* dissenters to the appellation of *protestants*. They have always *protested* against the selling, de-throning, or murdering their kings; against the usurpations and avarice of the *court* of Rome; against *deism*, *atheism*, *socinianism*, *quakerism*, *muggletoniasm*, *fanaticism*, *brownism*, as well as against all *Jews*, *Turks*, *infidels*, and *hereticks*. Whereas the title of *protestants* assumed by the whole herd of dissenters (except ourselves) dependeth entirely upon the *protesting* against *archbishops*, *bishops*, *deans*, and *chapters*, with their *revenues*; and the whole *hierarchy*; which are the very expressions used in the *solemn league and covenant* [1], where the word *popery* is only mentioned *ad invidiam*; because the *catholicks* agree with the episcopal church in those fundamentals.

Although the *catholicks* cannot deny, that, in the great rebellion against king *Charles* the first, more soldiers of their religion were in the parliament army, than in his majesty's troops; and that many jesuits and friers went about, in the disguise of *presbyterian* and *independent* ministers, to preach up

[1] A solemn league and covenant entered into between the *Scots* and *English* fanatics, in the rebellion against king *Charles* the first, 1643, by which they solemnly engaged, among other things, "To endeavour the extirpation of prelacy, that is, church government by archbishops, bishops, deans, archdeacons, and all other episcopal officers, depending on that hierarchy."

rebellion,

rebellion, as the best historians of those times inform us; yet the bulk of *catholicks*, in both kingdoms, preserved their loyalty entire.

The *catholicks* have some reason to think it a little hard, when their enemies will not please to distinguish between the rebellious riot committed by that brutal ruffian Sir *Phelim O Neal*, with his tumultuous crew of rabble, and the forces raised afterwards by the *catholick* lords and gentlemen of the *English* pale in defence of the king, after the *English* rebellion began. It is well known, that his majesty's affairs were in great distraction some time before by an invasion of the *covenanting*, *Scottish*, *kirk rebels*, and by the base terms the king was forced to accept, that they might be kept in quiet at a juncture when he was every hour threatened at home by that fanatic party, which soon after set all in a flame. And, if the *catholick* army in *Ireland* fought for their king against the forces sent over by the parliament then in actual rebellion against him, what person of loyal principles can be so partial to deny, that they did their duty by joining him with the marquis of *Ormond* and other commanders, who bore their commissions from the king? For which great numbers of them lost their lives, and forfeited their estates; a great part of the latter being now possessed, by many descendants from those very men, who had drawn their swords in the service of that rebellious parliament which cut off his head and destroyed monarchy. And what is more amazing, although the same persons,

persons, when the *Irish* were entirely subdued, continued in power under the *rump*, were chief confidents and faithful subjects to *Cromwell*, yet, being wise enough to foresee a *restoration*, they seized the forts and castles here out of the hands of their *old brethren in rebellion*, for the service of the king; just saving the tide, and putting in a stock of merit sufficient not only to preserve the land which the *catholicks* lost by their loyalty, but likewise to preserve their civil and military employments, or be higher advanced.

Those insurrections wherewith the *catholicks* are charged, from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the great *English* rebellion, were occasioned by many oppressions they lay under. They had no intention to introduce a *new* religion, but to enjoy the liberty of preserving the *old*; the very same which their ancestors professed from the time that *Christianity* was first introduced into this island, which was by *catholicks*; but whether mingled with corruptions, as some pretend, doth not belong to the question. They had no design to change the government; they never attempted to fight against, to imprison, to betray, to sell, to bring to a trial, or to murder their king. The schismatics acted by a spirit directly contrary; they united in a *solemn league and covenant* to alter the whole system of spiritual government established in all christian nations, and of apostolic institution; concluding the tragedy with the murder of the king in cold blood, and upon mature deliberation;

at the same time changing the monarchy into a commonwealth.

The *catholicks* of *Ireland*, in the great rebellion, lost their estates for fighting in defence of their king. The schismaticks, who cut off the father's head, forced the son to fly for his life, and overturned the whole ancient frame of government, religious and civil: obtained grants of those very estates, which the *catholicks* lost in defence of the ancient constitution, many of which estates are, at this day, possessed by the posterity of those schismaticks: and thus they gained by their *rebellion*, what the *catholicks* lost by their *loyalty*.

We allow the *catholicks* to be *brethren* of the dissenters; some people indeed (which we cannot allow) would have *them* to be our children, because *we* both dissent from the church established, and both agree in abolishing this persecuting sacramental test, by which *negative discouragement* we are both rendered incapable of civil and military employments. However, we cannot but wonder at the bold familiarity of these schismaticks in calling the members of the national church their *brethren* and *fellow protestants*. It is true, that all these sects (except the *catholicks*) are *brethren* to each other in faction, ignorance, iniquity, perverseness, pride, and (if we except the *quakers*) in rebellion. But, how the churchmen can be styled their *fellow protestants*, we cannot comprehend: because, when the whole *babel* of sectaries joined against the church, the king, and the nobility, for

twenty

twenty years, in a MATCH AT FOOT BALL, where the proverb expressly tells us, that *all are FELLOWS*; while the three kingdoms were tossed to and fro, the churches and cities and royal palaces shattered to pieces by their *balls*, their *buffets*, and their *kicks*; the victors would allow no more FELLOWS AT FOOT BALL; but murdered, sequestered, plundered, deprived, banished to the plantations, or enslaved, all their opposers who had *lost the game*.

It is said the world is governed by *opinion*; and politicians assure us, that all power is founded thereupon. Wherefore, as all human creatures are fond to distraction of their own opinions, and so much the more, as those opinions are absurd, ridiculous, or of little moment; it must follow, that they are equally fond of power. But no opinions are maintained with so much obstinacy as those in religion, especially by such zealots, who never bore the least regard to religion, conscience, honour, justice, truth, mercy, or common morality farther than in outward appearance, under the mask of hypocrisy to promote their diabolical designs. And therefore bishop *Burnet*, one of their oracles, tells us honestly, that the *saints* of those fanatic times pronounced themselves above morality; which they reckoned among *beggarly elements*; but the meaning of these two last words thus applied, we confess to be above our understanding.

Among those kingdoms and states which first embraced the Reformation, *England* appears to

have received it in the most regular way ; where it was introduced in a peaceable manner, by the supreme power of a king [u] and the three estates in parliament ; to which, as the highest legislative authority, all subjects are bound passively to submit, Neither was there much blood shed on so great a change of religion. But a considerable number of lords, and other persons of quality through the kingdom, still continued in their old faith, and were, notwithstanding their difference in religion, employed in offices civil as well as military, more or less in every reign, until the test act in the time of king *Charles* the second. However, from the time of the Reformation, the number of *catholicks* gradually and considerably lessened. So that, in the reign of king *Charles* the first, *England* became, in a great degree, a protestant kingdom, without taking the sectaries into the number ; the legality whereof, with respect to human laws, the *catholicks* never disputed ; but the *puritans*, and other schismatics, without the least pretence to any such authority, by an open rebellion destroyed that legal Reformation, as we observed before, murdered their king, and changed the monarchy into a republick. It is therefore not to be wondered at, if the *catholicks*, in such a *babel* of religions, chose to adhere to their own faith lest them by their ancestors, rather than seek for a better

[u] *Henry VIII.*

among

among a rabble of hypocritical, rebellious, deluding knaves, or deluded enthusiasts.

We repeat once more, that if a national religion be changed by the supreme legislative power, we cannot dispute the human legality of such a change. But we humbly conceive, that if any considerable party of men, which differs from an establishment, either old or new, can deserve liberty of conscience, it ought to consist of those, who, for want of conviction, or of right understanding the merits of each cause, conceive themselves bound in conscience to adhere to the religion of their ancestors; because they are of all others least likely to be authors of innovations either in church or state.

On the other side; if the reformation of religion be founded upon rebellion against the king, without whose consent, by the nature of our constitution, no law can pass; if this reformation be introduced by only one of the three estates, I mean the commons, and not by one half even of those commons, and this by the assistance of a rebellious army; again, if this Reformation were carried on by the exclusion of nobles both lay and spiritual (who constitute the other part of the three estates), by the murder of their king, and by abolishing the whole system of government; the *catholicks* cannot see why the successors of those schismatics, who are universally accused by all parties, except themselves, and a few infamous abettors, for still retaining the same principles in religion and govern-

ment, under which their predecessors acted ; should pretend to a better share of civil or military trust, profit and power, than the *catholicks*, who, during all that period of twenty years, were continually persecuted with the utmost severity, merely on account of their loyalty and constant adherence to kingly power.

We now come to those arguments for repealing the sacramental test, which equally affect the *catholicks*, and their brethren the dissenters.

First, we agree with our fellow-dissenters, that [x] *persecution, merely for conscience sake, is against the genius of the gospel.* And so likewise is any law for depriving men of their natural and civil rights, which they claim as men. We are also ready enough to allow, that *the smallest negative discouragements, for uniformity's sake, are so many persecutions.* Because, it cannot be denied, that the scratch of a pin is, in some degree, a real wound, as much as a stab through the heart. In like manner, an incapacity by law for any man to be made a judge, a colonel, or justice of the peace, *merely on a point of conscience, is a negative discouragement,* and, consequently, a real persecution : for in this case, the author of the pamphlet, quoted in the margin [y], puts a very pertinent and powerful question : *If God be the sole Lord of the conscience,*

[x] *Vid.* Reasons for the repeal of the sacramental test.

[y] *Vid.* Reasons for the repeal of the sacramental test.

why should the rights of conscience be subject to human jurisdiction? Now, to apply this to the catholicks; the belief of transubstantiation is a matter purely of religion and conscience, which doth not affect the political interest of society, as such: therefore why should the rights of conscience, whereof God is the sole Lord, be subject to human jurisdiction? And why should God be deprived of this right over a catholick's conscience, any more than over that of any other dissenter?

And whereas another author, among our brethren the dissenters, hath very justly complained, that, by this persecuting test act, great numbers of *true protestants* have been forced to leave the kingdom, and fly to the plantations, rather than stay here *branded* with an incapacity for civil and military employments; we do affirm, that the *catholicks* can bring many more instances of the same kind; some thousands of their religion having been forced, by the sacramental test, to retire into other countries, rather than live here under the incapacity of wearing swords, sitting in parliament, and getting that share of power and profit which belong to them as *fellow Christians*, whereof they are deprived *merely upon account of conscience, which would not allow them to take the sacrament after the manner prescribed in the liturgy.* Hence it clearly follows, in the words of the same [z] author, *That if we*

[z] See Reasons against the test.

catholicks are incapable of employments, we are punished for our dissent, that is, for our conscience, which wholly turns upon political considerations.

The *catholicks* are willing to acknowledge the king's supremacy, whenever their brethren, the dissenters, shall please to shew them an example.

Further, the *catholicks*, whenever their religion shall come to be the national established faith, are willing to undergo the same *test* offered by the author already quoted. His words are these: *To end this debate, by putting it upon a foot, which, I hope, will appear, to every impartial person, a fair and equitable one: we catholicks propose, with submission to the proper judges, that effectual security be taken against persecution, by obliging all, who are admitted into places of power and trust, whatever their religious profession be, in the most solemn manner, to disclaim persecuting principles.* It is hoped the publick will take notice of these words; *Whatever their religious profession be*; which plainly include the *catholicks*; and for which we return thanks to *our dissenting brethren.*

And whereas it is objected by those of the established church, that, if the schismatics and fanatics were once put into a capacity of possessing civil and military employments, they would never be at ease, till they had raised their own way of worship into the national religion through all his majesty's dominions, equal with the *true orthodox Scottish kirk*; which, when they had once brought
to

to pass, they would no more allow liberty of conscience to episcopal dissenters, than they did in the time of the great *English* rebellion, and in the succeeding fanatic anarchy, till the king was restored. There is another very learned schismatical [a] pamphleteer, who, in answer to a malignant libel called, *The presbyterian plea of merit*, &c. clearly wipes off this aspersions, by assuring all episcopal protestants of the present church, upon his own word, and to his own knowledge, that our brethren, the dissenters, will never offer at such an attempt. In like manner the *catholicks*, when legally required, will openly declare, *upon their words and honours*, that, as soon as their *negative discouragements* and their *persecution* shall be removed by repealing the sacramental test, they will leave it entirely to the merits of the cause, whether the kingdom shall think fit to make their faith the established religion or not.

And again, whereas our *presbyterian* brethren, in many of their pamphlets, take much offence, that the great rebellion in *England*, the murder of the king, with the entire change of religion and government, are perpetually objected against them both in and out of season, by our common enemy the present conformists; we do declare, in the defence of our said brethren, that the reproach aforesaid is *an old worn-out thread-bare cant*, which they always

[a] Vindication of the protestant dissenters.

disdained to answer: and I very well remember, that having once told a certain conformist, how much I wondered to hear him and his tribe dwelling perpetually on so beaten a subject; he was pleased to divert the discourse with a foolish story, which I cannot forbear telling to his disgrace. He said, there was a clergyman in *Yorkshire*, who, for fifteen years together, preached every *Sunday* against drunkenness: whereat the parishioners being much offended, complained to the archbishop; who having sent for the clergyman, and severely reprimanded him, the minister had no better an answer, than by confessing the fact; adding, that all the parish were drunkards; that he desired to reclaim them from one vice, before he would begin upon another; and since they still continued to be as great drunkards as before, he resolved to go on, except his grace would please to forbid him.

We are very sensible how heavy an accusation lieth upon the *catholicks* of *Ireland*; that some years before king *Charles* the second was restored, when theirs and the king's forces were entirely reduced, and the kingdom declared, by the *rump*, to be settled; after all his majesty's generals were forced to fly to *France*, or other countries, the heads of the said *catholicks*, who remained here in an enslaved condition, joined to send an invitation to the duke of *Lorrain*; engaging, upon his appearing here with his forces, to deliver up the whole island to his power, and declare him their sovereign; which,
after

after the Restoration, was proved against them by dean *Boyle*, since primate, who produced the very original instrument at the board. The *catholicks* freely acknowledge the fact to be true; and, at the same time, appeal to all the world, whether a wiser, a better, a more honourable, or a more justifiable project could have been thought of. They were then reduced to slavery and beggary by the *English* rebels, many thousands of them murdered, the rest deprived of their estates, and driven to live on a small pittance in the wilds of *Connaught*; at a time when either the *rump*, or *Cromwell*, absolutely governed the three kingdoms. And the question will turn upon this, whether the *catholicks*, deprived of all their possessions, governed with a rod of iron, and in utter despair of ever seeing the monarchy restored, for the preservation of which they had suffered so much, were to be blamed for calling in a foreign prince of their own religion, who had a considerable army to support them, rather than submit to so infamous an usurper as *Cromwell*, or such a bloody and ignominious conventicle as the *rump*. And I have often heard not only our friends the dissenters, but even our common enemy the conformists, who are conversant in the history of those times, freely confess, that, considering the miserable situation the *Irish* were then in, they could not have thought of a braver or more virtuous attempt; by which they might have been instruments of restoring the lawful monarch,

at

at least to the recovery of *England* and *Scotland* from those betrayers and sellers, and murderers of his royal father.

To conclude; whereas the last quoted author complains very heavily and frequently of a *BRAND* that lies upon them, it is a great mistake: for the first original *BRAND* hath been long taken off; only we confess the scar will probably remain, and be visible for ever to those, who know the principles by which they acted, and until those principles shall be openly renounced; else it must continue to all generations, like the mark set upon *Cain*, which, some authors say, descended to all his posterity; or like the *Roman* nose and *Austrian* lip; or like the long bag of flesh hanging down from the gills of the people in *Piedmont*. But, as for any *brands* fixed on schismatics for several years past, they have been all made with *cold iron*; like thieves who, by the *BENEFIT OF THE CLERGY*, are condemned to be only burned in the hand; but escape the pain and the mark by being in *fee* with the *JAYLOR*. Which advantage the schismatical teachers will never want, who, as we are assured, and of which there is a *very fresh instance*, have the souls and bodies, and purses of their people a hundred times more at their mercy, than the *catholick* priests could ever pretend to.

Therefore, upon the whole, the *catholicks* do humbly petition (*without the least insinuation of threatening*) that, upon this *favourable juncture*,
their

their incapacity for civil and military employments may be wholly taken off, for the very same reasons (besides others more cogent) that are now offered by their brethren the *dissenters*.

And your petitioners, as in duty bound, shall ever pray, &c.

Dublin,

Nov. 1733.

In this controversy the author was again victorious, for the *test* was not repealed.

S O M E
R E A S O N S

A G A I N S T

The BILL for settling the Tithe of *Hemp*,
Flax, &c. by a *Modus* [b].

THE clergy did little expect to have any cause of complaint against the present house of commons; who, in the last session, were pleased to throw out a bill [c] sent them from the lords, which that reverend body apprehended would be very injurious to them, if it passed into a law: and who, in the present session, defeated the arts and endeavours of *schismatics* to repeal the *sacramental test*.

For although it hath been allowed on all hands, that the former of those bills might, by its necessary consequences, be very displeasing to the lay gentlemen of the kingdom, for many reasons purely secular; and that this last attempt for repealing

[b] Many eminent clergymen, who opposed this scheme, applied to Dr. *Swift* to write against it, which he readily consented to upon their giving him some hints, and, two days after, the following reasons were presented to several members of parliament, which had so good an effect, that the bill was dropped.

[c] For the bishops to divide livings.

the *test* did much more affect, at present, the temporal interest, than the spiritual; yet the whole body of the lower clergy have, upon both those occasions, expressed equal gratitude to that honourable house for their justice and steadiness, as if the clergy alone were to receive the benefit.

It must needs be therefore a great addition to the clergy's grief, that such an assembly, as the present house of commons, should now, with an expedition more than usual, agree to a bill for encouraging the linen manufacture with a clause, whereby the church is to lose two parts in three of the legal tithe in flax and hemp.

Some reasons why the clergy think such a law will be a great hardship upon them are, I conceive, those that follow. I shall venture to enumerate them with all deference due to that honourable assembly.

First, the clergy suppose that they have not, by any fault or demerit, incurred the displeasure of the nation's representatives: neither can the declared loyalty of the present sett, from the highest prelate to the lowest vicar, be in the least disputed: because there are hardly ten clergymen through the whole kingdom, for more than nineteen years past, who have not been either preferred entirely upon account of their declared affection to the *Hanover* line, or higher promoted as the due reward of the same merit.

There is not a landlord, in the whole kingdom, residing some part of the year at his country seat,
 who

who is not, in his own conscience, fully convinced, that the tithes of his minister have gradually sunk, for some years past, one third, or at least one fourth of their former value, exclusive of all non-solvencies.

The payment of tithes, in this kingdom, is subject to so many frauds, brangles, and other difficulties, not only from *papists* and *dissenters*, but even from those who profess themselves *protestants*; that, by the expence, the trouble, and vexation of collecting, or bargaining for them, they are, of all other rents, the most precarious, uncertain, and ill paid.

The landlords, in most parishes, expect, as a compliment, that they shall pay little more than half the value of the tithes for the lands they hold in their own hands; which often consist of large domains: and it is the minister's interest to make them easy upon that article, when he considers what influence those gentlemen have upon their tenants.

The clergy cannot but think it extremely severe, that, in a bill for encouraging the linen manufacture, they alone must be the sufferers, who can least afford it. If, as I am told, there be a tax of three thousand pounds a year paid by the publick, for a farther encouragement to the said manufacture, are not the clergy equal sharers in the charge with the rest of their fellow-subjects? What satisfactory reason can be therefore given, why they alone should bear the whole additional weight, un-

less

less it will be alledged that their property is not upon an equal foot with the properties of other men. They acquire their own small pittance by at least as honest means as their neighbours, the landlords, possess their estates; and have been always supposed, except in rebellious or fanatical times, to have as good a title: for no families now in being can shew a more ancient. Indeed, if it be true, that some persons (I hope they were not many) were seen to laugh when the rights of the clergy were mentioned; in this case an opinion may possibly be soon advanced, that they have no rights at all. And this is likely enough to gain ground, in proportion as the contempt of all religion shall increase, which is already in a very forward way.

It is said, there will be also added, in this bill, a clause for diminishing the tithe of hops, in order to cultivate that useful plant among us: and here likewise the load is to lie entirely on the shoulders of the clergy, while the landlords reap all the benefit. It will not be easy to foresee where such proceedings are like to stop: or whether, by the same authority, in civil times, a parliament may not as justly challenge the same power in reducing all things titheable, not below the tenth part of the product (which is, and ever will be, the clergy's equitable right), but from a tenth part to a sixtieth or eightieth, and from thence to nothing.

I have heard it granted, by skilful persons, that the practice of taxing the clergy, by parliament,

without their own consent, is a new thing, not much above the date of seventy years: before which period, in times of peace, they always taxed themselves. But things are extremely altered at present: it is not now sufficient to tax them in common with their fellow-subjects, without imposing an additional tax upon them, from which, or from any thing equivalent, all their fellow subjects are exempt; and this in a country professing *Christianity*.

The greatest part of the clergy, throughout this kingdom, have been stripped of their glebes by the confusion of times, by violence, fraud, oppression, and other unlawful means; all which glebes are now in the hands of the laity. So that they now are generally forced to lie at the mercy of landlords, for a small piece of ground in their parishes, at a most exorbitant rent, and usually for a short term of years, whereon to build a house, and enable them to reside. Yet, in spite of these disadvantages, I am a witness, that they are generally more constant residents, than their brethren in *England*; where the meanest vicar hath a convenient dwelling, with a barn, a garden, and a field or two for his cattle; besides, the certainty of his little income from honest farmers, able and willing not only to pay him his dues, but likewise to make him presents, according to their ability, for his better support. In all which circumstances the clergy of *Ireland* meet with a treatment directly contrary.

It is hoped the honourable house will consider, that it is impossible for the most ill-minded, avaricious, or cunning clergyman to do the least injustice to the meanest cottager in his parish in any bargain for tithes, or other ecclesiastical dues. He can, at the utmost, only demand to have his tithe fairly laid out; and does not once, in a hundred times, obtain his demand. But every tenant, from the poorest cottager to the most substantial farmer, can, and generally doth, impose upon the minister, by fraud, by theft, by lyes, by perjuries, by insolence, and sometimes by force; notwithstanding the utmost vigilance and skill of himself and his proctor. Insomuch, that it is allowed, that the clergy in general receive little more than one half of their legal dues; not including the charges they are at in collecting or bargaining for them.

The land rents of *Ireland* are computed to about two millions, whereof one tenth amounts to two hundred thousand pounds. The beneficed clergymen, excluding those of this city, are not reckoned to be above five hundred; by which computation, they should each of them possess two hundred pounds a year, if those tithes were equally divided, although, in well-cultivated corn countries, it ought to be more; whereas they hardly receive on^o half of that sum, with great defalcations, and in very bad payments. There are, indeed, a few glebes in the north pretty considerable; but, if these and all the rest were in like manner equally divided, they would not add five pounds a year to

every clergyman. Therefore, whether the condition of the clergy in general among us be justly liable to envy, or able to bear a heavy burthen, which neither the nobility, nor gentry, nor tradesmen, nor farmers, will touch with one of their fingers; this, I say, is submitted to the honourable house.

One terrible circumstance in this bill is, that of turning the tithe of *flax* and *hemp* into what the lawyers call a *modus*, or a certain sum in lieu of a tenth part of the product. And by this practice of claiming a *modus* in many parishes by ancient custom, the clergy, in both kingdoms, have been almost incredible sufferers. Thus, in the present case, the tithe of a tolerable acre of *flax*, which, by a medium, is worth twelve shillings, is, by the present bill, reduced to four shillings. Neither is this the worst part in a *modus*; every determinate sum must, in process of time, sink from a fourth to a four and twentieth part, or a great deal lower, by that necessary fall attending the value of money, which is now at least nine tenths lower all over *Europe*, than it was four hundred years ago, by a gradual decline; and even a third part at least, within our own memories, in purchasing almost every thing required for the necessities or conveniences of life; as any gentleman can attest, who hath kept house for twenty years past. And this will equally affect poor countries, as well as rich. For, although I look upon it as an impossibility that this kingdom should ever thrive under its pre-

sent disadvantages, which, without a miracle, must still increase; yet, when the whole cash of the nation shall sink to fifty thousand pounds, we must, in all our traffick abroad, either of import or export, go by the general rate, at which money is valued in those countries that enjoy the common privileges of human kind. For this reason no corporation (if the clergy may presume to call themselves one) should, by any means, grant away their properties in perpetuity upon any consideration whatsoever; which is a rock that many corporations have split upon to their great impoverishing, and sometimes to their utter undoing; because they are supposed to subsist for ever, and because no determination of money is of any certain perpetual intrinsic value. This is known enough in *England*, where estates, let for ever, some hundred years ago, by several ancient noble families, do not, at this present, pay their posterity a twentieth part of what they are now worth at an easy rent.

A tax affecting one part of a nation, which already bears its full share in all parliamentary impositions, cannot possibly be just, except it be inflicted as a punishment upon that body of men, which is taxed, for some great demerit or danger to the publick apprehended from those upon whom it is laid. Thus the *papists* and *nonjurors* have been doubly taxed for refusing to give proper securities to the government; which cannot be objected against the clergy. And therefore, if this bill should pass, I think it ought to be with a preface,

shewing wherein they have offended, and for what disaffection or other crime they are punished.

If an additional excise upon ale, or a duty upon flesh and bread, were to be enacted, neither the victualler, butcher, nor baker would bear any more of the charge than for what themselves consumed, but it would be an equal general tax through the whole kingdom: whereas, by this bill, the clergy alone are avowedly condemned to be deprived of their ancient, inherent, undisputed rights, in order to encourage a manufacture, by which all the rest of the kingdom are supposed to be gainers.

This bill is directly against *magna charta*, whereof the first clause is for confirming the inviolable rights of holy church; as well as contrary to the oath taken, by all our kings, at their coronation, where they swear to defend and protect the church in all rights.

A tax laid upon employments is a very different thing. The possessors of civil and military employments are no corporation; neither are they any part of our constitution; their salaries, pay, and perquisites, are all changeable at the pleasure of the prince who bestows them, although the army be paid from funds raised and appropriated by the legislature. But the clergy, as they have little reason to expect, so they desire, no more than their ancient legal dues: only indeed with the removal of many grievous impediments in the collection of them; which, it is to be feared, they must wait for until more favourable times. It is well known that
they

they have already, of their own accord, shewn great indulgence to their people upon this very article of *flax*, seldom taking above a fourth part of their tithe for small parcels, and oftentimes nothing at all for new beginners; waiting, with patience, until the farmers were able, and until greater quantities of land were employed in that part of husbandry; never suspecting that their good intentions should be perverted in so singular a manner to their detriment by that very assembly, which, during the time that convocations (which are an original part of our constitution, ever since *Christianity* became national among us) are thought fit to be suspended, God knows for what reason, or from what provocations; I say, from that very assembly, who, during the intervals of convocations, should rather be supposed to be guardians of the rights and properties of the clergy, than to make the least attempt upon either.

I have not heard, upon enquiry, that any of those gentlemen, who, among us without doors, are called the court-party, discover the least zeal in this affair. If they had thoughts to interpose, it might be conceived they would shew their displeasure against this bill, which must very much lessen the value of the king's patronage upon promotion to vacant sees, in the disposal of deanries, and other considerable preferments in the church, which are in the donation of the crown; whereby the vice-roys will have fewer good preferments to bestow on their dependents, as well as upon the kindred

of members, who may have a sufficient stock of that sort of merit, whatever it may be, which may, in future times, most prevail.

The *dissenters*, by not succeeding in their endeavours to procure a repeal of the *test*, have lost nothing, but continue in a full enjoyment to their toleration; while the clergy, without giving the least offence, are, by this bill, deprived of a considerable branch of their ancient legal rights, whereby the schismatical party will have the pleasure of gratifying their revenge—*hoc Graii voluere*.

The farmer will find no relief by this *modus*, because, when his present lease shall expire, his landlord will, infallibly, raise the rent in an equal proportion upon every part of land where flax is sown, and have so much a better security for payment at the expence of the clergy.

If we judge by things past, it little avails that this bill is to be limited to a certain time of ten, twenty, or thirty years. For no landlord will ever consent that a law shall expire, by which he finds himself a gainer; and of this there are many examples, as well in *England* as in this kingdom.

The great end of this bill is, by proper encouragement, to extend the linen manufacture into those countries where it hath hitherto been little cultivated: but this encouragement of *lessening the tithe of flax and hemp* is one of such a kind as, it is to be feared, will have a directly contrary effect. Because, if I am rightly informed, no sett of men hath, for their number and fortunes, been more industrious

industrious and successful than the clergy, in introducing that manufacture into places which were unacquainted with it, by persuading their people to sow *flax* and *hemp*, by procuring seed for them, and by having them instructed in the management thereof; and this they did not without reasonable hopes of increasing the value of their parishes after some time, as well as of promoting the benefit of the publick. But if this *modus* should take place, the clergy will be so far from gaining, that they will become losers by their extraordinary care, by having their best arable lands turned to *flax* and *hemp*, which are reckoned great impoverishers of land: they cannot therefore be blamed, if they should shew as much zeal to prevent its being introduced or improved in their parishes, as they hitherto have shewed in the introducing and improving of it. This, I am told, some of them have already declared, at least so far as to resolve not to give themselves any more trouble than other men about promoting a manufacture, by the success of which they only of all men are to be sufferers. Perhaps, the giving even a further encouragement than the law doth, as it now stands, to a sett of men who might, on many accounts, be so useful to this purpose, would be no bad method of having the great end of the bill more effectually answered; but this is what they are far from desiring; all they petition for is no more than to continue on the same footing with the rest of their fellow-subjects.

If

If this *modus* of paying by the acre be to pass into a law, it were to be wished, that the same law would not only appoint one or more sworn surveyors, in each parish, to measure the lands, on which *flax* and *hemp* are sown, but also settle the price of surveying, and determine whether the incumbent or farmer is to pay for each annual survey. Without something of this kind, there must constantly be disputes between them, and the neighbouring justices of peace must be teized as often as those disputes happen.

I had written thus far, when a paper was sent to me, with several reasons against the bill, some whereof, although they have been already touched, are put in a better light, and the rest did not occur to me. I shall deliver them in the author's own words.

I. That tithes are the patrimony of the church : and, if not of divine original, yet at least of great antiquity.

II. That all purchases and leases of titheable lands, for many centuries past, have been made and taken, subject to the demand of tithes, and those lands sold and taken just so much the cheaper on that account.

III. That if any lands are exempted from tithes, or the legal demands of such tithes lessened by act of parliament, so much value is taken from the proprietor of the tithes, and vested in the proprietor of the lands, or his head tenants.

IV. That

IV. That no innocent, unoffending person can be so deprived of his property, without the greatest violation of common justice.

V. That to do this, upon a prospect of encouraging the linen or any other manufacture, is acting upon a very mistaken and unjust supposition; inasmuch as the price of the lands, so occupied, will be no way lessened to the farmer by such a law.

VI. That the clergy are content chearfully to bear (as they now do) any burthen, in common with their fellow-subjects, either for the support of his majesty's government, or the encouragement of the trade of the nation; but think it very hard, that they should be singled out to pay heavier taxes than others, at a time, when, by the decrease of the value of their parishes, they are less able to bear them.

VII. That the legislature hath hitherto distinguished the clergy by exemptions, and not by additional loads, and the present clergy of the kingdom hope they have not deserved worse of the legislature than their predecessors.

VIII. That, by the original constitution of these kingdoms, the clergy had the sole right of taxing themselves, and were in possession of that right as low as the Restoration; and, if that right be now devolved upon the commons, by the cession of the clergy, the commons can be considered, in this case, in no other light than as the guardians of the clergy.

IX. That

IX. That, besides those tithes always in the possession of the clergy, there are some portions of tithes lately come into their possession by purchase; that, if this clause should take place, they would not be allowed the benefit of these purchases, upon an equal foot of advantage with the rest of their fellow-subjects. And that some tithes, in the hands of impropriators, are under settlements and mortgages.

X. That the gentlemen of this house should consider, that loading the clergy, is loading their own younger brothers and children, with this additional grievance, that it is taking from the younger and poorer to give to the elder and richer; and,

Lastly, That, if it were, at any time, just and proper to do this, it would however be too severe to do it now, when all the tithes of the kingdom are known, for some years past, to have sunk above one third part in their value.

Any income, in the hands of the clergy, is at least as useful to the publick, as the same income in the hands of the laity.

It were more reasonable to grant the clergy, in three parts of the nation, an additional support, than to diminish their present subsistence.

Great employments are, and will be, in the hands of *Englishmen*; nothing left for the younger sons of *Irishmen* but vicarages, tide-waiters places, &c. therefore no reason to make them worse.

The *modus*, upon the *flax* in *England*, affects only lands reclaimed since the year 1690, and is

at

at the rate of five shillings the *English* acre, which is equivalent to eight shillings and eight pence *Irish*, and that to be paid before the farmer remove it from the field. *Flax* is a manufacture of little consequence in *England*, but is the staple in *Ireland*; and if it increases (as it probably will) must, in many places, jostle out corn, because it is more gainful.

The clergy of the established church have no interest, like those of the church of *Rome*, distinct from the true interest of their country, and therefore ought to suffer under no distinct impositions or taxes of any kind.

The bill, for settling the *modus* of *England*, was brought in, the first year of the reign of king *George I.* when the clergy lay, very unjustly, under the imputation of some disaffection; and encouraged the bringing in of some fens in *Lincolnshire*, which were not to be continued under *flax*; but it left all lands, where *flax* had been sown before that time, under the same condition of tithing, in which they were before the passing of that bill: whereas this bill takes away what the clergy are actually possessed of.

That the woollen manufacture is the staple of *England*, as the linen is that of *Ireland*, yet no attempt was ever made in *England* to reduce the tithe of wool for the encouragement of that manufacture. This manufacture hath already been remarkably favoured by the clergy, who have hitherto been generally content with less than half, some
with

with six pence a garden, and some have taken nothing.


Employments, they say, have been taxed; the reasons for which taxation will not hold with regard to property, at least till employments become inheritances. The commons always have had so tender a regard to property, that they would never suffer any law to pass, whereby any particular persons might be aggrieved without their own consent.


N. B. *Some alterations have been made in the bill about the modus, since the above paper was written; but they are of little moment.*

END OF VOL. IX.









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